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On the eve of World War II, Maya Angelou – then a teenager – moved from the small town 
of Stamps, Arkansas, to Oakland, California, before settling in San Francisco. In her autobiography, 
I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings, Angelou recounts the shock of moving out West as a young African 
American adult and navigating a bustling city that was so different from the town in the South in 
which she had grown up. In San Francisco, Angelou grew to love the fog and the Bay, but she also 
struggled to find her place as a Black teenager in the predominantly white city.1 Her experience of 
culture shock included witnessing the Western Addition neighborhood, which was the pre-war hub 
of San Francisco’s Japanese American community, undergo “a visible revolution” following the 
attack on Pearl Harbor.2 Within months of the attack, the federal government organized the mass 
relocation and incarceration of Japanese Americans living on the West Coast. “As the Japanese 
disappeared,” Angelou explained, “Negroes entered with their loud jukeboxes.”3 Houses and 
apartments emptied of their Japanese American occupants became home to the many Blacks who 
migrated to the West Coast to work in the wartime defense industries. The great misfortune of 
Japanese Americans was a boon to the African American newcomers who, excluded from 
predominantly white areas, were desperate for accommodations amidst the West Coast’s wartime 
housing shortage. The local economy registered the population shift: Yakamoto Sea Food Market 
became Sammy’s Shoe Shine Parlor and Smoke Shop, Yashigira’s Hardware became La Salon de 
Beauté, and Nippon Drugs became a Black-owned jazz club called Bop City.4 A similar pattern 
occurred in Los Angeles. Pilgrim House, a social services organization that served a predominantly 
                                               
1 Maya Angelou, I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings, Reissue (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 180. 
2 Ibid., 177. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. and Gary Kamiya, “Western Addition: A Basic History,” FoundSF, 
http://www.foundsf.org/index.php?title=Western_Addition:_A_Basic_History. [Excerpted from Gary Kamiya, “The 
Haunted House,” in Cool Gray City of Love: 49 Views of San Francisco (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 294–311.]  
2 
African American community, replaced the Japanese Union Church, and the district of Little Tokyo 
was renamed Bronzeville. “Where the odors of tempura, raw fish and cha had dominated,” Angelou 
recalled, “the aroma of chitlings, greens and ham hocks now prevailed.”5 
A little-known story, the evolution of these neighborhoods in San Francisco and Los 
Angeles reflects the monumental impact World War II had on domestic race relations in the United 
States, as well as people’s experiences of race in the country. The war reconfigured the position of 
Japanese Americans and African Americans in U.S. society and in relation to one another. As U.S. 
historian Matthew M. Briones argues, “While Blacks and Japanese had interacted before this time, 
they had never previously been forced – in such large numbers and with such regularity – to share 
urban spaces so intimately, compete for similar jobs so intensely, or agitate for civil rights with such 
collective might.”6 The transformation of Little Tokyo into Bronzeville is just one example of how, 
in the context of war, the federal, state, and local governments approached non-white citizens and 
how these citizens responded to their new relation to the state.  
World War II altered dominant ideas of race and citizenship in manners that had significant 
ramifications for conceptions of Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ national belonging. As 
with any war, the circumstances of the war led to the state redrawing boundaries of what it meant to 
be an American citizen and who qualified for recognition as such. As legal scholar and historian 
Barbara Young Welke theorizes, throughout U.S. history, citizenship and national belonging – 
distinguished by the legal components of citizenship as well as the cultural aspects of national 
belonging – have “[depended] on there being others who do not belong.”7 These “borders of 
                                               
5 Angelou, I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings, 178. I originally read this quote in Kamiya, “Western Addition.”  
6 Matthew M. Briones, Jim and Jap Crow: A Cultural History of 1940s Interracial America (Princeton University Press, 
2012), 152-153. 
7 Barbara Young Welke, Law and the Borders of Belonging in the Long Nineteenth Century United States (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1. 
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belonging” have shaped the contours of individual and group identity and their relationships to 
power in the United States since its inception. During World War II, Katherine Archibald, a U.C. 
Berkeley graduate student, tracked this dynamic by conducting a survey of the Moore Dry Dock 
Company’s shipyard in Oakland. Based on her research, she concluded that the war “reëmphasized 
America’s disunities, … [which] became a subject of increasing concern; for war, of course, demands 
subordination of lesser disputes to the service of the common battle. In the frantic search for a unity 
of thought and action America discovered the depth of its social canyons.”8  
Even as the United States joined forces with other nations to fight fascism abroad, its 
citizens grappled with issues of racism and disunity within its borders. The Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor in December 1941 fueled intense anti-Japanese sentiment nationwide. Shortly thereafter, 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s signing of Executive Order 9066 codified as national policy the 
classification of Japanese Americans as “enemy aliens,” which paved the way for their expulsion 
from the West Coast and subsequent mass incarceration. Simultaneously, the increased labor 
demands of the wartime economy spurred a massive internal migration of African Americans, who 
left their communities in the South and struck out for the West Coast in search of employment. Up 
to that point, the Black population of the western United States had been relatively low. The influx 
of African Americans elicited fierce resistance from white residents and authorities, who considered 
them a contagion and destabilizing influence on the status quo. These significant wartime relocations 
threatened the prevailing social order, which was rooted in and perpetuated white Americans’ 
economic and political supremacy. The federal government, in collaboration with many actors and 
institutions, orchestrated these wartime relocations but also worked to minimize and control their 
potential to disrupt the existing power structures. 
                                               
8 Katherine Archibald, Wartime Shipyard: A Study in Social Disunity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), 9. 
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 In their theory of racial formation, sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant 
foreground the centrality of the state as an agent that creates and enforces the meanings ascribed to 
racial categories in society. Omi and Winant describe the state as a sprawling network that functions 
somewhat like a rhizome.9 Rather than a singular, unified entity, the state is a set of “institutions, the 
policies they carry out, the conditions and rules which support and justify them, and social relations in 
which they are embedded.”10 Because the state functions without one central node of control, 
“various state institutions do not serve one coordinated racial objective; they may work at cross-
purposes.”11 Although the state is in reality an incredibly decentered and nebulous system, it is often 
consolidated in people’s conceptualizations as one coherent entity, because the disparate 
components that comprise the state are united by a common goal of working together to uphold 
and enact the nation’s normative values. As it appears in this study, “the state” should be 
understood as shorthand for an immense web of institutions, individuals, policies, and organizations 
spread across the nation. In the United States, the state upholds policies and structures institutions 
to privilege whiteness. 
This conception of the state and its functions is particularly useful for making sense of 
domestic race relations during World War II, because there were many contradictory government 
messages and policies occurring at the same time. These include the simultaneous condemnation of 
fascism abroad and the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans at home and the professed 
commitment to racial equality while legally barring African Americans from equal opportunities in 
the defense industries and armed services. Rather than evidence of a broken, unorganized, or 
                                               
9 For more about the theory of the rhizome, see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “Introduction: Rhizome,” in A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 
3-28. 
10 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s, (New York: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 76. Emphasis in original. 
11 Ibid., 77. 
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confused power structure, these contradictions reflect the multivariate operations of systems of 
power actually working in tandem to maintain power, assert normative ideas of American identity, 
and control the nation’s citizens. Omi and Winant’s conception of the state recognizes the 
contradictory, flexible, mutable, and resilient nature of the state and the racial order it oversees. My 
work highlights these characteristics by analyzing the state’s role as an arbiter of citizenship, both in 
terms of legal rights and symbolic belonging to the nation. 
This research considers how the material and rhetorical demands of the war, as determined 
by the state, affected the treatment of Japanese Americans and African Americans. I identify and 
analyze the overlaps and disjunctures in these two groups’ experiences with racism and their 
responses to it, as well as the moments of connection – both physical and ideological – between 
these two communities during and immediately after the war. Central to this examination is the 
following question: how, during World War II, did notions of race shift and figure into wartime 
formulations of citizenship and its associated entitlements? 
Another important question guiding this research is how the unique circumstances of the 
war compelled racially marginalized citizens to reconceive of their national or cultural belonging. 
This project addresses the ways in which Japanese Americans and African Americans responded to 
denial of their full citizenship, which further reveals the complexity and flexibility of the power 
structures behind white supremacy. Because the state imposes the status quo upon a large, diverse 
citizenry, it must inevitably deal with challenges to its authority from those at the bottom of the 
racial hierarchy. In response to racialized citizens’ pushback against its objectives, the state is 
constantly refining its strategies and policies, resulting in a “unstable equilibrium.” As Omi and 
Winant explain, “Racial conflict persists at every level of society, varying over time and in respect to 
6 
different groups, but ubiquitous. Indeed, the state is itself penetrated and structured by the very 
interests whose conflicts it seeks to stabilize and control.”12  
Because the racial order is constantly in flux, the state employs various tactics to maintain 
the status quo, sometimes making minor tweaks to policies and practices and sometimes being 
forced to make major adjustments. During periods of national stability, “state institutions have 
effectively routinized the enforcement and organization of the prevailing racial order. … The system 
of racial meanings, of racial identities and ideology seems ‘natural’.” However, when the nation 
inevitably encounters social, political, or economic instability, such as during periods of war, “inter-
institutional competition and conflict within the state is augmented, as some agencies move toward 
accommodation of challenging forces while others ‘dig in their heels.’ Recomposition of 
constituencies and political alliances takes place.”13 The state’s flexibility and the multiplicity of 
tactics it uses suggest that the state is able to retain its power by continuously adapting and shifting 
its strategies while maintaining fidelity to the core normative ideologies that undergird the system, 
such as white supremacy. The experiences of Japanese Americans and African Americans during the 
war make legible the myriad ways the state addressed and exploited race ideologies to satisfy wartime 
labor demands, as well as to assuage public attitudes and anxieties.  
World War II constricted and reified the nation’s exclusive borders of belonging. The state 
mediated both Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ experiences of exclusion by 
implementing anti-Japanese and anti-Black policies during the war. Through Executive Order 9066 
and associated legislation, the federal government created a network of agencies to displace Japanese 
Americans from the West Coast and incarcerate them en masse. Japanese Americans’ expulsion and 
intense vilification was a clear example of the state mobilizing its power to place citizens outside the 
                                               
12 Ibid., 79. 
13 Ibid. 
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constructed borders of belonging. While less concentrated, spontaneous, and egregious than 
Japanese internment, the discrimination African Americans experienced during the war also 
demonstrated the state’s broader investment in their second-class citizenship. Despite some legal 
shifts that created more opportunities for African Americans to work in the defense industries, these 
changes were mostly superficial and/or temporary, intended to boost the war effort rather than 
signal a fundamental change in the government’s treatment of Black citizens. In the case of African 
Americans, the federal government instituted reform measures in terms of war work and service out 
of a need to recruit Blacks to the war effort, which suggested the government’s investment in racial 
equality. In actuality, these changes were superficial reforms that prevented – as they were intended 
to do – meaningful civil rights reform that would upset the status quo. The state recalibrated its 
treatment of racialized groups during the war, enacting both overt and subtle policy shifts that 
racialized Japanese Americans as perpetual and potentially dangerous outsiders and African 
Americans as inferior insiders. However, national discourses emphasizing freedom and democracy, 
scripted and fueled by the federal agencies, obscured these events as racism. Further, dominant 
discourses of patriotism elevated loyalty and unity such that individuals or groups that levied 
critiques at the government risked being labeled and treated as suspect, even treasonous. 
As the objects of state repression, Japanese Americans and African Americans became more 
aware of and concerned by the state’s insidious approach to maintaining the racial order. As a result, 
the two racialized communities increasingly looked towards each other’s situations to try to make 
sense of the racism and inequality they both faced in the United States. In particular, the rapid 
demotion of Japanese Americans in the racial hierarchy – to assume a position traditionally held by 
African Americans, albeit in a different form and for different reasons – compelled cross-
identification between these two groups. Many African Americans recognized the process of 
racialization Japanese Americans were undergoing. Likewise, Japanese Americans began to identify 
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connections between their situation and African Americans’ marginalization, which has, throughout 
U.S. history, traditionally been the most visible and enduring foil to white Americans’ power. 
In this project, Japanese internment is the guiding framework that delineates the study’s 
temporal and spatial parameters; however, this framework does not preclude considering the 
experiences of African Americans. To the contrary, internment is a particularly useful framework 
with which to explore the connections between these groups because it brought them into closer 
contact, both physically and ideologically. Moreover, this framework highlights the significance of 
the West Coast as site of unique racial dynamics. In contrast to many other parts of the country 
– especially the South and the Northeast – the West’s significant histories of migration from Asia 
and Latin America influenced the formation of region’s racial hierarchy. These dynamics 
differentiated the West from other areas of the country that viewed and experienced race primarily 
as a Black-white binary. During and after the war, Japanese Americans, displaced from the West 
Coast, and African Americans, relocated to the West Coast, both attempted to make the West Coast 
their home, and they encountered many barriers in their attempts to settle there. In many ways, 
internment serves as the anchor of this project because analyzing it makes legible many of the war’s 
central issues and contradictions regarding state power, race, democracy, citizenship, and belonging. 
 There is a rich and significant body of scholarship on both Japanese internment and African 
Americans’ westward wartime migration from many different disciplines and perspectives, including 
historical studies, legal analyses, sociological and anthropological investigations, and oral history 
projects. However, generally, historians have segregated the histories of Japanese internment and 
African American wartime migration into distinct silos. In addition, much of the scholarship 
approaches these histories separately, detached from the broader, multiracial context in which they 
occurred. These silos obscure the connections and overlaps between these linked histories. 
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Making sense of Japanese internment has been a major focus of contemporary historians.14 
The body of scholarship on Japanese internment has been deeply influenced by the extensive 
interdisciplinary research projects undertaken during the internment period, such as the Japanese 
American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (JERS), which was led by U.C. Berkeley sociology 
professor Dorothy Swaine Thomas. Data was collected by more than two dozen Japanese American 
and non-Japanese American fieldworkers, who conducted research at temporary detention facilities, 
concentration camps, and in resettlement communities after the war. The JERS publications and 
data guided later scholarship on Japanese internment.15 Japanese Americans’ own personal accounts 
of their incarceration during the war, in the form of memoirs, diaries, interviews, and oral histories, 
have also greatly increased people’s awareness and understanding of the complexities and realities of 
Japanese internment.16 
In comparison to the literature on Japanese internment, there is less published scholarship 
on African American migration to the West. The difference in the volume of scholarship can be 
partly attributed to the fact that, unlike with internment, there were few contemporary studies 
conducted on Black migration as it unfolded, and few of the predominantly working-class Black 
migrants had much time on their hands to write down their stories. Most of the historical 
scholarship on Black wartime migration to the West belongs to a broader canon of scholarship on 
                                               
14 Greg Robinson, a professor of history at the Université du Québec à Montréal, is one of the preeminent 
contemporary scholars of Japanese internment. His publications, including By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment 
of Japanese Americans (2001), A Tragedy of Democracy: Japanese Confinement in North America (2009), and After Camp: Portraits in 
Midcentury Japanese American Life and Politics (2012), have shaped the recent scholarship on this issue. 
15 JERS research culminated in the publication of three books: Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard Nishimoto, 
The Spoilage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946); Dorothy Swaine Thomas, The Salvage (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1952); and Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War, and the 
Constitution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954). See “Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement 
Study,” Densho Encyclopedia, last modified March 4, 2014, 
http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Japanese_American_Evacuation_and_Resettlement_Study/ for more information. 
16 See Miné Okubo, Citizen 13660 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1946); Charles Kikuchi, The Kikuchi 
Diary: Chronicle from an American Concentration Camp – The Tanforan Journals of Charles Kikuchi (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1973); Monica Sone, Nisei Daughter (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953); and Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston 
and James D. Houston, Farewell to Manzanar (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973). 
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westward African American migration throughout U.S. history.17 Some of the most compelling 
scholarship that focuses specifically on the experiences of African Americans out West during 
World War II is a product of more recent oral history projects.18 
In recent years, some scholars have used comparative frameworks to trouble this siloed 
approach to history, and their texts emphasize the points of intersection among Japanese Americans, 
African Americans, and other racialized communities.19 Texts that work within a comparative 
framework have explored the deep and varied history of political and social connections between 
people of Asian and African descent to emphasize the prevalence of interracial interactions and 
coalitions that developed as a result of sustained encounters between racialized groups. Matthew M. 
Briones’ book, Jim and Jap Crow: A Cultural History of 1940s Interracial America, is one of the few texts 
that conducts an in-depth analysis on the connections between Japanese Americans’ and African 
Americans’ experiences during World War II. Briones highlights the prevalence of multiracial 
milieus before, during, and after the war, emphasizing the possibilities and challenges associated with 
interracial organizing and suggesting that cross-racial encounters were a fundamental part of the 
World War II era that should not be ignored.  
                                               
17 Quintard Taylor, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Washington, Seattle, is one of the most well-
known contemporary scholars of African American migration to the West. His works, including In Search of the Racial 
Frontier: African Americans in the American West 1528-1990 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1998) and Seeking El 
Dorado: African Americans in California (Los Angeles: Autry Museum of Western Heritage, 2001), are some of the most 
extensive surveys published on African American life on the West Coast. Likewise, Albert S. Broussard of Texas A&M 
University has focused on African American westward migration during World War II as part of a broader trend of 
internal migration. His books Black San Francisco: The Struggle for Racial Equality in the West, 1900-1954 (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1993) and Expectations of Equality: A History of Black Westerners (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012) give detailed historical accounts of African Americans’ experiences out West. 
18 See Gretchen Lemke-Santangelo, Abiding Courage: African American Migrant Women and the East Bay Community 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996) and Shirley Ann Wilson Moore, To Place Our Deeds: The African 
American Community in Richmond, California, 1910-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
19 See Allison Varzally, Making a Non-White America: Californians Coloring Outside Ethnic Lines, 1925-1955 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008); Heike Raphael-Hernandez and Shannon Steen, eds., AfroAsian Encounters: Culture, 
History, Politics (New York: New York University Press, 2006); and Gerald Horne, Facing the Rising Sun: African Americans, 
Japan, and the Rise of Afro-Asian Solidarity (New York: New York University Press, 2018). 
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I use a comparative framework to put the wartime experiences of Japanese Americans and 
African Americans into conversation with one another. This method allows for a more nuanced, 
multifaceted analysis of how race and racial hierarchies functioned and manifested in different ways 
in the United States during World War II. Such a framework reveals the complexities of how the 
system of white supremacy operated with regards to different racialized groups during the war, 
exposing how the state wielded its power in a dynamic way while also maintaining some degree of 
continuity. The state conformed to some pre-war modes of maintaining racial order while also 
demonstrating its flexibility to deploy new and/or modified forms of state power to respond to 
unique circumstances of the war. 
As with the concept of the state, it is important that I clarify my usage of several other 
important terms. In this project, I use the term “Japanese American” as an umbrella term for people 
of Japanese ancestry living in the United States as permanent residents and citizens.20 This term 
encompasses the Issei (the first generation immigrants from Japan to the United States), the Nisei 
(the second-generation children of the Issei who were born in the United States), and the Sansei (the 
third-generation children of the Nisei), as well as people who do not fit in rigidly defined 
immigration categories, such as the Kibei, who were American-born people of Japanese ancestry 
who were raised and educated in Japan. I also use the terms “African American” and “Black” as 
umbrella terms for members of the African diaspora living in the United States. This term refers 
primarily to those who were descendants of Africans captured, enslaved, and brought against their 
will to North America as part of the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Additionally, I aim to use precise, 
accurate language about Japanese Americans’ mass incarceration in this project. As part of 
implementing the state’s policies, government staff members created public relations guidelines that 
                                               
20 My definition of the term “Japanese American” is analogous to the term “Nikkei,” which refers to all those in the 
Japanese diaspora living as permanent settlers outside Japan.  
12 
established a lexicon of euphemistic terms to refer to the displacement and detention of Japanese 
Americans.21 This study intends to reframe many of these misleading, minimizing terms. Except 
when quoting primary source materials, this thesis will use the terms “forced removal” and 
“expulsion” instead of “evacuation,” “temporary detention facility” instead of “assembly center,” 
and “internment camp” and “concentration camp” instead of “relocation center.”22 
This narrative begins by focusing on the evolving forms of power the state deployed during 
World War II in order to regulate Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ citizenship and 
belonging. The first chapter examines both the mass incarceration of Americans of Japanese descent 
and the expansion of racially restrictive housing covenants and other forms of anti-Black spatial 
segregation policies, arguing that such policies were undertaken to ensure that Japanese Americans 
and African Americans could not claim full citizenship rights. In this chapter, I draw on Omi and 
Winant’s seminal racial formation theory to decipher how and why the state reimagined and 
reconstructed Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ racial identities during the war. In 
particular, I use this theory to examine how the state restricted these groups’ property ownership 
and physical mobility and reoriented their participation in the wartime economy. I argue that the 
state adapted its strategies of control during the war in order to maintain the white supremacist racial 
order. The wartime restrictions on racialized communities’ movement and settlement solidified their 
place as outsiders in the nation and reinforced white Americans’ dominant social, cultural, and 
economic position during an era of immense domestic and international destabilization. 
                                               
21 For more information and perspectives on how to refer to Japanese Americans’ mass incarceration, see “War 
Relocation Authority,” Densho Encyclopedia, last modified May 6, 2015, 
https://encyclopedia.densho.org/War_Relocation_Authority/; John Howard, Concentration Camps on the Home Front: 
Japanese Americans in the House of Jim Crow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 14-15; and Cynthia Lee, “Debate 
over words to describe Japanese American incarceration lingers,” UCLA Newsroom, September 15, 2015, 
http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/debate-over-words-to-describe-japanese-american-incarceration-lingers. 
22 Although “internment” as a term is itself fraught and, arguably, somewhat misleading, this project still uses it as 
an overarching label to describe this issue because its frequent usage in mainstream settings makes it a familiar and easily 
recognizable catch-all term. 
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The second chapter shifts focus to how Japanese Americans and African Americans 
responded to the state’s wartime shifts in policy. This chapter examines the ways in which these 
communities negotiated their experiences as racialized people who were treated as second-class 
citizens in the U.S. The orientation of this chapter is also influenced by racial formation theory, since 
a central mechanism of the theory is the inevitability of pushback against the state. Part of the 
reason the state is constantly adapting its approach to maintaining the racial order is that racialized 
citizens resist the repressive state forces that are meant to keep them subordinated. This chapter 
explores Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ understandings of their changed status as well 
as their actions to counter the state. Incipient solidarity between Japanese Americans and African 
Americans emerged as a form of pushback against the state. During the war, Japanese Americans 
and African Americans began to develop relationships with one another as the circumstances of the 
war forced both communities to reconceptualize their understandings of race, white supremacy, 
democracy, and citizenship in the United States. For Japanese Americans and African Americans, 
the expansion of both anti-Japanese and anti-Black rhetoric and policies across the country was a 
catalyst for both communities to reflect on what it meant to be racialized people in the United 
States, as well as to look beyond the limits of their own racial communities to try to find solutions to 
the problem of racism. In particular, many Japanese Americans and African Americans saw 
internment as a shocking and threatening revocation of a racialized group’s citizenship, and the 
policy spurred Japanese Americans and African Americans to observe, sympathize with, and draw 
on the organizing tactics of other groups with an increased sense of urgency. The war inspired 
nascent interracial coalitions between Japanese Americans and African Americans, as these two 
groups tried to develop a cohesive, multiracial theory of oppression by inverting the dominant 
contemporary understandings of race. Rather than attempt to solve the “Negro Problem” or the 
14 
“Oriental Problem,” Japanese Americans and African Americans worked together to address the 
underlying “American Problem” of white supremacy.  
 The third chapter is a case study of the extended interactions between Japanese Americans 
and African Americans in San Francisco and Los Angeles after the war, within the broader context 
of ghettoization, exclusion, and economic hardships. As Japanese Americans returned to their pre-
war neighborhoods on the West Coast, they encountered African Americans who had moved into 
these vacated neighborhoods during the war. In the post-war era, Japanese Americans and African 
Americans clashed and cooperated as they attempted to share spaces they had at various points in 
time each considered exclusively their own. In the Western Addition neighborhood of San Francisco 
and the Little Tokyo-Bronzeville neighborhood of Los Angeles, residents collaborated to build 
bicultural community institutions and foster a culture of compromise and mutual respect. Taking 
such steps ensured that both Japanese Americans and African Americans had the opportunity to 
belong to the neighborhoods. The Afro-Asian neighborhoods in San Francisco and Los Angeles 
were short-lived, as the state mobilized in a new form in the 1950s and 1960s to again reconfigure 
Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ position in society – this time through policies of 
urban renewal and redevelopment. The chapter evaluates the degree to which people put into 
practice the expressions of solidarity highlighted in the second chapter and whether these alliances 
were an effective challenge to the state’s power. An examination of the post-war era throws into 
sharp relief the ways in which these narratives are deeply interconnected and share many points of 
physical and ideological common ground. Examining this period of continued accommodation and 
upheaval demonstrates the constant cycle of disruption and change that characterizes the unstable 




The State of Belonging: 
World War II and Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ Conditional Citizenship 
 
World War II profoundly changed the United States. Over 12 million Americans enlisted in 
military service, with almost three-quarters of them stationed in the European, Pacific, and North 
African theaters of combat.1 On the homefront, Americans mobilized to support troops abroad and 
Allied Victory. The war managed what the New Deal had not; it decisively ended the Great 
Depression, and the unemployment rate decreased from over 14 percent to less than 2 percent, as 
people went to work on behalf of the war effort.2 The defense industries expanded their 
employment and increased their production, and the composition of the workforce changed, with 
women and people of color finding new avenues of employment as the state worked to fill the gaps 
produced by those who left their pre-war jobs to serve in the military. Scores of married, middle-
class white women entered the workforce for the first time to take the places of white men who left 
to fight in the war. Black women’s work opportunities also changed. Before the war, Fanny 
Christina Hill was one of the over 50 percent of Black women confined to domestic service. “The 
War,” she claimed, “made me live better: Hitler was the one that got us out of the white folks’ 
kitchen.”3  
Wartime economic mobilization relied on internal migration, both voluntary and forced. 
Americans across the country picked up to go where the work was: “[W]hole sections of the country 
[were] being loaded into cars and trucks and trailers, busses, and trains. … At night the highways 
                                               
1 “Research Starters: US Military by the Numbers,” The National WWII Museum | New Orleans, accessed April 
22, 2018, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-
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2 Stanley Lebergott, “Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment, 1929-1939: Estimating Methods,” Monthly 
Labor Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, April 1948, 50–53. 
3 Fanny Christina Hill, quoted in Sherna Berger Gluck, Rosie the Riveter Revisited: Women, The War, and Social Change 
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987): 23. 
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were dotted with their campfires, and the roadhouses and trailer camps were crowded with them.”4 
World War II had such an astounding impact on the reorganization of the United States’ population 
that the 1948 Census Bureau noted, “Probably never before in the history of the United States has 
there been internal population movement of such magnitude as in the past seven eventful years.”5 
African Americans were among those on the move. Since the World War I era, Blacks had 
migrated from the South to urban centers in the North and Midwest, but with World War II they 
also moved west in unprecedented numbers to take advantage of work opportunities on the West 
Coast. As African Americans moved in, Japanese Americans were moving out, but not by choice. 
After the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed 
Executive Order 9066, which designated a military zone from which anyone deemed a threat could 
be excluded. The order targeted Japanese Americans, who General John DeWitt, head of the 
Western Defense Command, classified as “a dangerous element whether loyal or not.”6 As a result, 
within six months of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the federal government forcibly removed over 
110,000 Japanese Americans – nearly two-thirds of them American citizens – from their homes on 
the West Coast and incarcerated them in concentration camps in the interior of the country. 
Participating in a global war – and, more importantly, winning one – prompted the complete 
reorganization of the American state. This chapter explores the state’s wartime practices of 
restricting racialized groups’ property ownership and mobility while simultaneously incorporating 
them more fully into the national economy as part of the war effort. Various state agencies and 
operatives deployed these tactics against Japanese Americans and African Americans as part of the 
                                               
4 William Martin Camp, Skip to My Lou (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1945), 193-194, quoted in Marilynn S. 
Johnson, The Second Gold Rush: Oakland and the East Bay in World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 
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5 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, ser. P-20, no. 14, Internal Migration in 
the United States: April 1940 to April 1947 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census), 1, quoted in Johnson, The Second 
Gold Rush, 2. 
6 General John DeWitt, testimony before the House Naval Affairs Subcommittee, April 13, 1943. 
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wartime project of redefining these communities’ citizenship and belonging. Following Pearl 
Harbor, the federal government implemented a sprawling legal framework to displace, sequester, 
and incarcerate the bulk of the nation’s Japanese American population for the duration of the war. 
Internment disrupted Japanese American communities by uprooting residents from their homes, 
dismantling their businesses, and reorienting their position in the economy to better serve the 
nation’s wartime interests, such as laboring on government-supported agricultural and 
manufacturing projects. At the same time, almost half a million African Americans moved from the 
South to the West Coast in search of work in the defense industries. During the war, the West’s 
Black population increased by 33 percent.7 The influx of southern African Americans sparked 
intense discrimination and hostility from white West Coast residents and local governments. 
Housing was a major flashpoint issue, and discrimination and segregation flourished in both private 
and public housing. However, the heightened demand for wartime labor afforded African 
Americans some increased job opportunities and the possibility of economic advancement. I argue 
that the state’s interactions with these two racialized groups changed in relation to the war in 
manners unique to each group’s value to state agendas. The state’s actions helped to redraw and 
redefine the nation’s “borders of belonging,” placing both Japanese Americans and African 
Americans on the outside of these boundaries. 
 This chapter employs Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s racial formation theory to analyze 
how the state enacted policies during the war that redefined Japanese Americans’ and African 
Americans’ status as citizens. I argue that the state’s policies, which appeared contradictory at times, 
were part of a broader effort to maintain the racial order during a time of national upheaval. Omi 
and Winant theorize that race and its meanings are dynamic and fluid; each is constantly being 
                                               
7 Albert S. Broussard, “Wartime Tensions and the Struggle for Housing,” in Black San Francisco: The Struggle for Racial 
Equality in the West, 1900-1954 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 166-179. 
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“formed, transformed, destroyed and re-formed.”8 The content and significance of racial categories 
is constantly shifting, depending on the prevailing social, political, and economic forces and 
counterforces. The state – viewed broadly as a decentered but coordinated aggregate of institutions 
and agencies – mediates, defines, and redefines the various meanings ascribed to different racial 
designations. Accordingly, “racial meanings pervade US society, extending from the shaping of 
individual racial identities to the structuring of collective political action on the terrain of the state.”9 
In times of war, the mechanisms with which the state deploys, manipulates, and exploits ideologies 
of race become uniquely visible due to the state’s quick and extreme actions motivated by crisis.  
In this chapter, I use property ownership/physical mobility and labor as the main sites of 
focus to examine how the state solidified Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ limited 
citizenship and belonging. I analyze these two sites of focus in order to trace the wide-ranging 
impacts of the state’s actions during the war. Property ownership/physical mobility and labor were 
significant axes of state control during World War II because these concepts were central elements 
of the state’s conceptions of freedom and citizenship. Throughout U.S. history, both people of 
Japanese and African descent have had tenuous relationships to land, property ownership, physical 
mobility, and economic independence. The state has used both de facto and de jure exclusion policies 
as tactics to dictate where these groups could settle and how they participated in the national 
economy. The state utilized exclusionary tactics during World War II to reinforce the boundaries of 
citizenship and national belonging amidst the tumultuous societal shifts of the war.  
Throughout the nation’s history, the state has been an arbiter of citizenship and belonging. 
In the United States, both legal citizenship and symbolic belonging to the nation have traditionally 
relied on or been connected to the ability to own private property and practice economic self-
                                               
8 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s (New York: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 61. 
9 Ibid., 66. 
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ownership. Cheryl Harris, a legal scholar of Constitutional law and civil rights, argues that property 
rights are deeply entangled with, and are a marker of, racial identity and status. In her influential 
article, “Whiteness as Property,” Harris illustrates the historical underpinnings, stretching back to 
the nation’s foundations of slavery and colonization, that linked whiteness and white power to the 
ability to own property.10 Harris argues that “whiteness and property share a common premise – a 
conceptual nucleus – of a right to exclude.”11 Although the link between these two concepts has 
shifted throughout American history to assume “more subtle forms, … [it] retains its core 
characteristic – the legal legitimation of expectations of power and control that enshrine the status 
quo as a neutral baseline, while masking the maintenance of white privilege and domination.”12  
Similar to Harris, Barbara Young Welke argues that notions of property ownership are 
inherently tied to ideas of citizenship in the U.S. “Personhood,” as Welke argues, “rests most 
fundamentally on legal recognition and protection of self-ownership, that is, of a right to one’s 
person, one’s body, and one’s labor.” From this right flows other rights, such as the freedom to 
purchase, own, or inherit property, and the freedom of movement.13 Both Harris and Welke assert 
that the interrelated concepts of property ownership, unrestricted physical mobility within the 
country, and the right to control one’s labor are cornerstones of possessing full personhood in the 
United States. Limiting these rights to white Americans helped to solidify whiteness as a prerequisite 
for first-class citizenship. To retain the social, political, and economic powers and privileges afforded 
to white Americans, the state has enacted systems of control throughout U.S. history to regulate 
racialized people’s property, physical mobility, and participation in the economy. 
                                               
10 Cheryl I. Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” Harvard Law Review 106, no. 8 (June 1993), 1714. 
11 Ibid. 
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During World War II, citizens were moving around the country in unprecedented numbers 
and the composition of the labor force changed in response to the wartime production demands, 
which meant that this period had the potential to disrupt the links between whiteness, personhood, 
property, mobility, and self-ownership of labor. Therefore, it was a priority for the state to maintain 
the status quo by enacting new forms of control that regulated racialized groups’ ability to own 
property, move and settle freely within the country, and have control over their labor. As Harris and 
Welke demonstrate, racism and racialized structures of property ownership and labor were 
fundamental parts of the nation. The definition of a first-class American citizen with full 
personhood depended on creating classes of people who were cultural, legal, and racial outsiders. 
As Devon Carbado explains, legal citizenship, American identity, and belonging are 
interrelated concepts, but they are not the same. Carbado writes, “American identity means the 
capacity, as a racial subject, to be a representative body – figuratively and materially – for the 
nation.” He continues, “Historically, Asian Americans, even those with formal American citizenship, 
have lacked this representational capacity.”14 In the case of Japanese Americans during World War 
II, the federal government, in collaboration with the media, nationalized longstanding anti-Japanese 
xenophobic and nativist rhetoric. There was a disavowal of Japanese Americans as internal enemy 
aliens whose presence in the country was invasive and destructive. Various state actors – such as 
President Roosevelt, members of Congress, and fear-mongering newspapers – took actions that 
helped to equate Japanese Americans’ racial identity with foreignness. According to Carbado, 
“Notwithstanding their formal citizenship status, [Japanese Americans] were perceived to be 
foreigners. One can think of Japanese Americans in this context as citizen aliens (as distinct from 
illegal aliens).”15 Many Japanese Americans had legal citizenship, but they were nonetheless seen as 
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infiltrators and un-American, which justified and facilitated their displacement and mass 
incarceration. 
In the case of African Americans, the war created the potential for social, political, and 
economic advancement by escaping the racism of the Jim Crow South and relocating to the West 
Coast. However, African Americans discovered that anti-Black racism was also deeply embedded 
within the West Coast through measures like restrictive housing covenants, racial quotas in wartime 
housing projects, and hierarchical economic structures that relegated Blacks to the lowest paying and 
least desirable jobs. Settling out West was challenging for African Americans, who encountered 
state-sanctioned employment discrimination and housing restrictions in every place they tried to 
settle. Unlike Japanese Americans, African Americans were not seen as perpetual foreigners, but 
they were nonetheless excluded from full citizenship rights, expressed through the state’s restrictions 
on their ability to settle freely. Carbado explains, “Slavery was a kind of forced naturalization, a 
process in which blacks were simultaneously denationalized from Africa and domesticated to (but 
never fully incorporated in) America.” With this foundation, Blacks “were intelligible as Americans – 
more particularly, as inferior beings that belonged to America.”16 African Americans had both legal 
citizenship and were accepted as belonging to the American polity, but they were relegated to the 
bottom of the nation’s hierarchy. The state’s construction and enforcement of African Americans’ 
symbolic and material inferiority boosted white Americans’ hegemony and sense of national 
belonging during the war. 
The war did not, and arguably could not, completely reshape a political and social structure 
reliant on restricting some people’s freedom. It did, however, profoundly impact the nation’s 
material circumstances, and, as a result, affect the state’s need to harness racialized groups’ labor. 
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Despite the state’s infringements upon their citizenship rights and denials of their cultural belonging, 
Japanese Americans and African Americans were still useful as workers, particularly in the 
agriculture sector and the defense industries. Their utility as workers tethered them to the national 
project during the war. 
In the pre-war era, Japanese Americans primarily worked in small businesses in ethnic 
enclaves or as part of the agriculture sector in California, and nativists perceived Japanese 
Americans’ economic independence and self-sufficiency as a threat to white Americans’ economic 
interests. After Pearl Harbor, pushing Japanese Americans out of the West Coast economy became a 
tactic to revoke their citizenship rights and national belonging, in line with the link between 
personhood and economic independence identified by Welke. Moreover, nativists and white 
business owners rallied for Japanese Americans’ incarceration in part to boost their own economic 
standing, which reinforced their personhood and status as first-class citizens. Furthermore, while 
Japanese Americans were incarcerated, the government implemented programs for Japanese 
Americans to grow and harvest food and manufacture goods to serve the war effort. Controlling and 
reorienting Japanese Americans’ labor in the concentration camps became a tool to subordinate 
them and redefine their racial identity, underscoring their lack of full personhood. 
In contrast to Japanese Americans’ historical position as a perceived economic competitor 
with white Americans, throughout U.S. history African Americans have been shunted to the bottom 
of the economic ladder, beginning with slavery. Before World War II, the economy was structured 
in such a way that African Americans had virtually no opportunities for economic advancement, and 
Black workers typically did manual labor, domestic service, sharecropping, and other stigmatized 
jobs. The wartime labor shortage provided a rare opportunity for them to potentially rise up in 
economic standing and gain access to previously unattainable jobs and wages. The West Coast 
defense industries appeared to be sufficiently flexible to employ both Black and white workers, 
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which represented a potential disruption of the equilibrium that was maintained in part through 
African Americans’ consistent economic subordination. However, the war presented a unique 
challenge, because the West Coast defense industries really did need African Americans’ labor to 
function at full capacity. To resolve this issue, the federal government implemented policies that 
gave Black workers more legal standing to enter into industries and jobs that previously excluded 
them, but white workers and supervisors on the West Coast kept Black workers’ economic mobility 
in check by treating them as inferior members of the workforce. Moreover, many of the legal 
advances that the federal government granted were temporary and limited in scope, which meant 
that although there was an outward appearance of fairness and equality, the underlying structure of 
relegating most Black workers to the bottom of the economic hierarchy persisted. 
Enshrining these systems of racial hierarchy in a broader framework of democracy obscured 
their centrality to the nation’s functioning. This enabled the state to continually maintain the 
unstable equilibrium by shifting its forms of control over time. The shifts could appear to signal the 
end of the racial hierarchy when, in reality, the changes represented the flexibility of the state and the 
adaptability of the racial hierarchy. Analyzing these established mechanisms reveals the ways in 
which racism was able to persist during World War II in the midst of the state’s increased emphasis 
on democracy. The state refined its expressions of white supremacy against Japanese Americans and 
African Americans during this era to complement the nation’s shifting wartime rhetorical strategies 
and material circumstances.  
 
Shifts in Property Ownership and Physical Mobility 
 The anti-Japanese backlash in the United States following the bombing of Pearl Harbor was 
swift and severe. Japanese Americans were the targets of prejudice, harassment, and abuse from 
civilians and authorities alike. After the United States entered the war, Japanese Americans across 
the West Coast realized that the social and economic position they had cultivated in the country was 
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in danger of crumbling around them. Since the mid-nineteenth century, federal, state, and local 
governments had implemented policies that restricted East Asians’ immigration and settlement in 
the United States, targeting people of Chinese and Japanese descent most severely. Japanese 
immigrants were ineligible for legal citizenship based on the Naturalization Act of 1870, and in 1924 
Congress passed the National Origins Act, which included a special provision that called for the 
complete exclusion of immigrants from Japan. Alien land laws, such as the one passed in California 
in 1913, implicitly targeted Japanese immigrants and used their ineligibility for legal citizenship as the 
basis for prohibiting them from buying land or holding long-term leases. These exclusion policies 
created numerous barriers to Japanese Americans’ ability to settle, but nonetheless, many Japanese 
Americans had figured out ways to work within the system and eke out an existence, albeit an often 
marginalized one. 
The racist and xenophobic ideologies that underpinned Japanese exclusion had been 
percolating for nearly a century, but ultimately, the state constructed the legal framework for 
displacement and mass incarceration and established a coalition of government bodies charged with 
implementing this policy in approximately one month.17 A variety of organizations, both 
governmental and non-governmental, worked together to rapidly create and deploy a series of 
policies and social frameworks to forcibly remove and detain the West Coast’s Japanese American 
community. These agencies built off of the anti-immigrant legacies and expanded their scope to also 
target people of Japanese descent who were born in the United States (and therefore had birthright 
citizenship). While the various state apparatuses were not wholly coordinated, together their actions 
aligned to revoke Japanese Americans’ belonging by stripping them of their property and forcing 
them out of the communities in which they lived. 
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Less than a week after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Charles Kikuchi – a Nisei from Northern 
California who was studying to become a social worker at the University of California, Berkeley – 
wrote a handwritten note to Louis Adamic, the editor of Common Ground magazine, detailing the 
profound anti-Japanese hostility that he had witnessed in the days following the bombing: 
Radio announces: Don’t patronize Japanese stores. 
Boycott of store operated by Nisei. 
A Filipino swings at a Nisei in the Japanese district. 
Police officer sneers at a storeowner: “You ask me to be decent after what 
you ‘Japs’ did to Hawaii?” 
Crowd in Montana attempts to lynch a “Jap.” 
Illegal to give money to Japanese nationals. Son can’t give money to parents. 
Grant Ave. art goods store mostly failing. 
Chinese up and down coast wearing Chinese flags so they won’t be mistaken 
for Japanese. 
Unions boycotting Japanese laundries in the name of patriotism.18 
 
Kikuchi’s letter detailed an emerging coalition of institutions and attitudes that targeted Japanese 
Americans as enemies of the United States, emphasizing their supposed disloyalty and foreignness. 
These early responses to Pearl Harbor demonstrated that Japanese Americans’ belonging in the 
community was being re-negotiated on the local level. 
Like Kikuchi, Mary Oyama, a Nisei journalist living in Los Angeles, experienced a dramatic 
decline in her social position after Pearl Harbor.19 In an article in the Spring 1942 issue of Common 
Ground, Oyama outlined the deteriorating political and social conditions in Los Angeles following 
the United States’ entry to the war. According to Oyama, amidst the hostility, mistrust, and violence 
from their neighbors and vigilantes, many Japanese Americans’ biggest concern was the risk of 
losing their homes as part of the war effort. Oyama explained, “Young Nisei wives had visions of 
being turned out into the streets, of having their down-payment stoves, furniture, cars, etc. hauled 
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away; their gas, electricity, and water turned off.”20 Oyama expressed her own fears of losing her 
house, framing this loss in terms of its implications for her belonging in the United States: “Fred 
[Oyama’s husband] and I might even lose our new house. Though unpretentious, it is beautiful to us 
as the fulfillment of a dream, as a symbol of our roots here in these United States. I had thought it 
was only in old-fashioned melodramas that people lost their homes. . . .”21 Losing their homes was 
one of the most difficult and jarring possibilities for many Japanese Americans to consider, since 
their ability to own property was a recognition of their Americanness and an affirmation of their 
personhood. As an American citizen who was legally eligible for home ownership, Oyama did not 
realize how unstable her position in the community was until the war effort became a pretext to 
suspend her citizenship and its associated rights. 
 Kikuchi, more cynical and pessimistic than Oyama, presciently noted that the growing “seed 
of racial hysteria” was not limited to individual acts of violence and discrimination, but carried the 
very real possibility of state-orchestrated collective punishment for Japanese Americans. “The native 
patriotic groups would even want to send all of the Nisei to concentration camps,” Kikuchi wrote in 
a December 20, 1941, letter to Adamic. “This sounds crazy and I hope it does not go further than 
the talk stage, but is a most dangerous possibility and I am pessimistic about the outcome.”22 
Unfortunately, Kikuchi’s pessimism proved accurate. Already marginalized before Pearl Harbor, 
Japanese Americans’ racial designation as enemy aliens and perpetual foreigners solidified after the 
United States’ entry into the war. 
Some of the earliest public expressions of anti-Japanese rhetoric following the U.S. entry 
into the war came from the media and non-governmental organizations. On January 16, 1942, the 
Palos Verdes News raised the alarm to its readers that “the Japanese [are] here cultivating the land 
                                               
20 Mary Oyama, “After Pearl Harbor–Los Angeles,” Common Ground, Spring 1942, 12. 
21 Ibid., 12-13. 
22 Kikuchi to Adamic, December 20, 1941 (CKP, box 11, 1:1) quoted in Briones, Jim and Jap Crow, 82. 
27 
immediately adjoining the ocean and military objectives … the Japanese are everywhere.”23 On 
February 13, 1942, the developer A. E. Hansen abruptly cancelled the leases of forty Japanese 
farmers who cultivated 500 acres of farmland on the Palos Verdes peninsula.24 Portraying Japanese 
Americans as uniformly traitorous and dangerous to the war effort promoted a certain idea about 
what Japanese-ness was, and this constructed designation facilitated and justified stripping the 
Japanese American farmers of their leases. Without an overarching state policy of exclusion yet in 
place, individuals and private institutions were already taking steps to control and block Japanese 
Americans’ belonging by drawing on the pre-existing legal frameworks of segregation, 
discrimination, and alien land laws. 
Federal officials also contributed to the nationwide anti-Japanese fervor. One of the earliest, 
most extreme government proponents of Japanese Americans’ removal from the West Coast was 
John Rankin, a member of Congress from Mississippi. Rankin had cemented a reputation for 
himself in the House of Representatives as a staunch foe of civil rights legislation; he supported 
segregation, defended discriminatory poll taxes, and fought against anti-lynching bills. In addition to 
his anti-Black policy preferences, he also was one of the first government officials to call for the 
forced removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans following the bombing of Pearl Harbor. 
On December 15, 1941, Rankin boldly declared, “I’m for catching every Japanese in America, 
Alaska, and Hawaii now and putting them in concentration camps. … Damn them! Let’s get rid of 
them now!”25 Rankin’s espousal of anti-Japanese rhetoric was notable, since there were virtually no 
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established Japanese American communities in Mississippi in the pre-war era, and anti-Japanese 
discrimination was not institutionalized in the South in the same way that it was on the West Coast. 
Rankin’s hostility towards Japanese Americans in the wake of Pearl Harbor demonstrates how racist 
policies, systems, and ideologies were able to be transplanted to different contexts and be deployed 
against different groups. Before the war, Rankin was already concerned with maintaining white 
supremacy, as he sought to use his political power to limit African Americans’ citizenship via spatial 
segregation and restricted rights and privileges. During the war, Rankin found a new target for his 
segregationist views – Japanese Americans – and applied his white supremacist mentality and tactics 
to a different racialized group. 
On February 19, 1942, the calls for Japanese Americans’ removal from the West Coast 
reached the highest levels of the nation. President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which 
authorized the Secretary of War to “prescribe military areas … from which any and all persons may 
be excluded.”26 Like much of the anti-Japanese rhetoric during World War II, Executive Order 9066 
used military necessity as a pretext to enact policies that xenophobic and nativist groups had long 
promoted. In this executive order, the President leveraged his considerable unilateral power to argue 
that “successful prosecution of the war” required and thus justified taking these sweeping measures 
to demarcate and limit the areas in which certain civilians could reside.27 Executive Order 9066 did 
not explicitly specify Japanese Americans as its target; however, many parts of society – individuals, 
media organizations, private businesses, nativist groups, and government officials – had already laid 
the groundwork and bought into the ideological frameworks that allowed them to apply the order to 
the West Coast’s Japanese American communities. Executive Order 9066 was a crucial part of the 
state’s process of racializing Japanese Americans as obstacles to winning the war. There were no 
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attempts to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Japanese Americans or even between immigrants 
and American citizens – all people of Japanese descent were painted with the same broad brush. 
President Roosevelt used his executive power liberally to enact sweeping anti-Japanese policies, but 
he did not, and could not implement them alone. Under Roosevelt’s leadership, a wide array of state 
agencies came together to craft and execute the internment policy. In particular, a trio of state 
organizations – the Western Defense Command, the Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the 
War Relocation Authority – constituted the nucleus of the state bureaucracy that implemented 
internment. 
The Western Defense Command (WDC) formed prior to the U.S. entry into World War II 
alongside the Eastern, Central, and Southern regional Defense Commands. Headquartered in the 
Presidio in San Francisco, the WDC was responsible for defending the western region of the United 
States (defined as California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Arizona) 
“against attacks by land, sea, and air” – a very broad and far-reaching mandate.28 The WDC was led 
by Lieutenant General John DeWitt, an intensely paranoid man who was convinced that Japanese 
American saboteurs were planning to attack the U.S. from within, despite lacking evidence to 
support this claim. DeWitt’s powerful position gave him an outlet to codify his personal racist 
beliefs into government policies. Following the issuance of Executive Order 9066, General DeWitt 
issued Public Proclamation No. 1 on March 2, 1942. Using Executive Order 9066 as its basis, the 
proclamation created Military Areas 1 and 2 as restricted zones. Military Area 1 was defined as the 
western halves of Washington, Oregon, and California, and the southern half of Arizona. Military 
Area 2 was defined as the remaining portions of these four states. The proclamation encouraged 
Japanese Americans to “voluntarily” resettle outside of Military Area 1. 
                                               
28 Final Report, Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast, 1942, 33, quoted in “Western Defense Command,” Densho 
Encyclopedia, last modified January 21, 2014, http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Western_Defense_Command/. 
30 
 Even after Executive Order 9066 was issued and Military Areas 1 and 2 were formed, many 
government officials still believed that the process of Japanese Americans’ removal from the West 
Coast would be voluntary and self-imposed. However, government officials quickly realized that 
voluntary removal was an ineffective, unrealistic policy. Robert W. Frase, the assistant chief of the 
employment division of the War Relocation Authority, noted that within weeks of its 
implementation, “it became apparent that 112,000 people of all ages and occupations could not, 
within the short space of a few weeks, close out their economic affairs and find new homes and new 
methods of making a living in other parts of the country without considerable assistance and 
direction from the government.”29 This quote illustrates the state’s shift in strategy to achieve its 
desired outcome. Because the state receives pushback and resistance from racialized groups, 
maintaining the unstable equilibrium hinges on the state enacting a balance of positive and negative 
measures, alternating between accommodating racialized groups and cracking down on them. At the 
outset of the internment policy, the state attempted to appear more reasonable and accommodating 
of Japanese Americans by making the “evacuation” policy voluntary, which gave it a flimsy veneer 
of benevolent non-intervention. However, it quickly became clear that few Japanese Americans 
would or could voluntarily displace themselves without the state bureaucracy’s mandate. Therefore, 
the state changed tactics and cracked down on the West Coast’s Japanese American communities by 
implementing a policy of forced removal. A network of government agencies was developed to 
revoke Japanese Americans’ rights and privileges, using displacement and detainment as tactics to 
achieve this goal. The expansion and sophistication of the government bureaucracy overseeing 
internment demonstrated the extent to which the state expanded and institutionalized Japanese 
Americans’ exclusion.  
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On March 11, 1942, General DeWitt formed the Wartime Civil Control Administration 
(WCCA), as an agency within the WDC. The WCCA was responsible for overseeing the on-the-
ground process of Japanese Americans’ removal from their homes outlined in Public Proclamation 
No. 1. Headquartered in San Francisco, the WCCA rapidly established field offices across the West 
Coast and opened nearly 100 civil control stations, which would be the local hubs for organizing the 
Japanese American residents of each area. The agency also converted pre-existing public facilities, 
such as horse racetracks and fairgrounds, into 14 temporary detention facilities (euphemistically 
known as “assembly centers”).30 Rather than building all new facilities from scratch, the WCCA 
relied on identifying and repurposing pre-existing sites to serve the government’s new policy 
objectives. The state agency manipulated the nation’s pre-existing infrastructure in order to facilitate 
and expedite the execution of such a large project. 
When it became clear that voluntary removal was not feasible, the WCCA began to issue 
Civilian Exclusion Orders to Japanese American residents of the West Coast. Using Census data, the 
WCCA divided the region into over 100 areas, each containing approximately 1,000 Japanese 
American residents, and issued exclusion orders to each area. The exclusion orders required 
Japanese American residents to report to a predetermined location on a specific day, usually about a 
week after the exclusion order was posted. Japanese Americans were only allowed to bring with 
them belongings they were able to carry to the temporary detention facilities. The first exclusion 
order was issued on March 24, 1942, for the residents of Bainbridge Island, Washington. Just as the 
WCCA expropriated racetracks and fairgrounds and redefined the function of these sites to advance 
the internment project, the state also harnessed Census data to enact anti-Japanese policies. Rather 
than acting as a neutral tool to measure the population, the Census was a powerful tool of state 
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surveillance. The WCCA utilized demographic data to bolster the state’s racial project by identifying 
and targeting Japanese Americans for removal.  
On March 18, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9102 to establish the War 
Relocation Authority (WRA), which was the federal agency in charge of building and operating the 
longer-term camps in which Japanese Americans would be incarcerated for the duration of the war. 
While the WCCA detained Japanese Americans in temporary facilities, the WRA searched for 
locations in which it would construct the more permanent detention facilities. Milton Eisenhower, 
the brother of General Dwight Eisenhower, was the first leader of the WRA. Under his short 
tenure, the WRA conceded that the only politically tenable option was to construct military-style 
concentration camps, as opposed to the possibility of facilitating a mass inland migration of 
Japanese Americans as free civilians. In several weeks’ time, WRA administrators selected 10 sites as 
the long-term camp locations. Eisenhower made an agreement with John Collier, the director of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, to build one of the camps – which became the Poston War Relocation 
Center – on land of the Colorado River Indian Reservation. Although the mass incarceration of 
Japanese Americans was a new form of anti-Japanese discrimination, the logistics of the camps’ 
structures were influenced by the federal government’s entrenched policy of sequestering indigenous 
people on reservations. 
Supporters of Japanese Americans’ removal and incarceration framed their position in terms 
of the war effort, justifying their position by highlighting the supposed threat posed by Japanese 
Americans’ proximity to key military bases in California and the West Coast’s proximity to the 
nation of Japan. However, this justification was based on more racialization and jingoism than 
legitimate national security concerns. As Donald Teruo Hata, Jr., and Nadine Ishitani Hata note, the 
U.S. military knew by the end of June 1942 that Japan posed no serious threat to Hawai’i and the 
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West Coast.31 According to the Munson Report, which was a military intelligence briefing conducted 
prior to Pearl Harbor, almost all Japanese Americans on the West Coast were pro-American.32 
Government officials largely ignored the Munson Report and disregarded the measured assessments 
of the Navy and FBI officials. In the face of evidence to the contrary, the state nonetheless pushed 
ahead with internment as a method of safeguarding the imagined national community. The state 
apparatus had done so much to racialize Japanese Americans as dangerous enemy aliens that factual 
research, like the Munson Report, was unable to alter the state’s course of action. Racializing 
Japanese Americans as outsiders was such an integral part of the government’s wartime strategy that 
it could not be abandoned without upsetting the unstable equilibrium the state had constructed after 
Pearl Harbor. As a country at war, the physical and symbolic boundaries of the nation needed to be 
protected. The state redefined Japanese Americans as an enemy alien class, which was a potent 
justification for expelling them from the West Coast and denying them the rights and privileges of 
citizenship. Quarantining Japanese Americans allowed the state to foster a sense of national security 
and reinforced white Americans’ own sense of belonging and Americanness during the war. 
While the state constructed a massive bureaucracy to expel Japanese Americans from the 
West Coast, other state bodies were frantically organizing to limit an influx of migration to the West 
Coast by southern African Americans. As African Americans moved to California cities, local and 
state agencies scrambled to limit and control their settlement. The internal migration of African 
Americans upset local racial hierarchies. African Americans’ persistent mobility exposed the 
permeability of the nation’s internal borders in a system that aimed to rigidly control racialized 
groups. As such, the West Coast states began implementing restrictions on property similar to those 
in place in the southern states from which African Americans were leaving. In this way, the state 
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took steps to reassert the boundaries of belonging and community identity in order to exclude the 
incoming migrants. This exclusion reinforced the belief that, in an era of increased national unity, 
African Americans were ineligible for the full rights and privileges of citizenship.  
During the war, California became the epicenter of the nation’s defense industry, with 
shipyards operating in many major coastal urban centers. In the San Francisco Bay Area alone, the 
wartime shipyards built and launched over 1,400 ships – approximately one a day for every day of 
the entire war.33 Operating the wartime shipyards required a massive labor force. Initially, defense 
contractors sought to hire only local workers from the Bay Area. The defense industries tried to 
quash interstate migration from unskilled laborers clamoring for jobs in the western shipyards, 
fearing that a massive influx of unskilled workers would increase the burden on local relief and social 
welfare agencies and flood the already overwhelmed housing market. Instead, the shipyard operators 
mainly sought to hire white adult men in the region who were unemployed as a lingering impact of 
the Great Depression. The California Federation of Labor even launched a public relations 
campaign to discourage interstate migration to California.34 Without explicitly identifying Black 
workers as their target, West Coast employers and government agencies used well-established 
racialized rhetoric and frameworks to block African Americans’ physical mobility in order to 
maintain the pre-existing racial order. 
However, the war ramped up dramatically, and it became clear that the severe labor shortage 
necessitated a higher volume of workers. This shift in the war’s circumstances required the state to 
adapt its wartime approach to African Americans’ physical mobility. In order to accommodate the 
demands of the defense industry, shipyard authorities turned to unskilled laborers and out-of-state 
migrants, and the federal government helped to recruit laborers. Kaiser and other western shipyards 
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launched nationwide recruitment campaigns to bring hundreds of thousands of additional laborers 
from around the country to California. Federal and corporate labor recruiters traveled to poverty-
stricken areas of the Dust Bowl region and southern states, targeting areas with high unemployment, 
such as Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and North and South Carolina.35 By the end of the 
war, Kaiser had relocated 37,852 workers to Richmond with the help of recruiters, who covered the 
workers’ train fare to get to California, and an additional 60,000 workers came on their own with 
referrals from recruiters.36 
The West Coast shipyards advertised the California defense industry as a golden opportunity, 
drawing on the long history of California boosterism to entice workers. One Kaiser recruiting 
pamphlet extolled the virtues of the California climate alongside the economic stability the shipyards 
would provide workers: 
With or without experience, there’s a job of vital importance to your country waiting 
for you in the Richmond shipyards. And it opens a rare opportunity. You can learn a 
trade, get paid while you’re learning, and earn the highest wages for comparable work 
anywhere in the world. … You’ll be living where the sun shines 275 days a year – 
never a snowstorm, never too hot for comfort. … [Y]our job will be for the duration 
[of the war] and indefinitely beyond. … There is every indication that shipbuilding 
has returned to the Pacific Coast to stay.37 
 
This rhetoric was effective at drawing many people to California, especially African Americans from 
the economically depressed South. During World War II, California offered the highest wage and 
income standards in the U.S. In 1942, per capita income payments in California were 41.2 percent 
higher than the national average. According to Keith E. Collins, the move to California was even 
more lucrative for Black southerners than this figure suggests: “Many Blacks … advanced from 
domestic servants to common labors in the civilian industry to production workers in defense plants 
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by migrating and thus increased their income several fold.”38 Most Black southerners were poor, and 
many of the migrants who flocked to the West Coast hoped that westward migration would offer a 
path out of the social, political, and economic marginalization they had experienced for generations 
in the South.  
 Despite the prevalence of wartime recruiters, most African American migrants came to 
California on their own accord. In fact, the War Manpower Commission found in 1943 that nearly 
75 percent of all African Americans who migrated to the San Francisco Bay Area came to California 
without any direct contact with wartime recruiters.39 This figure demonstrates the degree to which 
the state neglected African Americans and strategically excluded them from the opportunity to reap 
the benefits offered by working in the western defense industries. African Americans who did 
engage with wartime recruiters were urged to travel to California without their families for the 
duration of the war. Recruiters who interacted with African Americans tried to minimize the scope 
and impact of Black migration to the West Coast. Pushing back against the state agencies’ plans, 
African American workers came to California with their wives and children or summoned their 
families after acquiring jobs.40 According to interviews conducted with Black Richmond residents, 
the most commonly cited factors for chain migration among African American southerners were 
letters written by family and friends encouraging people to move to the West Coast.41 Another key 
factor in the westward migration was the role of Black porters and other railroad workers, who 
disseminated information about California job opportunities across the South through the Southern 
Pacific and Santa Fe railway lines. Church congregations also influenced Black migration to the West 
Coast. For example, the War Manpower Commission noted that a Black Baptist church in 
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Shreveport, Louisiana, served as an organizing hub for migrants heading out West.42 The strategy of 
relying on community-based networks reveals the non-state channels that Black communities used 
to sidestep the government’s attempts to prevent them from moving West. Blacks’ resistance and 
continued migration required the West Coast’s state agencies to recalibrate their plans for controlling 
African Americans. 
 The unparalleled scale of African Americans’ wartime migration stretched the physical and 
political boundaries that had organized the pre-war racial order. In the first three years of the war, 
150,000 African Americans came to West Coast from the South.43 Between 1940 and 1945, the Bay 
Area’s Black population increased by more than 227 percent, growing from 19,759 people to 64,680 
people. In Oakland, the Black community grew from 8,462 people before the war to 21,770 people 
by 1944. In Richmond, the Black population grew by an astonishing 2,001 percent.44 These figures 
were so enormous that it was virtually impossible to confine Black migrants to limited ethnic 
enclaves or ghettoes. As Katherine Archibald noted in her study of the Moore Dry Dock Company 
shipyard, “Thousands of new Negro inhabitants, for the most part fresh from the South, were 
employed in the shipyards of the Bay Area – too many to be confined within the black belts already 
sanctioned by custom.”45 African Americans’ migration upset the unstable equilibrium and therefore 
could not be managed using the same pre-war strategies of exclusion and containment. To reimpose 
the status quo, the state undertook various projects to establish residential segregation across the 
West Coast and reinforce that African Americans did not belong there. 
 Inevitably, the influx of migrants to California urban centers strained the housing market and 
caused tensions between locals and newcomers. Residents expressed keen anxiety over the presence 
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of migrants, particularly regarding the fact that many of them were working class, rural, and Black. 
For southern African Americans migrants in particular, local California officials expressed doubt in 
their ability to be absorbed into the community: “The Negro who was born and reared here fits into 
our picture, but these Southern Negroes are a serious problem. They don’t get along with the 
Negroes who were born and reared here, nor with the white residents … If this in-migration is not 
stopped, until such time as these people can be properly absorbed into the community, dire results 
will insue [sic].”46 State officials and local residents made it clear that even if African Americans 
settled in the West, they would not be included in the community. 
 Beginning in late 1942, the government constructed war housing projects to accommodate 
the shipyard migrants who moved to California. The units established quotas for Black residents, 
capping them at 25 percent of total occupancy, and blocks of housing units were segregated.47 These 
housing projects were inadequate to accommodate the sheer number of African American workers. 
The government used spatial segregation in the housing projects to re-inscribe African Americans’ 
inferiority, deeming them unworthy of receiving an equitable share of the government’s social 
services and instead forcing most of them to figure out their own housing. 
 In the private sector, white property owners used restrictive covenants, which were a legally 
permissible form of housing discrimination, to block Blacks’ settlement. Although this form of 
exclusion was not directly mediated by the government, the decentered view of the state that Omi 
and Winant provide shows the ways in which these individuals’ actions were influenced and 
sanctioned by the federal, state, and local governments and inspired by the widespread practices of 
spatial segregation across the country and most notable in the Jim Crow South. In many California 
cities, “home improvement” associations led campaigns to ensure that all residential areas had 
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restrictive housing covenants to lock African American migrants out of buying or renting property 
in the area. Pasadena and San Gabriel Valley underwent this process in 1941. By the end of 1943, the 
African American population of Los Angeles had doubled, with virtually no change in the residential 
resources available to them. African American migrants were only eligible to reside in approximately 
5 percent of the city due to its rampant segregation policies. The state used residential segregation to 
exercise a level of control over the enormous population of migrants, limit their ability to establish 
roots in the communities, and entrench their racial subordination in a new region of the country. 
 Because of the limited housing options available, many African American migrants had to 
get creative to survive in their inhospitable new neighborhoods. In cities like San Francisco and Los 
Angeles, some African American families repopulated Japantowns from which Japanese Americans 
had been forcibly removed.48 North Richmond, which was mainly populated by immigrant families, 
people of color, and wartime migrants, was filled with trailers, tents, and other makeshift forms of 
housing. In West Oakland, up to 50 men would squeeze into dilapidated houses – often without 
indoor plumbing – that had been neglected during the Depression years. In some cases, men would 
sleep in shifts in “hot beds” to accommodate everyone.49 Policies of racial segregation forced 
African American migrants into dire circumstances as they struggled to settle on the West Coast. 
The state’s policies of exclusion and institutionalized neglect pushed African Americans to the 
physical and symbolic margins of western communities by denying them the ability to live 
comfortably in their new settlements. On the West Coast, a wide variety of state agencies came 
together to reinforce African Americans’ racial designation as an inferior class of Americans who 
were ineligible for full citizenship benefits. 
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In both the case of Japanese internment and the case of African American migration to the 
West Coast, the state quickly responded to societal shifts by implementing new forms of control and 
modifying pre-existing frameworks to fit the wartime context and demands. Moreover, the state’s 
wartime actions demonstrate the ways in which different parts of the state apparatus borrowed and 
adapted policies from one part of the country and applied them to another. Before Pearl Harbor, 
California had been the nucleus of anti-Japanese sentiment and legislation. After Pearl Harbor, these 
ideologies and policies gained currency among a much larger public. Nativist organizations and 
California politicians shared their goals and frameworks with the federal government, which 
incorporated those perspectives into its broader wartime racial project in order to make anti-
Japanese prejudice legible on a nationwide scale. Similarly, before the influx of African American 
migrants to the West Coast, few areas of the West Coast had developed comprehensive or explicit 
anti-Black policies. However, when African American southerners began moving there in significant 
numbers, local and state governments quickly drew upon the pre-existing frameworks that limited 
African Americans’ settlement in other parts of the country and applied them to the western 
context. The experiences of Japanese Americans and African Americans highlight the ways in which 
the state continued old practices while also introducing new strategies to maintain the racial status 
quo. In both cases, the goal of regulating citizenship and belonging by controlling racialized groups’ 
property rights and physical mobility – and the underlying legal mechanisms by which to achieve this 
goal – were the same; however, the state practiced its flexibility in terms of the new and modified 
forms deployed in order to enact this goal.  
 
Shifts in Economic Participation 
Although the state took actions to limit Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ 
citizenship and belonging during World War II, the demands of the wartime economy meant that 
the state simultaneously worked to harness these groups’ labor, while continuing to reinforce their 
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legal and social exclusion from the nation. The material circumstances of the war drew attention to a 
recurring tension: the state blocked people of color from belonging to the nation’s symbolic 
American community, while also depending on them as cheap, exploited sources of labor. During 
World War II, this dynamic was central to the state’s interactions with Japanese Americans and 
African Americans. Japanese internment precipitated the forcible severing of Japanese Americans’ 
relationships to their local communities, the dissolution of the Japanese American ethnic economy, 
and the redirection of Japanese Americans’ labor to benefit the war effort. Meanwhile, working in 
West Coast shipyards offered some unprecedented opportunities for African Americans to work in 
racially integrated settings, advance economically, and receive some legal protections from 
discrimination. However, these advances were only possible because they hinged on portraying 
African Americans as inferior and making them temporary measures that would only last for the 
duration of the war. 
 The war forced some shifts – albeit limited – in the widespread practice of racial segregation 
in the workplace. For example, Executive Order 8802, signed by President Roosevelt in June 1941, 
prohibited racial discrimination in all defense industries and established the Fair Employment 
Practices Committee (FEPC) to enforce the order.50 However, despite these shifts, racism and 
subjugation against Japanese Americans and African Americans proliferated in the workforce. 
Focusing on wartime labor extraction emphasizes the ironies and contradictions of Japanese 
Americans’ and African Americans’ labor being critical to sustain a country that discriminated 
against them. Moreover, this dynamic illustrates the state’s adaptability in maintaining the racial 
order by striking a balance between curtailing some rights and expanding others.  
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For Californians, World War II was “merely another chapter in a lengthy story of 
antagonism” against Japanese Americans in the workforce.51 Charles Kikuchi mused that the basis 
for anti-Japanese animus was primarily economic, noting, “Prejudice against the Japanese arose in 
large part from economic competition. The Japanese arose beyond the level of a ready available 
labor force to be exploited, whereas the Mexicans and Negroes in this state are still in a submerged 
status.”52 White workers and industry leaders viewed Japanese Americans as an existential threat, 
infiltrating the labor market and destabilizing white Americans’ economic hegemony. Beginning in 
the late nineteenth century, Japanese workers tried to gain entry into a variety of industries – such as 
logging, mining, fishing, and railroad work – to many white labor unions’ outrage. Many unions 
believed Japanese workers were strikebreakers, like the earlier generation of Chinese laborers. By 
1905, delegates representing more than 67 labor organizations convened in San Francisco to create 
the anti-immigration Asiatic Exclusion League.53 
White anxiety over economic competition resulted in employment discrimination against 
Japanese Americans. Many Japanese Americans were unable to find stable jobs, let alone lucrative 
positions. During his life, Charles Kikuchi worked a variety of low-wage, menial jobs, such as 
serving as a janitor at a Japanese beer parlor, a clerk at an art-store, a fish scaler, a window cleaner, a 
peach picker, a migrant farm worker, and a factory worker.54 By 1940, only 5 percent of Nisei 
worked for white employers in Los Angeles. The other 95 percent were either self-employed or were 
employed by other Japanese Americans. Japanese Americans were wholly barred from working in 
civil service jobs. As Matthew M. Briones notes, although Los Angeles’ Japanese American 
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population exceeded 30,000 people, on the eve of World War II, the city did not employ a single 
Japanese American “fireman, policeman, mailman, or public school teacher.”55  
Locked out of working in white-owned businesses, Japanese Americans developed internal, 
“ethnic economies.”56 In the Central Valley and Southern California, many Japanese American 
laborers had saved enough money to purchase or lease land to cultivate crops, such as vegetables, 
berries, and flowers. They contributed to the network of growing and distributing produce and other 
agricultural products in California. Participation in agriculture was so high that 20 percent of all 
Japanese Americans in Los Angeles worked at Japanese-owned and operated fruit stands.57 In urban 
areas across the state, Japanese Americans owned small businesses concentrated in Japantowns. 
 Given this history of economic competition and workplace discrimination, some Japanese 
Americans questioned the government’s rationale for internment, hypothesizing that internment was 
an opportunistic step taken to strip Japanese Americans of their property and businesses to 
neutralize a perceived threat to white economic interests. Kikuchi, typically cynical and probing in 
his assessment of the underlying motivations for many government policies, argued that internment 
was motivated by self-interested economic concerns and racial prejudice: “Many citizens, in the 
name of loyalty, are using the present war as a weapon to shove all Japs out while they have a 
theoretical legal chance. If we examine the motives behind many of the individual acts, I am sure 
that we will find personal and selfish reasons why they want the Nisei property to be confiscated and 
business competition eliminated.”58 
 This was precisely the case. Many anti-Asian nativist organizations in California – such as the 
California Joint immigration Committee, American Legion, and the Native Sons and Daughters of 
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the Golden West – had been advocating for policies that excluded Japanese immigrants and their 
descendants from the workforce for decades. Pearl Harbor provided a new justification for such 
policies and lent a new level of urgency to nativist organizations’ work. “This is our time to get 
things done that we have been trying to get done for a quarter of a century,” a member of the 
California Joint immigration Committee exclaimed. The managing secretary of the Grower-Shipper 
Vegetable Association of Central California underscored that the anxiety over Japanese economic 
competition was based in a more existential fear: “We’re charged with getting rid of the Japs for 
selfish reasons. We might as well be honest. We do. It’s a question of whether the white man lives 
on the Pacific Coast or the brown man.”59 Japanese Americans’ removal represented a way for white 
Americans to assert their economic dominance in the western economy, thereby reinforcing their 
own Americanness and first-class citizenship within the frameworks outlined by Harris and Welke. 
The government’s treatment of people of Japanese descent in Hawai’i (then a U.S. territory) 
completely contradicted all the justifications for internment based on military necessity and concern 
for national security. Executive Order 9066 was not implemented in Hawai’i, and only a small 
number of people considered dangerous or troublesome were detained or evacuated, since the 
workforce in Hawai’i was comprised of a majority of Japanese people. Briones incisively highlights 
the hypocrisy of this policy: “[I]n a bald-faced, hypocritical policy exception … the government 
bowed to its elites in the tropics and exempted Hawai’ians of Japanese descent from evacuation, 
allowing the uninterrupted production of profitable crops on island plantations. Despite the 
Japanese having attacked naval assets in Hawai’i, authorities saw no need to rearrange the economic 
priorities of the American empire in that part of the Pacific.”60 If the Japanese workforce in Hawai’i 
had been incarcerated, the island’s economy would have crashed. Japanese labor was crucial to the 
                                               
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 51. 
45 
production of many of Hawai’i’s most profitable exports, such as sugar, pineapple, and coffee. 
Incarcerating the group would have jeopardized over $100 million worth of exports.61 The 
differential treatment of people of Japanese descent in Hawai’i was one of the most striking 
demonstrations of state’s flexibility, which enabled it to deploy different strategies in different 
contexts to maintain the status quo. 
W. E. B. Du Bois argued that internment was a brazen, greedy, coordinated attempt to 
manipulate the nation’s workforce and consolidate economic power within white ownership: “The 
driving out of people of Japanese descent on the West Coast was not only the attempt to confiscate 
their savings without return, but to foment and prolong racial antagonism. The persons back of this 
wanted to keep serf Japanese labor in the Hawaiian islands and prevent the Japanese from working 
anywhere in the United States outside the West Coast.”62 Rather than appearing contradictory, the 
state’s different strategies to control people of Japanese descent on the mainland and in Hawai’i 
seemed to align when Du Bois analyzed them through a lens of racial control. 
Bolstering this perspective on internment, a key feature of the internment policy was 
exploiting incarcerated Japanese Americans’ labor to benefit the war effort at a drastically reduced 
cost. The WRA and WCD worked in earnest to locate sites where Japanese Americans could be 
isolated in self-sustaining concentration camps. Government administrators strategically selected the 
locations of the camps to maximize their productivity, with hopes of converting many of the desert 
locations into arable agricultural sites when Japanese Americans were eventually released. Ultimately, 
the government agencies settled on sites for the concentration camps in Arizona, Arkansas, eastern 
California, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming, “for the most part on publicly owned land which 
has possibilities of development for agriculture and other enterprises.”63 
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Rather than being static holding centers, the concentration camps can more accurately be 
seen as work sites – akin to indentured servitude or penal labor – intentionally and strategically 
crafted to maximize the economic benefits for the state. When Japanese Americans arrived at the 
concentration camps, which were mainly located in remote areas with harsh, arid climates, camp 
administrators put them to work doing construction and other outdoor labor: “land subjugation, 
building irrigation laterals and canals, and so forth.”64 The WRA’s emphasis on agricultural 
production and other manufacturing work made clear that the internment policy was engineered 
with the federal government’s economic interests at the forefront. The state used Japanese 
Americans’ detention to gain control over a racialized group that, in the pre-war era, had worked 
primarily in independent ethnic economies. Subordinating Japanese Americans and sequestering 
them in isolated camps enabled the state to harness the labor of a sizable class of people.  
The labor programs at concentration camps were very productive. In 1942, incarcerated 
Japanese Americans planted and harvested approximately 2,700 acres of crops. At the Gila River 
War Relocation Center in Arizona, where Kikuchi and his family were incarcerated, detainees were 
put to work “[tilling] and [cultivating] seven thousand ‘profitable’ acres of crops through a vast, 
labor-intensive agricultural program.”65 At Gila, several hundred Japanese Americans commuted to 
the cotton fields every day to pick long-staple cotton, creating an unsettling, if perhaps unwitting, 
parallel to enslaved Black people’s forced cotton harvesting in the antebellum South, which was 
enabled by their systematic dehumanization.66 WRA director Dillon S. Myer noted, “Before the close 
of the production season in 1943, it seems likely that the relocation centers will produce all their 
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own vegetables, all their eggs and poultry, and about half their meat requirements, largely in the 
form of pork and pork products.” He added, “This, of course, will help reduce the public expense of 
operating the relocation centers.”67  
The work done at concentration camps went beyond subsistence farming, and detainees’ 
labor greatly benefited the national economy. Incarcerated Japanese Americans worked to grow and 
harvest sugar beets, tomatoes, potatoes, beans, apples, cotton, and other crops for national 
consumption. Additionally, at Gila, two camp factories “completed projects for the military: one 
made camouflage nets and the other, model warships; the latter produced eight hundred models for 
the U.S. navy.”68 Some incarcerated Japanese Americans were even contracted out to work on offsite 
work projects that were in need of more laborers. When local farm workers left their homes to enlist 
in the military or join the defense industries, they left behind crops in need of tending and 
harvesting. This labor shortage was exacerbated by an inadequate flow of migrants to make up for 
the farmers who left. To fill in the gaps during the 1942 harvest season, “nearly 10,000 evacuees 
from ten relocation centers voluntarily assisted in saving thousands of acres of sugar beets. Among 
them were hundreds of workers who had never done farm work before – former office clerks and 
salesmen, mechanics and technicians, students, and even housewives.”69 During the 1943 harvest 
season, Japanese American farm workers traveled across the United States – extending as far as 
Nebraska, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio – to produce a variety of products, including 
poultry, milk, corn, wheat, and other grains.70 The state used the camps’ work projects to strip 
Japanese Americans of their economic independence. Incarceration was a useful framework to 
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control and redirect Japanese Americans’ labor, since it forced detainees to submit to the camp 
administrators’ orders. Subdued through an inmate-guard relationship to the state, Japanese 
American laborers were finally seen as valuable to the economy. 
In a May 15, 1942, diary entry, Kikuchi noted the exploitative nature of the labor 
configuration at the camps: “The thing that I have feared is going to happen. The WCCA and WRA 
announced today that thousands of Japanese would be granted special furloughs to help bring in 
America’s food crop … Japanese will be enlisted in a day or so to go to Eastern Oregon to harvest 
the sugar beet crop … This is nothing more than a work corps. What about resettlement?”71 As 
Kikuchi’s commentary suggests, the government’s emphasis on labor extraction prioritized the 
nation’s wartime interests over Japanese Americans’ wellbeing and resettlement opportunities. The 
state only seemed to value Japanese Americans when they were compelled to do work that suited the 
government’s economic needs. In the end, the Japanese American workers’ production was 
staggering: their efforts resulted in a yield of nearly one million tons of sugar beets, which provided 
approximately 297 million pounds of refined sugar for consumption in the United States.72  
Despite Japanese American workers’ misgivings about their exploitation, some white 
commentators, like Carey McWilliams, saw advantages to the government compelling its inmates to 
work. “[T]he WRA has a real opportunity,” McWilliams wrote. “It should provide not merely 
routine or commonplace jobs but devise a unique type of work for the Japanese – something that 
will enable the evacuees to make a special contribution to the war effort.”73 In this way, camp 
administrators and outside commentators simultaneously reified Japanese Americans’ difference 
from other Americans, while also signaling that they had an opportunity to shift their racial 
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designation through their forced labor. It is not coincidental that, in a nation built in part on 
enslavement, labor – and the degree of freedom associated with one’s labor – was a key site of racial 
formation. Japanese Americans’ racial identity was linked to foreignness and disloyalty, and the state 
identified labor as a tool to prove their loyalty and allegiance to the United States. In light of the 
revocation of their citizenship through internment, Japanese Americans were expected and 
encouraged to perform labor as a way to reassert their Americanness and demonstrate their 
commitment to serving the nation during the war.  
African Americans also experienced significant economic exploitation and shifting forms of 
discrimination in the workforce during World War II. Despite the increased demand for labor, the 
southern workforce remained stubbornly and rigidly segregated. Many of the wartime shipbuilding 
and aircraft production industries operating in the South refused to hire African American workers 
or blocked them from being promoted to more lucrative skilled positions. If Black workers were 
able to gain employment, they were often barred from vocational training programs that were only 
available to white workers. In its final report published after the war ended, the FEPC concluded 
that “very little progress in upgrading Negroes were made in the Southern and Gulf yards. With few 
exceptions, the yards south of Virginia utilized Negroes in a limited number of occupations, most of 
which were unskilled.”74 African American southerners were excluded from reaping the benefits of 
shipyard employment as part of maintaining the racial order in the South. 
Even when a few African Americans were able to gain entry into the southern defense 
industries, they experienced extreme hostility that made few of them stay in those occupations. The 
southern defense industries were plagued by racial violence. In May 1943, riots broke out in Mobile, 
Alabama, at the Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Corporation after federal authorities ordered 
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the shipyard to integrate. According to one Black worker at the plant, “A lot of the colored workers 
got beat up, and I was afraid to go back to the yard. … White men rode around … [and] threw 
rocks at our houses.”75 White workers took extreme steps to preserve the pre-war southern racial 
order, and these violent measures influenced African American workers’ migration out of the South. 
Immediately following the riots in Mobile, the quoted worker and a group of other Black workers 
left to go to Richmond, California, to try to find better employment opportunities out West. 
Without any clear opportunities for upward mobility in the South, some African Americans 
gambled on encountering different circumstances on the West Coast. According to the FEPC’s final 
report, in contrast to the southern shipyards, “the employment policies of the Maritime yards in the 
Northeast and on the West Coast were sufficiently flexible to permit a considerable utilization of 
nonwhites in a wide variety of skills.”76 This flexibility, indicative of the state’s decentered nature, 
was part of a strategy to harness the products of African Americans’ labor without resulting in long-
term social progress for African Americans. 
Katherine Archibald vividly portrayed the defense industry as growing and operating on a 
grand scale, whose need for a workforce was seemingly boundless. She wrote, “For months after 
December 7, 1941, the shipyards of the West Coast were ravenous for men, and they used effective 
propaganda to lure workers from all corners of the land. … [T]he shipyards absorbed them all. 
Color, age, sex, soundness of limb did not matter; whoever could walk or lift a welder’s stinger was 
welcomed.”77 At the peak of wartime employment, 20 percent of the personnel at the Moore Dry 
Dock were African American. About 80 percent of those workers were estimated to be from 
South.78 
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 While the employment possibilities of the western shipyards seemed remarkable, some 
workers were skeptical of the wartime boom’s long-term impact on African Americans’ economic 
prosperity. Louis Campbell, an African American Bay Area resident who lived in the region before 
the war began, wrote an article in the California Voice, an Oakland-based Black newspaper, in which 
he “urged black men to ‘look before they leaped’ warning that when the war was over, they would 
be ‘cast adrift in the army of the unemployed.’”79 Campbell feared that this employment boom was 
temporary, and that once the rapacious demands of the wartime defense industry receded, Black 
workers would likely be the ones to suffer most harshly from the cutbacks, harkening back to the 
adage of “last hired, first fired.” Campbell’s fear was rooted in a recognition of the state’s 
adaptability and the likelihood that the racial order would shift form again in the post-war era. 
Although the fear of future unemployment might have loomed in the back of Black workers’ 
minds, the demands of the war shifted the West Coast’s pre-war social and workplace norms in ways 
both large and small. The shipyards brought together people from vastly different backgrounds and 
social positions who “ordinarily were separated by geographical and social barriers” and put them to 
work together.80 This was a disorienting shift for white migrants who came from regions where 
segregation was customary in all sectors of public life. As Archibald noted, for many white workers 
who came to the West Coast, “Most, if not all, of these people had never used the same toilet 
facilities or eaten at the same tables or sat in the same streetcar seats with a Negro until they 
migrated to the shipyards.” However, Archibald reported that these white workers “accepted it 
without open revolt.”81  
This unity was not indicative of a sudden about-face or a decrease in racist attitudes. Many 
parts of Black society had been pushing for economic advancement during the early to mid-
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twentieth century through projects like the March on Washington Movement of the 1940s, 
organized by A. Philip Randolph. Militant African American activism that called for desegregation 
put pressure on the racial order and earned some concessions from the state, such as the creation of 
the FEPC in 1941. Black resistance led to some shifts in their position in the workforce. However, 
Archibald credited the social unity of integrated shipyards to a more practical answer: “Ships had to 
be built.”82 The workers were drawn together not by affinity, but by the reality of the war and the 
desire to win it. “The only bond that held together” the workforce, Archibald argued, “was the 
chance and temporary pressure of a wartime need.”83 
Before the U.S. entered World War II, Bay Area unions were the main driving force behind 
Black workers’ exclusion in the region’s shipyards. The region’s shipbuilding industry was 
“dominated by closed-shop agreements,” which meant that union membership was a requirement of 
employment at many shipyards, such as Oakland’s Moore Dry Dock.84 Only two of the major 
unions at Moore’s shipyard (the C.I.O Machinists’ Union and the A. F. of L. Laborers’ Union) 
welcomed Black members fully without resistance. The other unions only changed their policies 
once management and government policies made it clear that the only other choice was to lose the 
shipyards’ closed-shop status. Some, like the Boilermakers’ Union – whose local 513 chapter was the 
largest trade in the Contra Costa and Alameda County region, with 38,000 members – had no Black 
members before the war. Rather than integrating the union, the union created a segregated auxiliary 
unit in response to Black workers’ demands at the Kaiser shipyard, the “shameful” Auxiliary Unit A-
36, which granted “separate-and-unequal” membership to Black workers.85 Archibald noted that, 
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when these unions did open membership opportunities to African Americans, they “usually did so 
with reservations calculated to hasten a return to exclusiveness when the demands of war should 
slacken.”86 The unions’ changes in policy represented begrudging accommodations to the wartime 
racial order. Many unions attempted to make the changes temporary in an effort to re-establish the 
previous racial order as soon as possible. 
Given the tensions surrounding union membership at the shipyards, a key priority for the 
federal government was ensuring that any disagreements between management and union 
membership did not result in work stoppages that would negatively impact the war effort. 
Shipbuilding and other defense industries were governed by the National War Labor Board 
(NWLB), a federal agency President Roosevelt established through Executive Order 9017 in early 
1942. The purpose of the NWLB was to resolve wartime labor-management disputes. Similarly, 
shipyard leaders came together to formulate policies that would ensure that production continued in 
the face of all the federal policy changes and demographic shifts in the workforce. Kaiser and other 
shipyard employers met with the unions to form the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee. 
Together, the committee developed “an eight-point agreement designed to increase production, 
control migration, and smooth labor relations.”87 The various state agencies made it clear that these 
new policies and organizations were not the start of a new social order, but rather, an adjustment of 
the norms for the duration of the war, in service of winning the war. For the war effort, there 
needed to be a “subordination of cherished localisms to larger social unities,” and a major part of 
this was lifting restrictions on union membership and workplace segregation.88 
Despite the tangible and symbolic changes in shipyards’ policies, anti-Black discrimination 
and hostility still pervaded nearly every aspect of the workforce, from individual interactions 
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between white and Black workers to systematic policies. The inclusion of African American workers 
in the western shipbuilding industry caused extreme stress to the white laborers and managers. 
White workers and industry leaders feared that Black workers would overtake and dominate white 
Americans in every sense: 
The Negro, shipyard workers were acutely conscious, was not content in his place. 
He was relentlessly pushing upward, and it was the obvious burden of shipyard fear 
that he might not be satisfied with standing at the white man’s side, but would push 
farther still to dominate his dominators. Southerners had especially dire predictions 
to make. The Negroes, they warned, would come in ever greater numbers to the 
lenient West; even after the war they would keep swarming to its cities to settle. They 
would crowd the white man from his homes, neighborhoods, places of social 
gathering and entertainment. “It’s the niggers who are taking over California,” an 
Okie remarked. “Pretty soon a white man in this state won’t stand a chance.”89 
 
The integration of the defense industry seemed to represent an existential crisis for anxious white 
workers and management. White workers’ fears manifested in their day-to-day interactions with the 
Black colleagues. Many white workers individually protested and expressed disapproval with Black 
workers’ presence.90 Unable to re-establish the segregated racial order of the pre-war era, many white 
workers resorted to asserting their racial superiority by denigrating Black workers. According to 
Katherine Archibald, white shipyard workers complained incessantly about their Black coworkers, 
emphasizing their supposedly ingrained laziness, unintelligence, criminality, and moral and cultural 
deficiency: “The inferiority of the black man, as the white shipyard worker conceived it, was all-
pervasive and a fit subject for infinite argument and example. After the scorching wind of prejudice 
had passed by, the Negro was desiccated of every gift of nature.”91 White workers attempted to 
designate African Americans as inferior in order to secure their place atop the racial hierarchy in an 
integrated workforce. 
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In the face of racial integration, occupational segregation and discrimination did not totally 
dissipate but instead took on different forms. Marginalized groups, such as women and people of 
color, were allowed into new fields for the duration of the war, but they were still slotted into jobs 
and tasks that aligned with the stereotypes and preconceived notions about each group’s skills. For 
example, African American workers – believed by shipyard employers to be best suited for 
strenuous physical labor due to the stereotype of the Black brute – were often relegated to the hull 
trades, which required workers to do grueling labor outdoors, year-round. Black workers at the 
Moore Dry Dock mainly did menial labor, such as custodial and maintenance work, rigging, and 
welding.92 By contrast, Chinese Americans often were hired to electrical work because they were 
believed to be better suited for more detail-oriented, less physically demanding labor.93 This internal 
reorganization of the shipyards demonstrated state’s flexibility in terms of incorporating previously 
excluded groups into the workforce, while also maintaining an internal hierarchy that perpetuated 
the prevailing social order by reinforcing deeply ingrained logics about racial identity. 
For both Japanese Americans and African Americans, World War II dramatically changed 
their relationship to the national economy and their place in the workforce. Historically, Japanese 
Americans and African Americans had been targets of extreme resentment, anxiety, and consequent 
exclusion in the western and southern labor markets, respectively. During the war, different 
elements of the state apparatus dislocated both groups from their previous positions in the economy 
and redirected their labor to serve the war effort. For Japanese Americans in concentration camps, 
internment destroyed their pre-war ethnic economies and led to their subsequent absorption into the 
national economy. For African Americans, working in the West Coast defense industries provided 
new opportunities to work in integrated environments and granted them an unprecedented degree 
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of recognition for their role in serving the national economy. However, their economic advancement 
was coupled with extreme hostility from their white colleagues and supervisors. Despite the rhetoric 
of inclusion, the wartime shipyards upheld old modes of exclusion and only begrudgingly lifted 
some restrictions, which signaled that the expanded opportunities were temporary and would 
contract after the war’s end. Both the case of Japanese Americans and the case of African Americans 
reveals the endurance of the state in maintaining the racial order and its adaptability under pressure. 
World War II required the state to carefully recalibrate its deeply embedded legal and social 
structures in order to maintain continuity in the face of enormous societal changes. To construct 
and reproduce Japanese Americans’ wartime designation as enemy aliens, the federal government 
expanded and intensified its control over Japanese Americans’ movement and labor, drawing on the 
long history of immigration exclusion, alien land laws, and urban spatial segregation to shape the 
emergent internment policy. For African Americans, the government strategically eased some of 
political and economic barriers, but various state agencies also extended and expanded anti-Black 
policies to the West Coast. This environment ensured that, despite some wartime accommodations, 
African Americans were still largely consigned to and trapped at the bottom of the West Coast’s 
social, political, and economic hierarchies. The state refined the tactics it used to regulate racialized 
groups’ citizenship during the war, underscoring the state’s entrenched commitment to sustaining a 
racial hierarchy. The state reoriented both Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ relationships 
to property ownership, physical mobility, and the national economy in order to redefine and limit 




“Colored folks has got to stick together”: 
World War II and the Emergence of Afro-Asian Connections 
 
 One afternoon in the winter of 1942, Charles Kikuchi was walking around the Gila River 
War Relocation Center where he was incarcerated. While he was out, he stopped to talk to a young 
Black worker who was digging post holes to put up the fence around the camp. In his diary, Kikuchi 
recounted that the worker asked him about Japanese Americans’ loyalty and was disappointed when 
Kikuchi explained that most Nisei were pro-American. The worker responded, “Boy, you are 
making a mistake. Why should you be loyal to a country that don’t want you?” He continued, “This 
is a white man’s country and all the colored peoples of this world has got to change this so that I can 
get a good job just like a white man and I don’t have to dig post holes to lock you Japanese up who 
are born in California. You help this country out and they will turn around and give you a kick in the 
pants afterwards.”1 Kikuchi gently countered the worker’s pessimistic perspective, expressing hope 
that Allied victory in the war would change the status quo for the better, but the worker dismissed 
him. “The white man don’t ever give you a chance. I should know that,” the worker retorted. In his 
diary, Kikuchi reflected on the interaction, pointing out the ironies and significance of his encounter 
with the Black worker: “Here I am, a person conceited enough to think that I am just as good an 
American as anybody, but I have to be put behind a fence dug by a black man who doesn’t even feel 
that this is his country … It just doesn’t make any sense.”2  
Kikuchi’s interaction with the Black worker at Gila illuminates many of the complex racial 
dynamics at play during World War II. The shifting norms of the war, such as the mass internal 
migrations of Japanese Americans and African Americans, created new opportunities for racialized 
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people to interact and share their perspectives with one another. Kikuchi and the Black worker came 
into contact as a direct result of the war. Their communication highlights the similarities and 
differences in their outlooks on race relations in the United States based on their different 
experiences of racialization and state power. The conversation covered many salient issues: loyalty, 
interracial unity, the war’s role in affecting equality, and the nature of the relationship between 
Japanese Americans and African Americans. Talking to the Black worker clearly had an impact on 
Kikuchi, who seemed to internalize and mull over the worker’s perspective. This brief encounter 
was part of a broader trend during the war. Japanese Americans and African Americans began 
developing nascent forms of cross-racial identification and alliances with one another. These 
relationships provided forums for racialized groups to reconceptualize the state’s role in their 
oppression and generate strategies to push back against the established racial order. 
According to Carey McWilliams, “[I]t was the war that set the racial revolution in motion.”3 
McWilliams was a prominent white liberal journalist, author, and politician from California whose 
work addressed the state’s many cultural and political issues, including migratory farm work and 
Japanese internment. Witnessing the many injustices of the war era radicalized him and sensitized 
him to the nation’s issues of racism and inequality.4 Like McWilliams, many people in the United 
States and around the world viewed the war through the lens of race, especially regarding the status 
and unity of the “darker peoples” of the world, Japan’s imperial ambitions, and Hitler’s oppression 
of European Jews in his quest to achieve Aryan supremacy and dominance. Questions about the 
relationship between race, citizenship, and democracy were at the forefront of ideological battles 
that accompanied fighting on battlefield across the globe.  
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The primacy of these issues compelled many Americans to grapple with how these topics fit 
into their daily lives, but also with their ideas of the nation. The United States’ participation in a war 
to eradicate fascism abroad threw into stark relief the central contradiction of wartime domestic 
politics and practices that allowed for – and, indeed, relied on – the infringement of racialized 
groups’ citizenship rights. The state’s wartime efforts to restrict Japanese Americans’ and African 
Americans’ belonging was clearly out of alignment with national leaders’ professed commitment to 
the values of democracy around the world. Increased scrutiny of the gap between the state’s rhetoric 
and its actions led to demands from racialized groups that the state live up to its ideals of democracy 
and freedom. 
This chapter explores how Japanese Americans and African Americans responded to their 
state-sanctioned wartime oppression by forming alliances, developing a cross-racial identification 
and empathy with one another, and co-opting national discourses of democracy and Americanness. 
The redrawing of national “borders of belonging” that positioned both Japanese Americans and 
African Americans outside conventional definitions of “American citizens” led members of both 
communities to identify with the other’s plights. Wartime shifts in the definitions and experiences of 
citizenship caused these groups to reconceptualize their relationship to the state and to each other, 
since both groups experienced a profound sense of alienation from the nation. 
Historians, social scientists, and Ethnic Studies scholars have researched the dynamics of 
Afro-Asian solidarity in the United States. However, much of the scholarship situates this 
phenomenon in the context of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly the Cold 
War-era Third Worldism movement and the domestic alliances such as “Yellow Peril Supports Black 
Power.” This chapter reveals collaboration and alliances that reach back much earlier, and I argue 
that World War II was a watershed moment in modern U.S. race relations because it marked a point 
at which these racialized groups began to identify and analyze the power the state and its 
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representatives had over their lives and their freedom. Theorizing a common root to their 
oppression allowed Japanese Americans and African Americans to look beyond the particularities of 
their experiences and see the same underlying structures, perpetrators, and motivations. Japanese 
Americans and African Americans centered their cross-racial identification on their shared 
experiences of exclusion. They attempted to identify and critique the flexible tactics used to elevate 
whiteness and privilege the rights and superiority of the dominant class at their expense. 
These cross-racial relationships were significant because the state’s treatment of Japanese 
Americans and African Americans often took different forms based on the groups’ racial 
designations. Being designated as either an “enemy alien” or an “inferior American” resulted in 
different relationships to the state, based on the distinct tactics the state used to regulate various 
racialized groups’ property ownership, physical mobility, and economic participation. In many cases, 
Japanese Americans and African Americans recognized that their social positions and racial 
designations were both motivated by the state’s attempts to maintain control and establish a racial 
hierarchy. However, in some instances, the distinct expressions and impacts of state-sponsored 
racism obscured the commonalities in Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ experiences. 
These differences could sometimes lead to resentment, tension, and even antagonism between 
members of the two communities. Moreover, members of both groups had internalized some of the 
ideas the state promoted about the other group’s racial identity: Japanese Americans were not 
immune from harboring anti-Black attitudes, and African Americans were also susceptible to anti-
Japanese beliefs. Such perspectives made people fear that working together would be a liability 
rather than a benefit. 
Despite encountering some challenges to their incipient cross-racial identification, Japanese 
Americans and African Americans began to develop a potent framework for solidarity during the 
war. For these two racialized groups, the jarring shifts that occurred during World War II exposed 
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the state’s attempts to maintain a racial hierarchy. The state’s actions to restrict Japanese Americans’ 
and African Americans’ citizenship during the war led to common experiences of 
disenfranchisement and exclusion, even though different tactics were used to accomplish this. In the 
wake of the wartime shifts, both groups began to identify parallels between their experiences of not 
belonging to the nation. Working together and looking at their situations in comparison to one 
another enabled Japanese Americans and African Americans to identify the depth and breadth of the 
state’s role in shaping and perpetuating the racial hierarchy. Identifying the state as a common 
oppressor and an arbiter of citizenship helped racialized groups formulate theories and tactics to 
push back against the state. 
 
Pre-War Connections 
 Although World War II marked a turning point in the breadth and depth of interactions 
between Japanese Americans and African Americans, it was not the first time that these 
communities had engaged with one another or contemplated the nature of their relationship. Before 
the internal migrations of the war era, the relationship between Japanese Americans and African 
Americans was limited by their geographical distance from one another. In some instances, Japanese 
Americans and African Americans interacted with one another in shared urban communities as 
economic competitors. For example, in Seattle, Japanese Americans and African Americans were 
both positioned at the bottom of the social hierarchy, albeit for different reasons. According to 
western historian Quintard Taylor, Japanese immigrants were excluded because they “allegedly acted 
as clannish foreigners who resisted assimilation,” while African Americans were considered 
“unmotivated, uneducated workers.” Taylor explains that although “other Americans had specific 
rationalizations for ostracizing each group, African Americans and Japanese Americans experienced 
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strikingly similar treatment” in Seattle.5 Local customs and policies intended to maintain the white 
supremacist racial order prevented both groups from acquiring lucrative jobs or patronizing white-
owned establishments, and the city’s spatial segregation policies confined the two racialized groups 
to ethnic enclaves. 
Despite the similarities in their treatment, Japanese immigrants and African Americans were 
not naturally inclined to identify with one another because, at this point in time, immigration status – 
rather than race – was the defining marker of Japanese identity. As such, immigration was a central 
flashpoint issue that created tension and divergent goals between the communities. Immigrants from 
Japan were legally ineligible for citizenship, and this differentiated them from Blacks in the U.S., 
who were racialized as inferior, but Americans nonetheless. These differences in social position 
obscured the connections and overlaps in the state’s treatment of each group. 
African American newspapers grappled with the issue of restrictions on Japanese 
immigration in the early twentieth century. Early coverage treaded a fine line between arguing that 
limiting Japanese immigration would benefit African Americans by reducing the pool of labor 
competition, while also acknowledging that much of the anti-Japanese rhetoric and laws – especially 
those being promoted by nativist politicians and organizations on the West Coast – was deeply racist 
and discriminatory against Asian immigrants and their American-born descendants. On April 19, 
1924, the Chicago Defender published a cartoon that illustrated this precarious situation for African 
Americans. The image depicted a brick thrown by a California landowner – labeled “Land Shall Be 
Sold to Caucasians Only” – bouncing off a Japanese American and hitting an African American. The 
cartoon’s caption read, “Perhaps It Wasn't Intended for Us, But _______.”6 The evocative drawing 
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captured the complex situation and conflicted sentiments of many African Americans, who may 
have felt that limiting immigration from Japan and other countries would give African Americans an 
economic advantage, while also fearing that the rabid nativism and xenophobia of white immigration 
opponents could pose severe, unintended consequences for African Americans as well. Similarly, the 
same month that this cartoon was published in the Chicago Defender, the Baltimore Afro-American 
reported that it was crucial for the U.S. to place limits on immigration to maintain the country’s 
economic and political order. However, the newspaper argued that a full ban on Asian immigrants 
went beyond what restrictions were necessary and veered into hateful and discriminatory treatment 
against a marginalized population. According to the Afro-American, the ban on Asian immigrants 
“would keep Jesus Christ out of the United States today, should He return, just as effectively as the 
unjustice [sic] towards Negroes is shutting Him out of the hearts of many white Americans.”7 The 
Chicago Defender cartoon and the Afro-American article suggest that some Black community leaders 
already had a nascent understanding that the fates of the two groups were linked in significant ways. 
As the Japanese American community established roots in the U.S., the state’s racialization 
of the group solidified. In particular, as the American-born Nisei came of age, it became increasingly 
evident that even assimilated Japanese Americans with legal citizenship rights were subsumed within 
the racial designation of untrustworthy, perpetual foreigners. War with Japan and the mass 
incarceration of Japanese Americans made people of Japanese descent the targets of revulsion, fear, 
and consternation from the government and civilians alike. In the pre-war era, anti-Japanese 
sentiment was racialized, but it was also fundamentally shaped by xenophobia and anti-immigrant 
sentiments. However, during the war, the government codified anti-Japanese sentiment in broad 
racial terms by categorizing all Japanese Americans as inherently disloyal and alien, regardless of 
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their immigration status, level of assimilation, or political affiliation. Japanese Americans, as the main 
social “problem” of society during the war years, came to inhabit a space that African Americans 
were accustomed to occupying by themselves. This shift created new points of connection between 
Japanese Americans and African Americans and facilitated their cross-racial identification during the 
war. 
As analyzed in the first chapter, the federal government rapidly created and deployed an 
expansive legal framework after Pearl Harbor that curtailed Japanese Americans’ legal citizenship 
rights as well as their cultural belonging to the nation. Simultaneously, federal, local, and state 
governments took steps to staunch the flow of Black migration to the West and limit African 
Americans’ social and economic mobility. While many of the wartime anti-Black policies represented 
an expansion of pre-existing forms of control and racial formation, internment seemed to represent 
a new iteration of state power, whose apparent departure from previous modes of control shocked 
and concerned many civilians, including African American political leaders. The state’s ability to 
forcibly displace and incarcerate citizens on such a large scale demonstrated its flexibility and broad, 
decentered power to enact new policies and alter pre-existing policies to maintain a system of white 
supremacy that boosted white Americans’ power and sense of belonging. Recognition of the 
adaptability of federal power to assume authority over its citizens of color drove some Japanese 
Americans and African Americans to reconsider their own social positions as well as think about the 
broader implications of the policy and what it meant for racial identity in the United States.  
 
Cross-Racial Ideological Exchange 
Before and during the United States’ involvement in World War II, there was a sustained 
pattern of Japanese Americans and African Americans recognizing the similarities and differences 
between the two groups’ experiences with racism and learning from these perspectives. Japanese 
internment had a major impact on Japanese Americans’ understanding of their racial identity and 
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position in society. In the pre-war era, Japanese Americans – both the immigrant Issei and the 
American-born Nisei – experienced employment and housing discrimination, economic hardships, 
harassment, prejudice, and violence. However, despite the clear markings of second-class citizenship 
(and the more literal legal denial of citizenship for Japanese immigrants), many Japanese Americans 
hoped that by working hard and trying to assimilate into white American culture that they would 
gain acceptance and belonging. For many Issei, their status as immigrants clearly marked them as 
outsiders in a nation with a strong nativist presence. Many of the legal frameworks of exclusion – 
the ban on immigration from Japan, alien land laws, and the ban on naturalization – were targeted 
towards those born outside of the United States. As such, the Issei looked toward their American-
born children, whose birthright citizenship could, in theory, enable them to gain access to the 
privileges and rights denied to Japanese immigrants. Yuji Ichioka, a preeminent scholar of Japanese 
American history and identity, writes that in the pre-war era, the Issei hoped that through an 
Americanized upbringing, the Nisei could serve as a “bridge of understanding” between their 
immigrant parents and white American society.8 Issei believed that learning English and assimilating 
to normative white American customs, while still developing a positive sense of their Japanese 
heritage, could enable Nisei to overcome the discrimination their parents faced. They hoped that 
these steps would prove the Nisei were worthy citizens and help them gain acceptance in the U.S., 
paving the way for future generations and overcoming the marginal status that their immigrant 
parents were unable to shed.  
The federal government’s forced removal and mass incarceration of all people of Japanese 
descent – approximately 60 percent of who were U.S. citizens by birth – demonstrated the state’s 
homogenization and racialization of the Japanese American community. All Japanese Americans on 
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the West Coast, regardless of immigration status or professed national loyalty, were condemned after 
Pearl Harbor; their ethnic identity was the defining factor that determined their treatment by the 
state. The government’s collective punishment of people of Japanese descent forced Japanese 
Americans, especially the assimilated Nisei, to reckon with their racial identity. 
Japanese Americans contemplated and negotiated their shifting racialization and altered 
citizenship status by considering the racialization of other marginalized groups, including African 
Americans. Throughout American history, people of African descent have been marked as the most 
visible and persistently marginalized racial Other in the nation. On October 8, 1939, the Los Angeles 
Japanese Daily News published an editorial by Dr. Yasuo Sasaki that compared the experiences of 
Niseis and African Americans and analyzed the African American community’s responses to their 
racist treatment. Sasaki highlighted several African American figures known for being outspoken and 
politically engaged, such as assemblyman Augustus Hawkins, composer William Grant Still, and 
actor Clarence Muse. Sasaki argued that Japanese Americans should follow these leaders’ examples 
and become more politically engaged and militant.9 Similarly, in his June 7, 1942, diary entry, Charles 
Kikuchi recounted a statement Bill Sasagawa made during a panel discussion on Christian Niseis’ 
attitudes toward the U.S. government. In stark contrast to the speakers who suggested that pacifism 
and belief in Christianity were the solutions to Japanese Americans’ current problems, Sasagawa 
argued to the group of Nisei college students that the incarcerated Japanese American community 
should learn from African Americans’ experiences with racism and emulate their militant reactions 
to it. Kikuchi wrote, “[Sasagawa] said that the Negroes only get things because they fought for their 
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rights and we should do the same.” He continued, “we should fight for what was ours and we would 
if we really felt like Americans and believed in the democratic principles.”10 
While detained at the Tanforan Assembly Center, located at a racetrack south of San 
Francisco, some of the more socially conscious Japanese Americans were beginning to view their 
wartime incarceration in relation to African Americans’ longstanding experiences of abuse, neglect, 
and second-class citizenship in the U.S. In his speech, Sasagawa referenced an earlier historical 
precedent set during World War I and connected it to Japanese Americans’ present situation of 
intense persecution. Sasagawa argued that, like African Americans, Japanese Americans were being 
mistreated and that it was necessary to stand up and fight for their rights. He foregrounded the 
importance of self-advocacy and adherence to the democratic ideals that the state often promised 
but rarely granted to its citizens of color. In a later diary entry, Kikuchi showed that Japanese 
Americans’ careful attention to African Americans’ social position persisted throughout the period 
of internment. On October 25, 1943, Kikuchi proudly reported that his sister, Bette, was beginning 
to get “much more socially conscious now,” as she was “discussing [the Negro problem] in her 
social problems class. She bought a recent New Republic magazine because there was a very 
interesting section in it on the whole Negro situation.”11 These examples suggest that for some 
Japanese Americans, looking to African Americans’ situation was a way to make sense of the 
confounding experience of racial discrimination and the revocation of citizenship they were in the 
midst of processing. 
 There was also a history of African Americans looking towards Japanese Americans for 
guidance in their quest to gain social acceptance. Before Pearl Harbor and the intensified nationwide 
vilification of Japanese Americans, some African Americans believed that Japanese Americans’ 
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modest successes provided a template that African Americans could adopt in order to elevate their 
social, political, and economic status. Although Japanese Americans experienced discrimination 
from white society, especially on the West Coast, some African American leaders observed that 
Japanese Americans had developed several key bulwarks that seemed to insulate them from some of 
the harshest forms of racism to which African Americans were subjected and helped them to 
advance economically while African Americans were locked in a permanent underclass. Booker T. 
Washington noted, “The Japanese race is a convincing example of the respect which the world gives 
to a race that can put brains and commercial activity into the development of the resources of a 
country.”12 The Japanese American community’s ability to operate self-sufficient businesses and 
community organizations appealed to African American leaders, who did not necessarily recognize 
or acknowledge the ways in which many Japanese Americans’ independent businesses and insular 
community organizations were products of the ghettoization and exclusion they faced.  
Blacks who praised Japanese Americans were impressed by the community’s ability to 
conform to tenets of respectability politics, seemingly pulling themselves up by their bootstraps to 
develop businesses and community organizations. African American leaders and writers lauded 
Japanese Americans for their independence and work ethic.13 George S. Schuyler, a columnist for 
the Pittsburgh Courier, went as far as to call the Japanese Americans the “most industrious, thrifty and 
best behaved citizens in this country.”14 Other noted figures, like W. E. B. Du Bois and California 
Eagle publisher Charlotta Bass, echoed this sentiment and encouraged African Americans to model 
their behavior on that of Japanese Americans. African American leaders’ admiration for Japanese 
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Americans was based on the belief that Japanese Americans’ successes could serve as a catalyst to 
dismantle the prevailing social order that prioritized whiteness. James Weldon Johnson observed 
that Japanese Americans’ social and economic clout could topple white Americans’ monopoly on 
the nation’s social, political, and economic norms. Calling Japan “perhaps the greatest hope for the 
colored races of the world,” Johnson stated matter-of-factly that “if industry and thrift on the part 
of the Japanese farmers mean the end of the white race in California, well, let it end.”15 If Japanese 
Americans could hasten the demise of white supremacy, it seemed prudent for African Americans to 
align themselves with Japanese Americans and follow their lead.  
 In addition to the emphasis on Japanese Americans’ economic self-sufficiency and self-help 
in the U.S., some African Americans looked to Japan as a leader for global racial liberation. In the 
buildup to World War II, pro-Japanese discourses sometimes represented the nation’s imperial 
ambitions as a more benevolent campaign to lead people of color around the world. In the spring of 
1942, Roi Ottley, an African American journalist, wrote in Common Ground, “When the Back-to-
Africa movement collapsed, it left a residue of fierce race- and color-consciousness which has 
propelled many a Negro movement since. Stimulated as they were, many Negroes turned to Japan as 
the messianic race and the hope of the darker peoples of the world.”16 There was a widespread 
admiration for Japan among African Americans, who saw the East Asian nation as an ally in the 
fight against white supremacy in the United States. Grassroots campaigning done by several Asian 
men working in the economically depressed areas of the United States, including the Midwest and 
the sharecropping regions in Arkansas, helped to bolster this image of Japan. Naka Nakane, who 
came to the United States from Japan at the end of World War I, organized African Americans in 
the Detroit area in the early 1930s. Nakane’s activism made him a target of the U.S. Department of 
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Justice and government intelligence agencies, which believed he was a “mouthpiece for Japanese 
propaganda asserting that Japan would protect black Americans in their struggle against white 
supremacy.” U.S. authorities deported him in 1934.17  
One of Nakane’s colleagues, Ashima Takis, worked to recruit members of Chicago’s African 
American community to Nakane’s organization, the Pacific Movement of the Eastern World.18 In 
1933, a federal informant reported that Takis gave a fiery speech to a Black crowd in St. Louis that 
addressed the injustice of their oppression and called them to action. “Negroes! You are too easy to 
be fooled by anybody and especially by white people,” Takis began. “White man pushes you ahead 
as cattle in any war and uses you as a shield, but when the spoils of the war are to be divided, white 
man is then in front and if any Negro raises only a finger of disapproval of white man’s actions, 
white man cuts off not only Negro’s finger, but whole hand! … Why should you respect the white 
man when the white man has nothing for you but a bloody whip.”19 Takis’ fierce rhetoric appealed 
to some African American midwesterners, like Burt Cornish, a Black elevator operator in St. Louis 
who reported that Takis was encouraging African Americans to immigrate to Japan, where they 
might find better paying jobs and social equality. Cornish was one of thousands of African 
Americans in St. Louis who joined the pro-Japan movement.20 The appeal of figures like Takis and 
Nakane suggests that some African Americans looked to Japan as an example of a powerful, 
independent, non-white nation that could help African Americans achieve their goals of racial justice 
at home in the United States. 
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In his Common Ground article, Roi Ottley clarified that, although African Americans had 
developed close bonds with Japanese Americans and felt an affinity with Japan, many African 
Americans were somewhat critical of Japan and did not fully agree with the nation’s actions. Ottley 
explained that African Americans “to a man are outraged by the treacherous assault upon their 
country” following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, and he pushed back against the notion that 
African Americans felt allegiance with Japan as a result of “having digested Japanese propaganda 
whole cloth.” African Americans, he argued, were critical and conscious observers who were 
sympathetic to Japanese rhetoric “because the ‘yellow Aryans’ drew no color line.”21 Ottley’s 
perspective balanced the many different outlooks of African American leaders and thinkers. He 
reasoned that African Americans who felt common cause with Japanese Americans or supported 
Japan did so because the United States took actions and implemented policies that harmed them. 
Betrayed by their own country, African Americans looked to other sources to seek their freedom 
and try to obtain the rights and privileges of full citizenship. 
Some Japanese Americans and African Americans developed relationships and friendships 
prior to any affinities inspired by the war. These pre-existing relationships between individuals 
cultivated a sense of empathy and mutual care that made people personally invested in achieving 
equity and justice for all. While many communities were racially segregated in disparate 
neighborhoods and regions of the country before the war, there is a documented pattern of Japanese 
Americans and African Americans coming together in urban centers on the West Coast, particularly 
in Southern California and Seattle, Washington. Charles Kikuchi, who vocally advocated for the 
rights of African Americans and other people of color, was raised in a multiracial orphanage in 
Healdsburg, California, an experience which shaped his outlook on race relations going forward. 
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Matthew M. Briones writes that Kikuchi “created a surrogate family of his own” at the orphanage, 
explaining that Kikuchi had “‘brothers’ who were African American, Native American, Mexican, 
Chinese, and white.”22 Briones argues that this formative experience sensitized Kikuchi to the 
experiences and needs of people different from him: “Kikuchi was earnestly hypersensitive to the 
predicament of those most severely abused and violated in the proverbial American family: 
minorities in general, but African Americans in particular.”23 The personal relationships Kikuchi 
cultivated while at the orphanage gave him a personal connection to and investment in the wellbeing 
of those he considered to be part of his extended family. 
 
The Slippery Slope of Internment 
 Government officials’ decision to displace and incarcerate Japanese Americans set a 
powerful legal and social precedent for state-sponsored racial discrimination by treating Japanese 
Americans as foreigners. The state’s ability to strip American citizens and residents of their 
citizenship and national belonging signaled to African Americans that, under the right 
circumstances, authority figures might be able to craft a justification for denationalizing them, too. 
As for Japanese Americans, internment shockingly indicated their status as outsiders and second-
class citizens. The undeniable currents of racial hostility that undergirded internment forged a new 
racial consciousness among Japanese Americans, who began to more vocally and intentionally 
connect their experiences of oppression to African Americans’ parallel experiences. Likewise, for 
some incarcerated Japanese Americans, the pain of internment allowed them to empathize with 
African Americans’ long history of exclusion and alienation from the nation. Japanese Americans 
and African Americans were keenly aware of the shifting policies and attitudes of the state during 
the war, and they recognized and drew attention to the ways in which many disparate institutions 
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worked together to serve the common goal of maintaining power structures which subordinated 
both groups. 
Many African Americans found the ease and speed with which the state erected the legal 
framework for Japanese internment alarming. Leading Black writers predicted that the precedent set 
could have broad implications that impacted other racialized groups. Writing in the midst of 
Japanese Americans’ forced removal from the West Coast, George S. Schuyler warned his Black 
readers that the incarceration of Japanese Americans “may be a prelude to our own fate. Who 
knows?”24 Likewise, in June 1942, the Post War World Council, composed of many different activist 
organizations, met in New York to discuss internment and strategize the best way to respond to the 
policy. During the meeting, Mike Masaoka, of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), 
appealed to the other activist organizations assembled by emphasizing the potential for internment 
to have wide-ranging, devastating consequences. Records of the meeting note that Masaoka 
“pointed out that, if this can be done to Japanese citizens, no one could tell what group might be 
affected next.”25 Schuyler and Masaoka suggested that Japanese internment represented a slippery 
slope that could portend further revocation of rights for people of color. 
Black political thinkers also worried that the legal framework set forth to justify internment 
could be used directly to target African Americans, since measures like Executive Order 9066 
targeted people of Japanese descent without explicitly referring to their race. Such policies 
established a framework that could be adapted to use against other racialized groups. In April 1942, 
Roy Wilkins, a civil rights activist and journalist who would go on to serve as the executive director 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1964, wrote an 
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article in the New York Amsterdam Star-News that detailed his uneasiness about the swiftness and 
severity of the ongoing forced removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans. He wrote, “[T]he 
steps which have been taken to move thousands of Japanese American citizens from their homes 
into virtual concentration camps do not reassure thoughtful Americans who love this democratic 
ideal of ours above all else.” He then floated the possibility that “internment for Japanese now 
[could mean] internment for African Americans later.” The piece closed with Wilkins’ genuine 
distress about the ease with Japanese Americans had been stripped of their rights and citizenship: 
“Does it mean anything to be an American citizen?”26  
Matthew M. Briones suggests that Wilkins may have been somewhat sarcastic about the 
likelihood of Black internment; however, figures like Schuyler also considered this to be a plausible 
outcome. In his “Views and Reviews” column, Schuyler fiercely critiqued Japanese internment, 
characterizing it as a push by “viciously reactionary elements to take away the citizenship of native-
born citizens of Japanese ancestry.” Schuyler dismissed official claims that Japanese internment had 
been a military necessity, arguing it was a calculated step to “take away the citizenship of native-born 
Americans simply because of ‘race.’”27 His comments alerted readers to the possible ways in which 
racially discriminatory revocations of citizenship could be applied to African Americans. Schuyler 
pointed out that the Native Sons of the Golden West, a xenophobic nativist group based in 
California, had suggested that African Americans be stripped of their citizenship in addition to 
Japanese Americans. Introducing another parallel between the experiences of Japanese Americans 
and African Americans, Schuyler noted, “There has been talk of sending these citizens ‘back’ to 
Japan (where most of them have never been) after the war. This is exactly what Senator Bilbo has 
been contending for the Afro-American citizens. We should get out of our heads immediately the 
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idea that this program cannot and will not be carried out.”28 Here, Schuyler alluded to Senator 
Theodore Bilbo, a staunch segregationist from Mississippi, who was intrigued by the “Back to 
Africa” movement of the 1930s because he saw it as a method to maintain racial segregation. During 
a filibuster of a proposed anti-lynching bill in 1938, Bilbo suggested the mass “deportation or 
repatriation” of the United States’ entire African American population to Liberia.29 Several weeks 
later, Bilbo announced that he would propose an amendment to the next New Deal public works 
appropriations bill that would implement a deportation/repatriation policy for African Americans.30  
Schuyler’s concern stemmed from the fact that African Americans were beginning to be 
considered a “nuisance and a social liability by many influential white people and organizations.” 
The characterization of African Americans as national burdens or threats could be possible grounds 
to “denationalize millions of Afro-American citizens” because such depictions categorized Blacks as 
un-American and even anti-American. Japanese internment relied in part on characterizing Japanese 
Americans as subversive, foreign elements who were not contributing to the overall national 
economy, which served as a justification for their expulsion from the West Coast.31 Because of the 
risk of segregationists using Japanese internment as a gateway to enact other policies of racial 
discrimination, Schuyler concluded that it was prudent for African Americans to fight against 
internment and other forms of anti-Japanese racism. 
 
Burgeoning Cross-Racial Relationships and Empathy 
The concerns expressed by Schuyler, Masaoka, and Wilkins revealed that some community 
leaders felt that there was an intrinsic cause for unity between Japanese Americans and African 
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Americans by virtue of both being non-white. The racial meanings and social positions ascribed to 
different racialized groups changed over time, but the emphasis on people’s physical appearances 
anchored the racial order in something that seemed tangible and immutable. Japanese American or 
African American racial identity could be associated with many different things based on the social 
context, but people’s external features were used as a shorthand to indicate their relative social 
position: white or non-white. The state rigidly segmented and categorized racial groups according to 
physical features, but in reality, people were not so easily confined to these boxes. This perspective 
was poignantly captured in the writings of leading African American writers like Langston Hughes 
and Chester Himes, both of whom used the subtle spectrum of skin color to express a sense of 
familiarity between their racial identity and Japanese Americans’.  
Hughes, writing in the Chicago Defender, evocatively argued that all racialized groups shared a 
linked fate because of their similar status as oppressed groups: “From the saffron-skinned Japanese-
American citizens of Los Angeles to brown-skinned Mexican-American citizens is only a step … 
From the brown Mexicans to the vari-colored Negroes is only a step, too … Logically speaking, 
color has nothing to do with citizenship or democracy. But prejudice and the mob-spirit pay logic 
no mind.”32 Hughes argued that, although racial groups are rigidly defined and demarcated in name 
– placing Japanese Americans, Mexican Americans, and African Americans into different siloes – 
their skin colors reveal their fundamental similarities and unities. Hughes emphasized that there was 
very little that separated the situations of Japanese Americans, Mexican Americans, and African 
Americans. As such, he reiterated the importance of sticking together. Likewise, in Chester Himes’ 
seminal novel If He Hollers Let Him Go, the protagonist Bob Jones comments, “I was the same color 
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as the Japanese and I couldn’t tell the difference. ‘A yeller bellied Jap’ coulda meant me too.”33 With 
this declaration, Himes, like Hughes, blurred the line between the experiences of Japanese 
Americans and African Americans, demonstrating the fragility and permeability of the borders that 
distinguished the two groups. Hughes and Himes pointed to the malleability of state-sponsored 
racial oppression and the state’s shifting targets for racism and discrimination. This recognition 
enabled African Americans to foster an emotional, personal connection to the plight of Japanese 
Americans. 
When the WCCA and WRA ordered Japanese Americans to go to temporary detention 
facilities and concentration camps, African Americans came out to demonstrate their support and 
extend a helping hand to their friends and acquaintances. Quintard Taylor describes an incident in 
Seattle, in which an unnamed African American man drove a Japanese American family to the train 
they would take to go to a detention center. The man assisted the family with their luggage and 
waited with them as they boarded the train. Thomas Bodine, a Society of Friends interpreter, 
witnessed the interaction and recalled that the African American man said to the Japanese American 
woman, “You know that if there’s ever anything I can do for you whether it be something big or 
something small, I’m here to do it.” Turning to the woman’s husband, he continued, “Goodbye now 
and good luck.” Before the family left on the train, the Black man got on his knees and hugged the 
Japanese American couple’s three children.34 This touching display of friendship, support, and 
connection between Japanese Americans and African Americans was echoed in the writing of 
Himes, who also referenced his personal connection to an incarcerated Japanese American family in 
If He Hollers Let Him Go. Himes moved into the same house that Mary Oyama, the Nisei woman 
from Los Angeles mentioned in the first chapter, was so worried about losing during the internment 
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order. In a pseudonymous account, the protagonist in Himes’ novel laments the internment of his 
former neighbor, “Little Riki Oyana,” a character whose inspiration was drawn from one of Mary 
Oyama’s sons, Rickey.35  
In his book New World A-Coming, Roi Ottley also commented on the amicable friendships 
between Japanese Americans and African Americans and noted African Americans’ neighborly 
response to Japanese Americans in the wake of internment. Ottley wrote, “A friend of mine who 
visited the main evacuation center in Los Angeles frankly reports that he was amazed to see that 
almost a fourth of the visitors were Negroes.”36 In his diary, Kikuchi recorded a similar impression 
of the African American community’s strong presence while he was incarcerated at the Tanforan 
racetrack. In a June 14, 1942, entry, Kikuchi observed that there were many African American 
visitors: “This afternoon we went up to the grandstands to look at the visitors. … The Negroes are 
coming down here in increasing numbers.” Kikuchi noted that some prominent African American 
figures – like Peter Ray, a “dancer who used to perform with Duke Ellington’s band,” and Walt 
Gordon, Jr., a football player at U.C. Berkeley – came to visit some of their detained friends.37 
Kikuchi also wrote about his friend, Melvin Stewart, who he had met while they both attended San 
Francisco State College. According to Kikuchi, Stewart was impacted by seeing the number of 
African American visitors to Tanforan and said in response to the turnout: 
You know who are your real friends now. A lot of use are behind any movements 
that will fight this thing because we have had to face a lot ourselves and so are 
opposed to anything so un-American. … [W]hen we actually see you people in camp, 
we go out mad as anything and want to do something about this great injustice 
because we know you Nisei are just as loyal as we are. The color of the skin is no 
indication of loyalty – we can testify to that.38 
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Stewart’s heartfelt statement underscored the depth of his identification and empathy with Japanese 
Americans. As white Americans disavowed Japanese Americans, many African Americans stepped 
in to show their support.  
 The war also brought together Japanese Americans and African Americans who had 
previously experienced no relations with one another. Before the war, there were virtually no 
Japanese Americans living in the South. However, during the war over 16,000 Japanese Americans, 
from both the mainland U.S. and Hawai’i, came to Arkansas and Mississippi.39 Japanese Americans 
were incarcerated at two concentration camps in Arkansas (Jerome and Rohwer), and Nisei soldiers 
trained at the Camp Shelby military post in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. While in the South, Japanese 
Americans witnessed firsthand the system of Jim Crow segregation for the first time. Upon 
encountering the South’s entrenched Black-white binary system of racial hierarchy, many Japanese 
Americans were deeply unsettled by the anti-Black racism they witnessed and also confused about 
how they, as neither white nor Black, fit into the South’s racial schema. As historian Jason Morgan 
Ward argues, Japanese Americans confounded the rigid racial binary of Jim Crow, and their presence 
in the South had the potential to destabilize the system of segregation.40 As such, white city officials 
in Hattiesburg attempted to prevent Japanese American soldiers from forming relationships with 
local African American residents. To try to prevent interracial alliances from forming, the local 
government classified Japanese Americans as white, which would constrain them from using the Jim 
Crow facilities designated for African Americans. Furthermore, city officials “prohibited Nisei 
soldiers from entering black neighborhoods and socializing with local African Americans” in their 
attempts to quash friendships and alliances.41 
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 Horrified by the routine anti-Black discrimination and violence they witnessed, Japanese 
Americans often defied the policies put in place by white government officials and struck up 
friendships and relationships with African American civilians and soldiers. Japanese Americans 
stood up for African Americans by occasionally lashing out against the unjust system in place and 
siding with Black southerners. Segregated buses were one setting in which Japanese American 
soldiers repeatedly pushed back against the racism of Jim Crow. Mike Tokunaga, a soldier from 
Hawai’i, remembered an incident in New Orleans, when he witnessed a bus driver push over an 
elderly Black woman. “I grabbed the bus driver by the shirt and dragged him off the bus,” Tokunaga 
recalled. “Six of us kicked the hell out of him for knocking that poor black woman down.”42 
Exposure to the indignities of the South’s racial hierarchy radicalized some Japanese Americans and 
compelled them to fight back against white supremacy, sometimes literally. Bill Hosokawa, a Nisei 
journalist for the Des Moines Register, traveled to the Arkansas Delta region during the war to report 
on the region’s WRA camps. Hosokawa noted that the African Americans he met during his time in 
the South frequently expressed that “colored folks has got to stick together.”43 Tokunaga and 
Hosokawa’s reflections highlight that both Japanese Americans and African Americans found value 
in building relationships and sticking together. 
Japanese American soldiers would intentionally disobey the racial decorum they were 
expected to uphold in order to side with Black southerners. In the South, Japanese Americans were 
awkwardly slotted in the middle of a racial hierarchy in which they did not have a clearly defined 
role, and many of them chafed at their indeterminate position. Although they were classified as 
white, Japanese Americans would disregard this designation and use the segregated facilities meant 
for African Americans. According to Joseph Hattori, “It was beyond our power to change” Jim 
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Crow, “so when we sat in the back of the bus on purpose, we were making a statement.”44 As 
Hattori’s comment suggests, some Japanese Americans living in the South felt conflicted about the 
discriminatory and contradictory system of Jim Crow that placed them as Japanese Americans above 
African Americans, and they resisted the attempts to keep Japanese Americans and African 
Americans separated and in opposition to one another. By willfully disregarding and distorting Jim 
Crow, some Japanese Americans forcefully shifted their racial designation in order to ally themselves 
with African Americans. 
 
A Holistic Racial Consciousness 
 The personal relationships that Japanese Americans and African Americans had before the 
war or developed as a result of their wartime circumstances gave people insight into the lived 
experiences of other racially marginalized groups. This proximity enabled Japanese Americans and 
African Americans to analyze the mechanisms of the state that kept both groups locked in 
subordinate positions. In the Los Angeles Tribune, Homer Jack, a white clergyman who helped found 
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), argued that people needed to move beyond superficial 
expressions of interracial cooperation – such as visiting Japantowns or “slumming it in Negro 
nightclubs” – and begin engaging in more substantive coalition-building and activism by “reading 
pamphlets, distributing literature, organizing meetings, and protesting discriminatory institutions.”45 
Jack urged readers to realize that true solidarity – or, “brothership” – was not easy to attain or put 
into practice, but it was vital for mutual survival. People of color must “live as brothers or perish,” 
Jack concluded.46 Rhetoric like Jack’s helped expand the analysis to a structural, institutional level 
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rather than just an interpersonal level. This shift in perspective enabled Japanese Americans and 
African Americans to formulate and articulate deeper, more compelling expressions of solidarity 
based on an understanding of their shared oppression as non-white citizens. 
Some Japanese Americans developed a relatively holistic racial consciousness that 
emphasized the linkages between the problems affecting Japanese Americans, African Americans, 
and other racialized groups and the interconnectedness of their solutions. Larry Tajiri’s searing and 
incisive article, “Farewell to Little Tokyo,” published in the Winter 1944 issue of Common Ground, 
proposed a new framework with which to deal with racism in the U.S. that illustrated this shift in 
mindset. Tajiri chronicled the experiences of Japanese Americans as they prepared to be released 
from concentration camps and outlined the ideological shifts that had occurred within the 
community as a result of their years-long incarceration. In his article, Tajiri deftly reframed the 
question of racism, emphasizing that it was not caused by the Japanese American community’s 
failure to succeed economically and politically but rather was a product of the “racial attitudes of the 
dominant white majority.”47 Recognizing this fact, Tajiri argued, “The problem of Japanese 
Americans being predominantly one of color and race, its ultimate solution will depend on 
correlation with other problems of color and race in America today. This fact is slowly seeping into 
the consciousness of the group.” The intense anti-Japanese hostility of this era – combined with 
“intensified … racial hypersensitivity” developed in the “mono-racial world of the relocation 
camps” – resulted in a substantial shift in Japanese Americans’ conceptualization of their social 
status.48 Tajiri argued, “Before evacuation, there was little in the way of a common color 
consciousness felt by Japanese Americans in their relationships with other colored groups. … But 
the racial nature of evacuation developed a recognition among many Japanese Americans that they 
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were inescapably relegated to a place on the color wheel of America, that their problem was … and 
is part of the unfinished racial business of democracy.”49  
Notably, Tajiri’s analysis emphasized that Japanese Americans’ newfound racial 
consciousness extended beyond the borders of their own community and included an awareness of 
other racialized groups. Tajiri concluded his article by juxtaposing the situation of Japanese 
Americans with that of African Americans in the Jim Crow South: “With this realization came a 
corresponding awareness of the urgent and demanding color problem of the American Negro … 
Thus, fact by fact and incident by incident, Japanese Americans are coming to the realization that 
theirs is only a part of the nation’s race problems.”50 Tajiri urged readers to recognize that 
internment and Jim Crow were “synchronized parts of the whole ‘American problem” rather than 
isolated or wholly disparate systems of the state.51 With this reconceptualization, Tajiri articulated a 
powerful framework that Japanese Americans and African Americans could use to express 
meaningful gestures of solidarity with one another. 
Like Tajiri, Charles Kikuchi underwent a profound shift in his perspective on race during the 
war era, and he began to see Japanese Americans’ oppression as one component of a much larger 
system of racial hierarchy and white supremacy operated by different parts of the state apparatus. 
Reflecting on what he learned from his pre-war and wartime relationship with Louis Adamic, who 
wrote prolifically about ethnic diversity and immigrants’ experiences in the U.S., Kikuchi explained 
in a 1988 interview, “I guess what [Adamic] wanted me to do was to break out of this ‘Japanese 
American solution,’ which I was seeing as the only problem [and] to put it into its proper 
perspective in terms of … other minority groups in this country that were having many problems, 
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including Blacks, Indians, and other groups.”52 Like Tajiri, Kikuchi’s rhetoric on race emphasized 
recognizing and empathizing with the experiences of others.  
Kikuchi did not view race through the prism of just Japanese American identity. Briones 
suggests that Kikuchi’s holistic mindset toward race relations in the U.S. was a form of “double 
consciousness,” a term coined by W. E. B. Du Bois to describe the sensation of feeling that the 
many facets of one’s identity are fragmented or at odds with one another, which prevents individuals 
from establishing a singular, unified identity. As Du Bois explained in the context of Black identity, 
African Americans view the world from their own perspective and also view themselves as they 
might be seen by white Americans. Briones argues that Kikuchi’s “ability to relate to marginalized 
members of society – migratory workers, gang members, laborers, African Americans and other 
ethnics – stemmed in large part from his own status as a marginal man.”53 Kikuchi’s understanding 
of his own marginalization and oppression compelled him to care deeply for others who also 
experienced the devastating consequences of racial prejudice and systematic discrimination.  
To make sense of the anti-Asian racism that characterized Japanese internment, Kikuchi and 
Tajiri looked beyond the confines of the Japanese American “problem” to see if they could identify 
the overarching state frameworks that linked racism against Japanese Americans to racism against 
other groups. Likewise, for some African American leaders and thinkers, recognizing the dire 
consequences of internment was a catalyst that pushed them to expand their focus to address the 
pressing reality of American racism against non-Black communities of color. A unified theory of 
racial oppression in the United States reframed the issue of racism to look at the underlying root of 
white supremacy rather than just its effects on people of color. This shift was significant because it 
formulated a method to make sense of racism and attempt to change people’s circumstances by 
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going directly to the source of the problem, which demonstrated that all these “problems” – the 
“Oriental problem,” the “Negro problem” – were inseparable because they, in fact, were products of 
the United States’ problem of white supremacy. United by their oppression, Japanese Americans and 
African Americans joined forces to achieve a mutually beneficial goal: upsetting the ideologies and 
structures that undergirded their oppression. 
This unified theory of oppression led to a proliferation of comparisons between the 
situations of the two groups, based on the analysis of the common root problem of the state-
sanctioned racial hierarchy. Many Black leaders’ critiques of the government’s treatment of Japanese 
Americans relied on comparing Japanese internment to Jim Crow. Situating these experiences within 
a common rubric helped to make legible the common actors and motivations driving both 
internment and anti-Black racism. In a fiery editorial titled “A Contagious Disease,” the Chicago 
Defender argued that African Americans’ concern for Japanese Americans stemmed from the 
similarities they identified between the state’s treatment of Japanese Americans and its treatment of 
African Americans. “As Americans, the Negroes have but one genuine concern for the Japanese,” 
the article explained. “That relates to the native-born Nipponese of the West Coast who today are as 
much the victims of racial prejudice as any Negro in the South. The current issue of Time Magazine 
gives a revealing picture of the Pacific Coast witch-hunt that differs little from the Rankin-brand 
anti-Negro propaganda in the South.”54 The article went on to decry the “furious wave of race-
baiting on the [West] Coast that rivals a lynching bee in Mississippi.”55 Likewise, in a 1940 report, 
Floyd Covington, the Los Angeles Urban League director, raised the alarm that he believed that 
California’s treatment of its residents of color put it on track to “[relive] almost identically the same 
experiences that imprinted themselves upon the historical South during the slave period.”56 These 
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attempts to contextualize the situation of Japanese Americans within a framework of American anti-
Black racism helped to make visible the common actors that perpetuated racial oppression against 
both groups.  
Central to the comparisons made by the Defender and Covington was the role of the state in 
coordinating and maintaining a white supremacist hierarchy. Anti-Japanese and anti-Black politicians 
borrowed tactics, rhetoric, and legislative agendas from one another. Jason Morgan Ward notes that 
Southern segregationist politicians were some of the most vocal and ardent supporters of Japanese 
internment outside the West Coast. Aside from John Rankin, who is perhaps the most well-known 
example in the historiography of internment, there were also figures like Senator Arthur Thomas 
Stewart from Tennessee, who argued that Japanese Americans were “utterly unassimilable” and 
should be stripped of their rights.57 Historian Kevin Allen Leonard emphasizes the ease with which 
state proponents of anti-Japanese racism and anti-Black racism learned from each other and used a 
common framework to demonize and discriminate against racialized people. Pointing to the fear of 
miscegenation and the practice of implementing school segregation, Leonard argues, “After 1880, 
the rhetoric of anti-Asian activists increasingly resembled that of white southerners.’58 These 
comparisons demonstrate that the similarities between Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ 
experiences were not limited to individuals’ racial prejudice but were part of a coordinated racial 
hierarchy kept in place by a vast state apparatus that transcended sectional boundaries. Enacting 
white supremacy, in various forms, was a central goal of the state. With this recognition, being 
dedicated to unity, rather than succumbing to divide and conquer tactics, had the potential to help 
people of color defeat white supremacy. 
 
                                               
57 Ward, “No Jap Crow,” 90. 
58 Kevin Allen Leonard, “‘Is That What We Fought for?’ Japanese Americans and Racism in California, The Impact 
of World War II,” Western Historical Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1990), 464.  
87 
Tensions and Obstacles to Interracial Alliances 
 Despite the profundity of the connections between Japanese American and African 
American communities, the wartime relationship between the two groups was also turbulent at 
times. Some Black proponents of civil rights did not think it was prudent for African Americans to 
focus on another community’s needs before their own problems had been resolved. Kelly Miller of 
Howard University, for example, was a notable exception to the trend of African Americans’ 
identification with and affinity for Japanese immigrants. He rejected the claim that African 
Americans naturally had common cause with Japanese immigrants, instead arguing that, unlike 
immigrants from Asia, African Americans had a greater stake in American citizenship given their 
long history in the country. Miller forcefully differentiated between the positions of African 
Americans and Japanese Americans, arguing that Japanese Americans were trying to gain acceptance 
they had not earned. “The Negro is an American citizen whose American residence and citizenry 
reach further back than the great majority of the white race … and his claims to patrimony are his 
just and rightful due,” Miller wrote. “The Japanese, on the other hand, is the eleventh hour comer, 
and is claiming the privilege of those who have borne the heat and burden of the day.”59 Although 
blunt and perhaps callous, Miller’s argument does highlight that African Americans had suffered at 
the hands of the state for centuries, enduring a variety of brutal and oppressive social orders that in 
turn enslaved, subjugated, exploited, and disposed people of African descent. Given this history, he 
thought it seemed unfair or undeserved for Japanese Americans to be able to reap the benefits of 
citizenship more quickly and with more ease than those racialized groups who were supposedly 
more “American” and who had been waiting for much longer to get their citizenship rights.  
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Miller questioned whether it was wise or self-serving for African Americans to take up issues 
relevant to the Japanese American community before the needs of African Americans had been met. 
Miller argued that it was strategically unwise to focus so much on problems affecting non-Black 
communities. He feared that addressing the issues of Japanese immigrants would distract from fixing 
African Americans’ problems. Instead, Miller argued that dealing with the particular concerns of 
African Americans should come first before trying to take on other groups’ specific issues. Miller’s 
mindset and concerns stemmed in part from the fear that that associating with another racialized 
group would harm African Americans’ own chance for acceptance from the state and white society.  
Although Miller’s conclusions were self-serving, there was some merit to the reasons for his 
apprehension. Alliances between racially marginalized groups signaled to the state that there could 
be intense pushback against its policies, which could result in a crackdown or intensification of state 
oppression to maintain the equilibrium. Especially after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924 
– which banned immigration from Japan – it seemed self-evident to some African American leaders 
that publicly aligning with such an intensely stigmatized and shunned group like the Japanese would 
only hurt their cause. From a strategic perspective, it seemed that Japanese exclusion had prevailed. 
It appeared foolish to link African Americans’ struggle to an intensely unpopular cause, especially 
since anti-Japanese prejudice was inextricably bound up in the belief that people of Japanese descent 
were perpetual foreigners. As David J. Hellwig summarizes the situation, “The Japanese had lost 
their long struggle. Blacks would serve neither their cause nor that of the Japanese by continuing to 
equate the plight of the two groups.”60 Likewise, Japanese Americans feared that aligning themselves 
with the “confrontational tactics associated with African American civil rights organizations” would 
impede rather than advance their “campaign for human dignity.”61 Both Japanese Americans and 
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African Americans feared that aligning themselves with another racially stigmatized group would 
undercut their attempts to gain a place in the national community and make them seem like cultural 
outsiders. 
 
The Fear of Disloyalty 
The state positioned both Japanese Americans and African Americans outside the nation’s 
borders of belonging, and those who chose to associate with racial Others were at risk of also losing 
their belonging. As such, the state framed many of the attempts at interracial activism as examples of 
a disloyal fifth column, since both racialized groups were believed to harbor un-American (or not 
properly American) tendencies. As Kenneth C. Barnes has detailed in his research on African 
American Arkansans’ history of political exchange with Japan, the specter of a disloyal, treasonous 
alliance between Japanese Americans and African Americans was a trope that preceded World War 
II, but the wartime fixation on the loyalty of citizens of color heightened white authorities’ 
preoccupation with the formation of an Afro-Asian fifth column.62 State agencies, the press, and 
nativist groups constantly questioned Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ loyalty during the 
war. 
Government officials, like General John DeWitt of the WDC, accused Japanese Americans 
of being saboteurs, enemy aliens who supposedly were orchestrating plans to attack the U.S. from 
within and reveal their allegiance to the Axis powers. African Americans, although not immigrants 
or clearly linked to a particular country of origin, also faced the stigma of being considered disloyal 
to the nation. Newspaper columnists churned out a high volume of alarmist articles about the 
existence of a fifth column, often based on flimsy evidence. Arthur Caylor of the San Francisco News 
boldly announced, “My story is that, whatever the philosophy involved, the enemy’s agents in our 
                                               
62 See Barnes, “Inspiration from the East: Black Arkansans Look to Japan,” 201-219. 
90 
town are not neglecting an attempt to create a Japanese-Negro anti-white-race fifth column,” basing 
his broad conspiracy on the mere fact that the “Japanese colony and the Negro colony in San 
Francisco are close enough neighbors to provide many contacts. They share some things in 
common.”63 Government officials also made unsubstantiated claims of a vast conspiracy between 
Japanese Americans and African Americans. In the government’s national investigation of race riots 
during the war, Congressman Martin Dies, Jr., of Texas, the chairman of the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities, “ordered the seizure of JACL files and specifically cited Japanese agents as 
fomenters of disorder and violence in Detroit.” John Rankin backed up Dies’ baseless claims, 
asserting that Japanese infiltrators were “stirring race trouble” in the U.S.64 These claims of a fifth 
column conspiracy justified the government’s attempts to keep Japanese Americans and African 
Americans separated and enabled the state to undermine any alliances that emerged. Divide and 
conquer “bolstered the legitimacy of white authority, helping to cement a relationship that hinged on 
control and containment.”65 
In instances where Japanese Americans and African Americans had a more substantial 
history of working together, white authorities’ apprehension about the potential for a fifth column 
was even more heightened. For example, several months after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, an FBI 
agent came to Mississippi County, Arkansas, to check up on African American residents’ political 
activities to see if they harbored any pro-Japan sentiments. Eight years earlier, an Asian man, a 
Mexican woman, and two Black men had been arrested and convicted on the charge of anarchy for 
attempting to organize African American residents to form a chapter of the pro-Japan group, the 
Original Independent Benevolent African Pacific Movement of World.66  
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The preoccupation with a fifth column demonstrated the state’s inability to reckon with its 
own actions and policies that had drawn Japanese Americans and African Americans into interracial 
alliances with each other. “In attributing black unrest and low morale to Japanese agents and 
propaganda,” Mark Gallicchio writes, “[federal agencies] fell back on a time-worn tradition of 
defenders of the racial status quo by blaming outside agitators.”67 The condemnation of Japanese 
Americans and African Americans as disloyal was a powerful tool to crush dissent and the stifle 
legitimate grievances of citizens of color. Because of the increased emphasis on loyalty during the 
war, being branded as disloyal was a major obstacle to achieving equality or receiving government 
support for their campaigns. As Cheryl Greenberg argues, “Federal officials … used ‘military 
necessity’ to hide racism and disarm potential critics. Such transformations have marked many 
important policy discussions with the use of rhetorical masks such as ‘national security’ or ‘law and 
order.’”68 Military necessity was used as a powerful blanket justification for many wartime policies, 
and it was used a cudgel to silence critics and bend skeptics into submission.  
The state was able to shield itself from valid criticisms by tarring dissenters as opponents of 
the U.S. war effort. This strategy was somewhat successful at suppressing the concerns of civil rights 
groups and racial justice advocates because many of these organizations relied on government 
support to enact their policy preferences. Being seen as opponents of the government’s agenda 
could lead to these organizations’ ostracization or provoke an intense crackdown on the racialized 
groups they represented, which was one of the worst possible outcomes for those engaged in the 
struggle for justice. Therefore, it was prudent for organizations and public figures to publicly express 
their allegiance to the government, even if the government’s policies were at odds with their 
principles. For example, the National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW) had repeatedly criticized 
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the government’s plan to forcibly remove and incarcerate Japanese Americans in 1942, but less than 
two years later, the Council effectively reversed its position, voting to publicly praise the WRA for 
its handling of internment, despite the depth of its initial concerns. As one NCJW delegate noted 
during the internal debate over the WRA resolution, “[A]s a minority group it is of great advantage 
… and certainly it is a wise policy to commend our government for acting in a democratic fashion 
towards another minority group.”69 This sentiment was, at its core, pragmatic: many organizations 
felt that they depended on the state for recognition and approval, so it was necessary to curry favor 
with the state and publicly make clear where their loyalties laid. Being branded as disloyal or anti-
American was a powerful strategy to silence Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ legitimate 
concerns and coerce them to comply with the state’s wartime policy agenda. Opposing the 
government could further marginalize stigmatized groups or justify more discrimination against 
them. Being painted as disloyal was dangerous for people already considered un-American and 
disdained. 
 
A People’s War for Democracy 
 Japanese Americans and African Americans wanted to counteract the accusations of fifth-
column activity and disloyalty to the nation. To do this, many of them framed their expressions of 
solidarity with other racialized groups to fit within the rubric of patriotism outlined by the state 
during the war. The U.S. government characterized World War II as a global war for democracy, 
freedom, and equality. Japanese Americans and African Americans emphasized these same 
principles in their organizing efforts. Criticizing the government in an oppositional way may not get 
them far, but if groups were able to affirm their commitment to the same principles which the 
government professed, they could promote their cause as a larger part of the American war effort.  
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The Double Victory movement – also known as the Double V movement – was one of the 
most effective examples of mobilizing the state’s rhetoric to promote the rights of African 
Americans and people of color more broadly. The Double V movement took the state at its word 
that it was committed to fighting for democracy and called the government to put this goal into 
practice domestically as well as internationally. In his Master’s thesis on the Double V movement in 
Los Angeles, Harlan Dale Unrau explains the origins of the movement: “Many black Americans had 
gone into World War I with high morale, because they believed that the democratic slogans with 
which the war was fought … but the race riots, lynchings and continued rigid segregation following 
the war left bitter memories in the minds of Negroes that would linger in the future.”70 World War I 
had exposed the gap between the government’s words during a national crisis and its actions. When 
the U.S. entered World War II, many African Americans – especially those who remembered the 
previous war – were apprehensive, recognizing that the state was not likely to put its lofty wartime 
rhetoric into practice at home. Instead of taking the government’s commitment to democracy at face 
value, African Americans decided to more forcefully advocate for racial justice during World War II 
by explicitly linking “their racial demands to the American war aims” in hopes of bringing about 
meaningful change.71 
 With the heightened emphasis on these principles, some writers asserted that the nation’s 
internal contradictions were a hindrance to the war effort, arguing that it was necessary for the state 
to remedy its internal inequalities and racial discord to boost its legitimacy as a global leader for 
democracy. In a fiery editorial in the New York Amsterdam News, Julius J. Adams challenged the 
government to live up to its promises and grant full citizenship rights to African Americans. “Either 
Negroes are citizens and are entitled to all the rights guaranteed all other citizens,” he wrote, “or 
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they are not citizens and have no rights in law or equity, except that which is given through the 
mercy of the majority. Certainly it would be embarrassing and world-shaking for the United States to 
announce to the world that it doesn’t consider its Negro residents full citizens entitled to all 
privileges and opportunities and protection granted American citizens under the law.”72 Kikuchi 
shared Adams’ sentiment, musing in his diary, “It does seem a little inconsistent that our war aims 
conflict with what is carried on in this country in many states. Evacuation of the Japanese is just one 
small, but important part of it. The problem of our 13 million Negro population is much larger. … 
Treatment of colored people in this country is directly connected to our ‘aim’ to free the colored 
people abroad.”73 Roi Ottley was more blunt in his analysis: “Race conflicts in the United States are 
of undoubted propaganda value to the Nipponese.”74 This statement was a direct challenge to the 
United States to re-examine its own policies. For example, perhaps a fifth column was not the cause 
of the United States’ wartime struggles, but rather it was the state’s own mistreatment of its citizens 
of color. M. Margaret Anderson of Common Ground framed the issue in more positive terms than 
Ottley, but she reached the same general conclusion. “Freedom for the world and freedom for the 
Negro at home in America are not mutually exclusive concepts,” she wrote. “[I]nstead, they 
reinforce each other, they give good conscience to our world crusade.”75 Figures like Adams, 
Kikuchi, Ottley, and Anderson argued that it was in the nation’s best interest to resolve its internal 
contradictions around race and citizenship for people of color. 
 Some organizations and writers embraced the rhetoric of World War II as a war for 
democracy, positioning themselves as effusively patriotic in hopes of making a convincing case for 
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racial justice that was compatible with the state’s own goals. In its defense of Japanese Americans, 
the Chicago Defender preempted its critique of the government’s actions by shutting down the notion 
that its perspective was a product of disloyalty. Instead, the editorial professed the depth of African 
Americans’ patriotism by asserting, “The facts are that the Negro people have been proved through 
every war to be the most loyal and patriotic segment of America simply because they have no 
loyalties or links to any other land. The Negroes of America represent proportionately the largest 
native-born group in the land.”76 Likewise, the NAACP released a statement one day after Pearl 
Harbor affirming African Americans’ unwavering loyalty to the U.S. and arguing that part of this 
loyalty was to fight for full civil rights for citizens of color: “Though 13 million American Negroes 
have more often than not been denied democracy, they are American citizens and will as in every 
war give unqualified support to the protection of their country. At the same time we shall not abate 
one iota in our struggle for full citizenship rights here in the United States.”77 The NAACP 
statement linked their two wartime goals as being congruent with one another, not at odds as the 
state would try to suggest.  
In a February 28, 1942, Pittsburgh Courier article, Horace Cayton embraced the language of the 
war effort, arguing that “The Negro is engaged in a struggle to make this a peoples’ war for 
democracy, not just a white man’s war.”78 Writing in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, Tooru 
Kanazawa made a poignant, almost imploring appeal for Japanese Americans’ loyalty and 
commitment to democracy to be recognized, echoing much of the same rhetoric deployed by 
Cayton. “We are all engaged in this war for democracy,” Kanazawa wrote. “We believe in it. We 
want to see it stamp out prejudice and discrimination which are symptoms of the very thing we are 
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fighting – fascism. And when the war is finally over, we know it will be found that we Japanese 
Americans have acquitted ourselves creditably and honorably in the defense of our country.”79 Roi 
Ottley affirmed this emphasis on a war fought for the principles of democracy and put the onus on 
the state – rather than its subordinated citizens – to put this policy into practice: “If, as we declare 
daily, the United States is fighting a war to extend democracy to all peoples, then the Federal 
officials must fall into step and dictate policies which envision a new and democratic era. They must 
lead the way, not pander to backward localities.”80 These appeals were a savvy rhetorical strategy, 
because they fit the war effort into a teleology of progress, framing it as part of the American 
narrative of its ascension to fulfill its core promises and uphold its most cherished principles as a 
nation. This was a compelling tactic to use, even if some people did not truly feel a deep well of 
patriotism or loyalty to the U.S., as certainly many disillusioned and mistreated Japanese Americans 
and African Americans would be justified in feeling. 
World War II increased the breadth and depth of interactions between Japanese Americans 
and African Americans. During this era, people came into closer physical proximity with one 
another and learned more about the situations the other racialized group faced. These personal 
relationships fostered a sense of common ground between Japanese Americans and African 
Americans. During this period of adjustments to and shifts in the racial order, members of both 
racialized groups expressed that they were sympathetic and supportive of others who also 
experienced racism, alienation, and exclusion. People looked beyond their interpersonal relationships 
during this period and began to develop an incipient sense of solidarity, empathy, and identification 
with one another. Japanese Americans and African Americans recognized that the state was 
implementing policies that harmed them during the war. The experiences of the war sharpened 
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people’s racial consciousness and expanded their focus to look beyond their immediate communities 
and examine the state’s role in maintaining the racial order. The war also provided a lexicon and 
framework of democracy and universal equality that cross-racial alliances harnessed, arguing that 
these principles must be applied universally and consistently to all marginalized groups. This rhetoric 
allowed Japanese Americans and African Americans to fit their goals within a patriotic framework 
while still expressing sentiments critical of the state. World War II was a watershed moment for 
cross-racial relationships. During the war, racialized groups collaborated with one another to 
strengthen their calls for freedom and full citizenship rights, subscribing to the notion that there is 
strength in numbers and that working together to achieve shared goals would advance their cause. 
Japanese Americans and African Americans laid important groundwork during the war that 




“The Race War That Flopped”: 
The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Ethnic Enclaves in San Francisco and Los Angeles 
 
In John Okada’s seminal 1957 novel No-No Boy, the protagonist, Ichiro “Itchy” Yamada, is a 
young Japanese American man struggling to navigate life in the post-war U.S. and grappling with his 
relationship to the state after spending the past four years incarcerated – the first two years in a 
WRA concentration camp and the next two in prison for refusing to fight in the U.S. military. The 
novel opens with Ichiro returning to his hometown of Seattle, Washington, and attempting to 
acclimate to his surroundings. The narrator describes Ichiro’s perspective as he walks down Jackson 
Street, the main thoroughfare of Seattle’s pre-war Japantown between Fifth and Twelfth Avenues:  
Being on Jackson Street with its familiar store fronts and taverns and restaurants, 
which were somehow different because the war had left its mark on them, was like 
trying to find one’s way out of a dream . . . The war had wrought violent changes 
upon the people, and the people, in turn, working hard and living hard and earning a 
lot of money and spending it on whatever was available, had distorted the profile of 
Jackson Street. The street had about it the air of a carnival without quite succeeding 
at becoming one.1 
 
Ichiro’s reaction to his former neighborhood testified to the significant changes the war had caused 
in Seattle’s Japantown. Central to these changes was a change in residents. Absent were the Japanese 
Americans who used to live there. In their place were African Americans, who are implicated in the 
above passage as the people who “distorted” Jackson Street. The characterization of Jackson Street 
as being reminiscent of a carnival demonstrates the uncanny, unsettling effect the drastic wartime 
shifts had on returning Japanese Americans. These changes forced former Japantown residents to 
reconceptualize their relationship to their surroundings and exposed them to new situations and 
challenges in the post-war era. 
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The beginning of No-No Boy describes a phenomenon that occurred across the West Coast 
after the United States declared victory in 1945. In fewer than five years, the war had left an 
indelible, lasting impact on the American homefront. Neither the changes outlined in the first 
chapter, nor the emergent interracial solidarity outlined in the second chapter, dissipated 
immediately once the United States entered a new phase of peacetime. Rather, Japanese internment 
and African American migration to California continued to have significant intersections and 
ramifications in the post-war era. In fact, some these connections became apparent only after the 
war’s end, as the two groups began to inhabit shared spaces in West Coast cities. 
This chapter focuses on the immediate post-war era to analyze the war’s lingering impact on 
Japanese Americans and African Americans in West Coast ethnic enclaves. During the war, many 
African Americans who migrated to the West Coast settled in the empty neighborhoods from which 
Japanese Americans were forcibly removed. When the period of Japanese internment ended, the 
state oversaw the resettling of 110,000 Japanese Americans. Rather than return to the West Coast, 
the federal government advocated for a policy of dispersal to encourage Japanese Americans to 
assimilate.2 Despite this policy, and perhaps not surprisingly, many Japanese Americans chose to go 
“home” instead. Those who did choose to return to Japantowns in West Coast cities encountered 
profoundly changed environments.  
Using a case study approach, this chapter traces the evolution that the neighborhoods of the 
Western Addition in San Francisco and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville in Los Angeles underwent as a 
result of the relocations compelled by circumstances of the war. In both of these cities, the pre-war 
Japantown (known as “Nihonmachi” in San Francisco and “Little Tokyo” in Los Angeles) 
transformed into a predominantly Black neighborhood during the war (known as “the Fillmore” in 
                                               
2 See Dillon S. Myer, “When You Leave the Relocation Center” (War Relocation Authority, n.d.), Shosuke Sasaki 
Collection, Densho Digital Repository, http://ddr.densho.org/ddr-densho-274-15/ for more information about the 
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San Francisco and “Bronzeville” in Los Angeles). The post-war situations in San Francisco and Los 
Angeles were distinct, and circumstances in each city were hardly identical. However, there were also 
evident patterns of state intervention and non-intervention in the Western Addition and Little 
Tokyo-Bronzeville. As a result, the Japanese American and African American communities in both 
cities faced similar trajectories in their composition, evolution, and eventual dissolution in the 
months and years following the war. 
After the war, African Americans and returning Japanese Americans struggled to navigate 
the changes in their neighborhoods. Questions of ownership over the space and belonging to the 
local community were paramount, as both groups tried to create and maintain a coherent yet 
multifaceted communal identity in the spaces they shared. The post-war years in the Western 
Addition and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville were marked by both interracial cooperation and clashes. 
Residents formed alliances and established interracial institutions, but also experienced friction, due 
in part to the competition for limited resources. The histories of the Western Addition and Little 
Tokyo-Bronzeville illuminate how the state mechanisms outlined in the first chapter operated and 
provide concrete examples to evaluate whether the lofty rhetoric of Afro-Asian solidarity analyzed in 
the second chapter was put into practice after the war. The evolution of the ethnic enclaves after 
World War II illustrates the precariousness of Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ 
relationship to their physical environments as they navigated and pushed back against their limited 
belonging on both the local and national level. 
 
Pre-War Japantowns 
Before World War II, many urban Japantowns up and down the West Coast were 
marginalized, somewhat insular ethnic enclaves, with Japanese-owned businesses, social institutions, 
and rented homes and apartments. In both San Francisco and Los Angeles, the city’s Japantown was 
located just on the outskirts of the downtown political and commercial center. The Western 
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Addition was immediately West of San Francisco’s City Hall and civic center, and Fillmore Street 
was its main commercial thoroughfare. Throughout San Francisco’s history, the neighborhood has 
been a highly contested “muddle in the middle” of the city, with people assigning it different names, 
different associations, and different significance.3 For 40 years after the 1906 earthquake, the 
Western Addition was considered the “Little United Nations” of San Francisco because of its 
multiracial composition and many immigrant residents. By the mid-twentieth century, it was one of 
the most racially diverse neighborhoods in the western half of the U.S., with large populations of 
Japanese Americans, Jewish Americans, Filipino Americans, African Americans, and Mexican 
Americans all settling there.4 In the pre-war era, there seemed to be a sense of racial harmony in the 
neighborhood, where “race didn’t seem to matter much” to residents.5 
Although extremely multiracial, the neighborhood held particularly strong significance for its 
Japanese American residents. Western Addition’s pre-war Nihonmachi neighborhood was bounded 
by Pine and O’Farrell Streets to the north and south and by Octavia and Buchanan Streets to the 
east and west. By 1940, there were more than 200 Japanese-owned businesses in the neighborhood, 
which catered to a wide variety of interests and clients.6 There were “hotels, bath houses, laundries, 
confectionaries, pool houses, general merchandise stores, dressmakers, tailors, tofu vendors, 
dentists, the YWCA, and the Hashimoto Hospital.”7 In addition to the commercial ventures, there 
were 40 churches and 17 schools.8 Nihonmachi was the heart of the local Japanese American 
                                               
3 The Fillmore, Neighborhoods: The Hidden Cities of San Francisco, documentary, (KQED, 2001). 
4 “Fillmore Timeline 1860-2001,” The Fillmore, KQED, 2001, 
http://www.pbs.org/kqed/fillmore/learning/time.html. 
5 The Fillmore. 
6 Gary Kamiya, “Western Addition: A Basic History,” FoundSF, 
http://www.foundsf.org/index.php?title=Western_Addition:_A_Basic_History. [Excerpted from Gary Kamiya, “The 
Haunted House,” in Cool Gray City of Love: 49 Views of San Francisco (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 294–311.] 
7 Lynne Horiuchi, “Mobility and Property: Japanese Americans and African Americans Coming and Going in San 
Francisco’s Japantown,” in Landscapes of Mobility: Culture, Politics, and Placemaking, ed. Arijit Sen and Jennifer Johung 
(London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 139. 
8 Gary Kamiya, “Western Addition.” 
102 
community, serving as a lifeline to connect people to their culture, language, and kin. Many people 
found a sense of rare belonging in Nihonmachi, which provided a haven from the racism and 
xenophobia of the predominantly white areas of San Francisco. 
Los Angeles’ Little Tokyo had a similar pre-war history to that of San Francisco’s 
Nihonmachi. Like the Western Addition, Little Tokyo was located adjacent to the city’s downtown 
area, just east of the Los Angeles city center. In the pre-war era, the neighborhood was bordered by 
Temple and Fourth Streets and stretched from the Los Angeles River to City Hall.9 The 
neighborhood began to take shape in 1885, when a man named Kame opened a restaurant on the 
west side of Los Angeles Street. By 1908, there were 300 Japanese-operated businesses and nearly 
100 boarding or lodging houses in the city, with the majority clustered around Little Tokyo.10 Many 
Japanese Americans in Los Angeles worked in the agriculture sector, operating a network of 
growers, distributors, and sellers. The money earned through agriculture was typically spent within 
the Japanese American community at Japanese-owned businesses in Little Tokyo. James M. Omura 
described the neighborhood in the 1920s and 1930s as “a jumble of poor establishments and a few 
nice-looking businesses like the Asia Company, and hotels on both sides, and bigger Nisei-operated 
pharmacies, like Iwaki Drug and Tenshodo across the street.”11 On the eve of World War II, Little 
Tokyo was the “biggest and busiest” Japantown in California, a bustling community of families and 
business proprietors.12 In both San Francisco and Los Angeles, Japanese Americans had eked out a 
somewhat comfortable, yet precarious, existence in their ethnic enclaves.  
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Although many pre-war residents felt deeply at home in their ethnic enclaves, these 
neighborhoods also faced many structural obstacles, such as overcrowding, poverty, and so-called 
“slum” conditions. Most significantly, Japanese American residents in Japantowns were in a 
vulnerable position prior to the war because many of them were ineligible to own property or hold 
long-term leases. California’s 1913 Alien Land Law prohibited all Issei from buying land. This legal 
framework consigned many Japanese Americans living in Japantowns throughout the state to rent 
from white landlords rather than own their own houses and apartments. Therefore, when the state 
forcibly removed Japanese Americans from the West Coast, many of them lacked the standing to 
retain their homes and businesses while they were incarcerated. Doris Morimoto, who was a resident 
of the Western Addition since 1927, recounted: “When we had to leave San Francisco, we had to 
sell everything. We had to sell the store, our truck. We sold everything we had for $400.”13 While 
incarcerated, the Morimoto family business became a warehouse and their apartment was occupied 
by other people.14  
 
Japantowns’ Wartime Transformations 
As author Gary Kamiya writes, “Sometimes the silences left by cataclysmic events are the 
loudest reminders.”15 Kamiya researched San Francisco’s city directories and compared the pre-
internment 1942 listing to the 1943 listings, focusing on the section from “Yamada” to “Yamazaki.” 
In the 1942 listings, he found 32 listings – “Yamada, Yamagata, Yamaguchi, Yamamoto, Yamasake, 
Yamazaki.” In 1943, there were no listings under these names.16 Similarly, Maya Angelou – who, as a 
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teenager, lived with her family in the Western Addition – noted that it seemed as though the 
Japanese American community completely disappeared after the internment order. “No member of 
my family and none of the family friends ever mentioned the absent Japanese,” she recalled. “It was 
as if they had never owned or lived in the houses we inhabited.”17 The internment order erased the 
existence of an entire community in the city, and the legal framework of alien land laws facilitated 
the quick and near-total replacement of the community in the aftermath of Japanese Americans’ 
forced removal, as new residents were able to move in and begin renting the commercial and 
residential buildings that Japanese Americans had been forced to vacate. 
The Western Addition and Little Tokyo were quickly repopulated and developed as 
predominantly African American neighborhoods. Architectural historian Lynne Horiuchi situates 
this phenomenon within a broader context: “Historically lacking capital and legal rights for the 
acquisition of new property, communities of color have often re-used older existing housing and 
adapted it to suit their particular needs.”18 As detailed in the first chapter, there was an extreme 
housing shortage on the West Coast during the war, as hundreds of thousands of interstate migrants 
poured into California, Oregon, and Washington looking for work in the defense industries. In a 
November 4, 1943, letter to California Governor Earl Warren, Little Tokyo Committee Chair 
Katherine Kaplan calculated that there were at least 175 African American migrants moving to Los 
Angeles every day.19 The issue of housing for these Black newcomers was compounded by the 
prevalence of racially restrictive housing covenants and discriminatory racial quotas in war housing 
projects, which introduced additional barriers to settlement and made African American migrants 
particularly desperate for housing. African Americans faced extreme obstacles to obtaining stable 
                                               
17 Maya Angelou quoted in ibid. 
18 Horiuchi, “Mobility and Property,” 138. 
19 Martha Nakagawa, “Housing Shortage,” Bronzeville-Little Tokyo, Los Angeles, http://bronzeville-
la.ltsc.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=31. 
105 
housing, and in these dire circumstances, “the empty apartment buildings and houses in 
[Japantowns] were a godsend.”20  
Japantowns were some of the only neighborhoods to which African Americans could move. 
The Western Addition was one of the few neighborhoods in San Francisco without racially 
restrictive housing covenants, which made it a prime location for African American migrants.21 
Additionally, since it was already a mixed-race neighborhood, many landlords were more willing to 
rent to African American migrants than landlords in other areas of the city. Likewise, Los Angeles’ 
Little Tokyo fell within the measly 5 percent of the city that did not have restrictions on Black 
residency.22 The lack of restrictions in the Western Addition and Little Tokyo facilitated the 
transition from predominantly Japanese American neighborhoods to predominantly Black ones. 
African Americans were no longer restricted by the confines of Jim Crow as they had been in the 
South, but they had entered into new dynamics of spatial segregation, restricted movement, and 
barriers to property ownership, predicated on the West Coast’s unique history of Asian exclusion. 
As Horiuchi explains, “African American migrants slipped into an unacknowledged pattern of racial 
discrimination directed at Asian immigrants who preceded them.”23 Horiuchi’s analysis is prescient 
because it recognizes the reality that African Americans’ migration – and the state’s responses to it – 
did not occur in a vacuum, but rather was profoundly structured and affected by the West Coast’s 
prevailing anti-Asian, nativist status quo.24 
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The high volume of African American newcomers settling in the Western Addition and 
Little Tokyo precipitated the development of African American businesses in these neighborhoods. 
In Los Angeles, Leonard Christmas – an African American business owner originally from 
Cambridge, Massachusetts – was the first African American to open a business in the neighborhood. 
Christmas opened the Digby Hotel at 506 ½ East First Street in early 1943. He was also the 
proprietor of the Digby Grill next door. In September 1943, the Crown Point Department Store, a 
cooperatively owned business run by 19 women, opened on the corner of First and Los Angeles 
Streets. It sold a wide variety of goods, including groceries, meats, medication, and clothing. The 
store’s leader, Clara W. Brown, had previously owned a retail store in New Orleans before heading 
out West.25 In October 1943, Christmas declared that the neighborhood of Little Tokyo no longer 
existed; it was now Bronzeville. In December, Christmas and three other residents founded the 
Bronzeville Chamber of Commerce. The group distributed placards to newly established businesses, 
which read, “This is Bronzeville. Watch us grow.”26 Within two months of its establishment, the 
Bronzeville Chamber of Commerce had 125 members. The residents’ assertive and proactive 
entrepreneurship in the neighborhood helped Bronzeville transition from a crowded settlement of 
migrants into a more unified Black community with established institutions. 
 Another vital element of the creation of the Fillmore and Bronzeville neighborhoods was the 
establishment of African American churches, which were some of the main communal organizations 
in the neighborhoods. In both San Francisco and Los Angeles, African American migrants bought 
and repurposed churches and Buddhist temples that had been vacated by the Japanese American 
community. In San Francisco, membership in Black churches in the Fillmore swelled from 
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approximately 100 to over 1,000 between 1942 and 1943.27 In Bronzeville, the Providence 
Missionary Baptist Association undertook the neighborhood’s most ambitious project. The 
Association worked to convert the Los Angeles Hompa Hongwanji Buddhist Temple into a 
multipurpose Christian institution that housed a theology school, the Providence Baptist Institute, 
and the First Street Baptist Church. Rev. Dr. L. B. Brown oversaw both the institute and the church, 
which opened for its first sermons on January 30, 1944. In addition to religious services and 
theology classes, the Association partnered with the Los Angeles City Board of Education to offer 
non-religious services, including adult classes on typing, shorthand, bookkeeping, art, and 
handicrafts. The first floor of the building also housed the First Street Clinic, a medical center run by 
Dr. George Hill Hodel. During the war, most of the temple space – as at many other temples and 
churches in Little Tokyo – was used to store incarcerated Japanese Americans’ suitcases and 
furniture while they were in concentration camps.28 Establishing churches helped African Americans 
put down roots to sustain the community and develop a sense of belonging in these neighborhoods.  
In both San Francisco and Los Angeles, the small ethnic enclave of African American 
wartime workers became known for its restaurants, nightclubs, and the vibrant music scene. 
Arguably the most significant and enduring legacy of the Fillmore and Bronzeville was their status as 
laboratories for jazz and bebop music to proliferate during the war years. Both neighborhoods 
became major hubs of music and culture, with many nightclubs and music venues popping up 
during and immediately after the war. In San Francisco, the Fillmore was home to the New Orleans 
Swing Club, Club Alabam, Jackson’s Nook, and the California Theater Club, among others. The 
music scene in the Fillmore during the war was compared to the Harlem Renaissance, and famous 
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musicians including Ella Fitzgerald, Louis Armstrong, Dexter Gordon, and Billie Holiday, played at 
the jazz venues in the neighborhood.29 
Similarly, Bronzeville had a bustling music and entertainment scene, due in part to the 
disposable income available to defense industry workers. Many African Americans were earning 
higher wages than they had ever received before, and they took advantage of this newfound 
economic mobility by patronizing nightclubs and music venues. Bronzeville residents frequented 
local nightclubs, known as “breakfast clubs,” since they were open through the night until breakfast 
time. These clubs were concentrated on San Pedro Street between First and Fifth Streets and 42nd 
and Central Streets. Shepp’s Playhouse, located on First and Los Angeles Streets, was the one of the 
most well-known of these clubs. Shepp’s famous patrons included Count Basie, Helen Humes, 
Heavyweight Champion Joe Louis, Judy Garland, Gene Kelly, and Pearl Bailey. Other popular 
breakfast clubs included the Creole Palace, Cielito Lindo, the Cobra Room, the Finale Club, and 
Club Rendezvous.30 The local Los Angeles government tried to crack down on the wildly popular 
breakfast clubs in the fall of 1944. The L.A. City Council prohibited businesses from operating 
between midnight and 6 a.m. unless they had a special permit. Breakfast club owners were often 
turned down when they applied for the special permits stipulated by the City Council.31 Such steps 
by the local government were attempts to shut down or at least slow the growth of the 
neighborhood’s businesses and activities. Many city officials associated breakfast clubs with vice, and 
they believed that the neighborhood was fostering unsavory behavior and hosting disreputable 
figures. The local government was anxious about the development of a lively Black community, 
especially one so close to the city center. 
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As African American migrants continued to move into the Fillmore and Bronzeville, 
government officials expressed consternation at the neighborhoods’ overcrowding and slum-like 
conditions. In San Francisco, the number of African American residents in the Western Addition 
jumped from 2,144 to 14,888 during the war. In comparison, the pre-war Japanese American 
community in the neighborhood was composed of approximately 5,000 people.32 In Los Angeles, 
the Bronzeville-Little Tokyo district swelled from an estimated 30,000 Japanese Americans before 
the war to an estimated 80,000 residents during the war, according to the Los Angeles County 
Health Department.33 The massive upswing in residents stretched the neighborhoods to their 
physical limits, as people crowded into houses, apartments, vacant storefronts, garages, and other 
temporary living spaces. In some cases, up to 40 people shared a single bathroom, and hot beds 
were common.34 In a June 6, 1944, letter to the manager of the San Francisco Housing Authority, 
Frank J. De Andreis, the California Division of Immigration and Housing assistant chief, decried the 
state of San Francisco’s former Nihonmachi: “The house is one of those former places evacuated by 
the Japanese. That the place should have been condemned, there is not a question of doubt. … With 
no water, of course, there are no bathing facilities and the resulting odors are conclusive of the fact 
that bathing is an unfrequent [sic] luxury.”35 In her letter to Governor Earl Warren, Katherine 
Kaplan commented on the dangers posed by the extreme overcrowding in Bronzeville, noting that 
“such conditions, including unsatisfactory sanitary conditions and general tenseness, constitute 
conditions that are ripe for epidemics, vice, and race riots.”36 These concerns targeted African 
Americans as a threat to the local social order. The emphasis on public health and safety implied that 
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the local authorities feared that Black residents’ supposedly disreputable character would spread 
sickness, violence, and disorder across the city. 
 The issue of overcrowding and the attendant public health and safety concerns were used as 
justifications for the local and state governments to intervene and exert control over the Black 
neighborhoods. Leonard Christmas attempted to shift the blame for the conditions on the previous 
Japanese American tenants, arguing that rather than causing the problem, African American 
residents were upstanding tenants attempting to clean up a mess they had inherited: “The 
proprietors found filth when they moved into the community, and have been trying ever since to 
clean the premises.” Christmas questioned “why such filth was allowed among the Japanese.”37 
However, in the absence of Japanese Americans (who, in the pre-war era, had also been subject to 
these sorts of charges), most white state officials blamed African American migrants for the squalid 
conditions. According to a 1943-1944 Biennial Report by the California State Division of 
Immigration and Housing, there was immediate need for policies to neutralize the alleged social and 
health concerns posed by predominantly African American neighborhoods: 
The matter of housing the thousands of Negroes who have recently migrated west to 
work in war jobs is rapidly crystallizing into a problem that calls for immediate 
attention. This colored exodus is unprecedented in the annals of our time, and while 
the Federal Government, through various housing projects, is trying to alleviate the 
need, that effort is only a miniature one in the light of the number of colored people 
that are flocking here…38 
 
The report is significant in that it called for the federal government to take responsibility for 
handling this issue, as well as for advocating for abatement as one of the primary strategies for 
dealing with neighborhoods like the Fillmore and Bronzeville. These suggestions demonstrated the 
state’s power to intervene and use the guise of city planning to control residents of color. As 
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scholars like Nayan Shah have asserted, the discourses of public health in American cities were often 
incredibly racialized, and the expressed concerns were often tied to racist, xenophobic fears about 
contagion, social unrest, and moral and physical decay.39 Local governments in San Francisco and 
Los Angeles framed their actions as attempts to modernize the cities, which relied on racially coded 
concepts of efficiency, cleanliness, safety, and organization. This shift in tactics worked to limit the 
settlement of Black residents and those who were perceived as “foreign” by classifying them as 
detrimental to the city’s health and wellbeing. 
Some concerned residents and government officials proposed easing racial quotas on 
wartime housing as a way to alleviate the overcrowding and blight found in African American 
migrants’ enclaves. Early in the war, a coalition of community organizations – led by the Negro 
Victory Committee, the NAACP, the National Negro Congress, the California Eagle, and the Los 
Angeles Sentinel – hosted a community-wide meeting at the First AME Church on December 13, 
1942. More than 1,500 people attended. According to journalist and researcher Martha Nakagawa, 
“At the meeting, attendees heard about an African American war worker, who had been evicted 
from a rat-infested home by the City Health Department but was refused housing at a vacant 
housing project because the racial quota for that housing project had been met.”40 Attendants 
criticized the unfairness of the racial quota system. The next year, the Los Angeles Housing 
Authority announced that racial quotas would be relaxed, but there were still reports of African 
Americans being denied housing in wartime projects. Towards the end of the war, Floyd Covington, 
the Los Angeles Urban League director, testified in an unsuccessful legal challenge to restrictive 
housing covenants that the only reliable source of housing that had become available to African 
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Americans in the city was Little Tokyo and the housing left behind by incarcerated Japanese 
Americans.41 
During the war, African Americans occupied a tenuous social position in these 
neighborhoods. In addition to physically replacing Japanese Americans, they took on some of the 
Japanese American communities’ social position and became a substitute for state concerns about 
contagion and invasion. Although they were not immigrants, African Americans from the South 
represented a dangerous foreign presence because local government officials and civilians saw them 
as infiltrating and contaminating the cities in which they tried to settle. Japanese Americans living in 
pre-war Japantowns had been subject to similar scrutiny of their ethnic enclaves, but the presence of 
a large number of African Americans drew attention to these neighborhoods in new and different 
ways. During the war, local governments in San Francisco and Los Angeles began laying the 
groundwork to target and control residents of predominantly Black neighborhoods, whose presence 
disrupted the cities’ unstable equilibrium. The end of the war and the return of Japanese Americans 
further destabilized the local racial order, created new circumstances that alarmed white officials, and 
led to further state intervention in these neighborhoods. 
 
An Uneasy Homecoming 
In the Summer 1942 issue of Common Ground, Carey McWilliams expressed doubt over the 
post-war fate of Japanese Americans. “I find it extremely difficult to imagine that the Japanese will 
eventually resettle again in large numbers on the West Coast,” he wrote. “In California, at least, the 
doors have been locked behind them. … Mass evacuation is drastic economic and social surgery; 
once a group has been forcefully removed, they cannot by mere executive fiat be restored.”42 When 
the government displaced Japanese Americans from the West Coast, it put no safeguards in place to 
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ensure that they would be able to return to their former homes. As such, the question of where 
incarcerated Japanese Americans would settle after they were released from concentration camps 
was a major issue that preoccupied detainees and state officials alike. In an Autumn 1942 Common 
Ground article, Robert L. Brown, the Public Relations Director of the Manzanar Relocation Center, 
reported that “[t]hrough all the standard pattern of life at Manzanar … runs the river of doubt – the 
fear of the future. … ‘But after the war – what happens?’ is the question in every adult mind.”43 
Many Japanese Americans anxiously awaited their eventual release, but they also worried about how 
they would fit back into the communities from which they had been removed. One elderly leader 
interviewed in Brown’s article argued in favor of dispersal and assimilation after the war: “We must 
scatter, spread ourselves thin over the country … We have lived too long in Little Tokyos all over 
the country. Our Caucasian neighbors do not know us. We trade among ourselves, have our own 
friends, and live apart from the country we are now frantically trying to cling to. No one knows 
us.”44  
Towards the end of the war, even some prominent Japanese American organizations and 
leaders advocated for dispersal, including the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). In late 
1944, Saburo Kido, the JACL president, elaborated on this position, stating, “Since [African 
Americans] occupy the former Japanese residential district, they will resent being displaced by 
returning evacuees.”45 From a practical perspective, figures like Kido and McWilliams did raise valid 
points: once Japanese Americans had been displaced, other people had quickly overtaken their 
former neighborhoods, businesses, and role in the economy. Japanese Americans could not simply 
move back into their former houses and apartments and go about their lives as they had before the 
war; the war had profoundly and irrevocably altered their ethnic enclaves. Furthermore, the forced 
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removal and period of internment had left many Japanese Americans in debt, or with significantly 
less savings than before the war, which complicated the prospect of resettlement. As Japanese 
Americans were released from internment camps, they were “more alienated than ever from the 
mainstream American polity,” having spent the past several years physically removed from the rest 
of the nation and held in isolated camps, which made social integration back into their pre-war 
communities more challenging.46 
On December 17, 1944, the Western Defense Command (WDC) issued Public Proclamation 
No. 21, which lifted the exclusion order and allowed Japanese Americans to return to the West 
Coast, effective January 2, 1945.47 With a single legal statement, the state reversed several years of 
federal policy and began dismantling the expansive government bureaucracy that had been put in 
place to oversee the removal and incarceration of the West’s Japanese American population. The 
ease with which the state withdrew the exclusion order underscores the precariousness of citizenship 
and how quickly the government could grant or revoke people’s rights. Moreover, it demonstrates 
the power with which the state is invested to define and redefine people’s citizenship in ways that 
contradict previous articulations of citizenship and belonging. The state’s ability to shift dramatically 
instilled a sense of vulnerability and fear among Japanese Americans that the government could take 
action against them at any time, which made it challenging for people to regain confidence and trust 
in the nation’s leaders and institutions.  
By April 1945, fewer than 1,300 Japanese Americans had returned to California. Instead, 
many chose to settle on the East Coast or in the Midwest, with small but robust communities 
forming in New York City and Chicago. However, for many Japanese Americans, the West Coast 
was their home, and they were determined to return to their pre-war neighborhoods. According to 
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Doris Morimoto, “I’ve lived on Fillmore Street all my life. This is the only place I know, the only 
place I feel comfortable living. … It’s my home.”48 By 1946, approximately half of the pre-war 
Japanese American community had returned to San Francisco’s Nihonmachi, and approximately 60 
percent of Los Angeles County’s Japanese American population had come back.49 
This homecoming was bittersweet for many Japanese Americans. Returning to their pre-war 
neighborhoods was an exciting prospect for people who had been incarcerated for the past several 
years far away in unfamiliar, impersonal, and inhospitable quarters behind barbed wire fences. For 
some, like Fumi Manabe Hayashi – who lived in Berkeley, California, before the war – returning 
home was a mostly positive experience: “The Berkeley fog was cold, and we tried to stay warm even 
within our house, yet we were overjoyed to be in our own home again, living in our beloved city 
among friends who were familiar to us.”50 During the war, the family’s home was rented to many 
wartime workers from Richmond’s Kaiser Shipyards, and they found the home in disrepair upon 
their return, but overall Hayashi and the rest of her family were delighted to be back.51 
Others returning to San Francisco’s Nihonmachi and Los Angeles’ Little Tokyo, however, 
found it disorienting and overwhelming. Many Japanese Americans hoped that upon their return to 
the West Coast they could quickly forget the trauma of internment and fit back into their 
communities. However, in their absence, the neighborhoods had visibly changed, making such a 
seamless reintegration impossible. Reflecting on his return to Little Tokyo after internment, Archie 
Miyatake expressed confusion at the unfamiliarity of his former neighborhood, stating, “One of the 
first places I went to see was the place where I was born. But all the houses were gone, and it was a 
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playground called the Bronzeville Playground.”52 The actor George Takei recounted a similar 
experience upon his family’s return to Little Tokyo: “I looked up at Mama to watch her reclaim 
another memory. But instead of the happy anticipation I had expected, she looked shocked. I heard 
her whisper to Daddy, ‘So many black people here now.’”53 It was confusing and disheartening for 
Japanese Americans seeking familiarity and stability in their pre-war communities to find that these 
spaces had been repurposed for another group during their absence. Returning Japanese Americans 
yearned for a sense of belonging after the indignity and alienation from their surroundings in the 
concentration camps. Back on the West Coast, however, Japanese Americans also encountered 
alienation in the spaces they considered their own. That sense of alienation came both from the 
physical changes and the disidentification with Black residents, who were considered a racial Other 
by many Japanese Americans. 
 As the reflections from Miyatake and Takei indicate, Japanese Americans’ transition into 
predominantly Black neighborhoods after the war was fraught with racial tensions and contestations 
over the neighborhoods’ post-war identities. Most of the interracial conflict in the post-war Western 
Addition and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville stemmed from two main sources: racial ignorance and 
competition over scarce resources in the neighborhoods. These sources of friction led to clashes 
between Japanese Americans and African Americans, as the two groups struggled to claim 
ownership over and assert their belonging to the space.  
There are no recorded incidents of overt racial hostility or violence between African 
Americans and Japanese Americans upon the post-war integration of Little Tokyo-Bronzeville. This 
was remarkable, considering that many Japanese Americans experienced isolation, animosity, and 
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even attacks from white Americans upon their return to the West Coast. Racial violence was the 
most visceral, aggressive way to dominate, intimidate, and subordinate people of color, both 
symbolically and physically. The lack of racial violence in Little Tokyo-Bronzeville can be explained 
in part by the cross-racial identification and empathy explored in the second chapter. During the 
war, African Americans reconsidered their relationship with Japanese Americans and began to more 
deeply empathize and identify with their plight as people who also experienced racism. This cross-
racial consideration made Black people disinclined to harass or commit violence against returning 
Japanese Americans. Even if African Americans did hold prejudiced views of Japanese Americans, 
the depth and breadth of wartime interactions and identification between the two communities 
could temper the hostility, because people were able to put themselves in the other groups’ shoes. 
While violence was not a problem, there are many accounts of racial ignorance and bigotry 
emerging as Japanese Americans returned to the West Coast. Like almost all Americans, many 
returning Japanese Americans held some form of anti-Black racist bias, which they expressed during 
their return. Moreover, this prejudice was exacerbated by the fact that most Japanese Americans had 
been completely secluded in a monoracial society during the war years, kept in concentration camps 
with little to no access to the outside world, and, in some cases, kept intentionally segregated from 
local African American communities. 
In an interview for an oral history project, Rev. Art Takemoto recounted his thoughts and 
feelings when he came back to Little Tokyo-Bronzeville in early 1945. Takemoto was apprehensive 
of the changed neighborhood, where he was to take over the Nishi Hongwanji temple. Takemoto 
recalled his experience of coming back to the temple and encountering an unfamiliar group of 
African Americans sitting on the steps:  
When your first impression is to see all the bars and all that, it’s relatively frightening. 
You’re the only Japanese American there, aside from the Chinese restaurants. And I 
lived in the temple, and it’s a big building, and I’m the only one there … I just froze 
… they were sort of inebriated. So they’re sitting there, but to have them there and – 
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oh what are they going to do next? You keep wondering and finally, after waiting, 
well I went to the door, opened it, and closed it. Nothing happened … You know, 
appearances are often deceiving.54 
 
Takemoto’s reflection on his fear of the African Americans outside the temple “demonstrates the 
degree to which many Japanese Americans had absorbed stereotypes of black criminality and 
violence from mainstream Anglo discourses.”55 The quote also suggests that Takemoto resented or 
was disconcerted by the prospect of sharing a space he felt that he owned. However, Takemoto also 
makes clear that, in hindsight, he recognizes that his concerns were based on misguided stereotypes, 
and he expressed that he began to question and change his mindset as he lived in the racially mixed 
neighborhood. 
John Okada dramatized these circumstances in No-No Boy through his protagonist Ichiro, 
who, like Takemoto, is overcome upon his return to his former neighborhood in Seattle with a 
profound sense of inner turmoil regarding its new Black residents:  
A shooting gallery stood where once had been a clothing store; fish and chips had 
replaced a jewelry shop; and a bunch of Negroes were horsing around raucously in 
front of a pool parlor. . . He walked past the pool parlor, picking his way gingerly 
among the Negroes, of whom there had been only a few at one time and of whom 
there seemed to be nothing but now.56  
 
Ichiro’s disorientation at seeing the changes to his once-familiar neighborhood is exacerbated by the 
unpleasant interaction he has with some of the neighborhood’s new residents. As he walked past his 
new Black neighbors, one says: “Go back to Tokyo, boy.” Ichiro’s reaction was intense, racial, and 
confused: “Friggin’ niggers, he uttered savagely to himself and, from the same place deep down 
inside where tolerance for the Negroes … abided … the hate which was unrelenting and terrifying 
seethed up.57  
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The racial epithets hurled by both the nameless African American character and Ichiro 
demonstrate that there was some degree of hostility at the prospect of sharing the space. The 
African American heckler tells Ichiro to leave the neighborhood – to go back to Japan, a place that 
is not Ichiro’s home – which denies Ichiro the right to exist and belong to the community in Seattle 
in which he was raised and considers his home. Ichiro viciously replies to this comment with an anti-
Black slur, making clear his own displeasure at sharing the space with African Americans. Notably, 
Okada’s text complicates the notion that Ichiro’s words and feelings are borne purely from an 
ingrained racial animus. By framing Ichiro’s response as coming from the same part of himself that 
tolerates and sympathizes with African Americans due to his own experiences as a victim of 
prejudice, the passage ties together Ichiro’s intimate understanding of how it feels to be belittled and 
othered with his conflicted feelings of sympathy, anger, and hatred towards the African American 
characters. The passage portrays the African American characters negatively, implying that they are 
responsible for the neighborhood’s decline in the detainees’ absence, but it is unclear whether this is 
due to a deeper racial bias within Ichiro, his emotional gut response to feeling alienated from a space 
that used to be intimately familiar to him and in which he now feels like an outsider, or a 
combination of the two. 
 Toru Saito, who was a boy when he and his family returned to San Francisco after the war, 
writes of a similar encounter and more fully elaborates on the complexities of navigating race and 
racism in post-war, racially mixed neighborhoods. Saito recounts the experience of walking down 
Third Street in San Francisco with his younger brother, Jiro. Saito notes that the two boys felt 
“trapped by the harsh stares of hakujin (white) strangers on the street” and ducked into a grocery 
store, where they were excited by the wide variety of options newly available to them, since they did 
not have access to items like Coca-Cola or 7Up while they were incarcerated. Suddenly, the 
shopkeeper berated the two boys and pointed to a sign that said, “NO JAPS ALLOWED.” Saito 
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and his brother began to walk away, crestfallen at the racism they had experienced. Saito explains 
that, on their way home, the brothers had another charged interaction, this time with a Black man 
on the street: 
[W]e see our first kokujin (black) man, our eyes wide with shock and wonder. … The 
sight of this young, dark-skinned man horrifies us. His chocolate-brown face and 
arms, his black woolen hair – they scare us to tears. . . Now, many years later, I 
realize he must have been offended by our reactions, at how we ran away as fast as 
we could.58 
 
Reflecting on the situation decades later, Saito was filled with anguish and guilt about his childhood 
response to encountering the Black man because he feels empathy and identifies with the man he 
saw on the street. Saito ran away from the man because he seemed unfamiliar and foreign, which 
was degrading experience to which Saito could personally relate. Directing his reflection to the man 
from that day, Saito writes, “Did I hurt you that day or have you forgotten? I know I haven’t. Can 
you forgive me? Before you do, I can’t feel real freedom in my heart.” Saito’s account is particularly 
powerful because it juxtaposes his experience as a victim of anti-Japanese racism with his 
perpetuation of anti-Black prejudice. Saito explains that his ignorance stemmed from being 
incarcerated for much of his childhood; the system of internment had blocked him from 
experiencing “the benefits of an open society with multiple cultures and differences.” Moreover, 
Saito and his brother were deeply hurt by the racism, alienation, and marginalization they faced while 
walking down the street, and then Saito found himself responsible for making someone else feel 
similarly. He writes, “I know a stare can make you feel unwanted and a stranger. I meant no harm.” 
Saito tries to find common ground with the Black man by acknowledging their mutual experience of 
being excluded and seen as outsiders.59 
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As these anecdotes demonstrate, there were racial prejudices and missteps between Japanese 
Americans and African Americans as they struggled to get used to interacting with and living 
alongside people of other races. These incidents were often a result of ignorance or fear rather than 
malice, but they nonetheless had a harmful impact on those affected. Incidents like those above 
created a sense of alienation from other community members or the neighborhood itself. Interracial 
tensions had the potential to damage residents’ sense of belonging to the community, which was 
part of the reason that it was crucial for Japanese Americans and African Americans to try to work 
through these issues and find common ground. Furthermore, Japanese Americans and African 
Americans had to figure out how to work together because they had nowhere else to go. In the 
immediate post-war era, an interconnected system of restrictive housing covenants, alien land laws, 
individual prejudice, and poverty kept Japanese Americans and African Americans locked out of 
homeownership and settlement in predominantly white neighborhoods. By custom and design, both 
communities were trapped in these ethnic enclaves and had few options except to figure out how to 
coexist. 
Forced into ethnic enclaves and excluded from many job opportunities, Japanese Americans 
and African Americans found themselves occupying a similar social position after the war, which put 
them in direct competition for limited resources in their ghettoized neighborhoods. Suddenly, the 
lofty visions of interracial solidarity and cooperation pledged by both communities during the war 
were put to the test by the real-world insecurities and constraints that both groups faced. Even 
before incarcerated Japanese Americans were released, there were limited housing options in both 
San Francisco and Los Angeles. When Japanese Americans returned, it was an additional group of 
people that needed housing. Moreover, as part of their desire to regain a sense of normalcy and re-
establish their pre-war social standing, many Japanese Americans sought to reclaim the houses, 
apartments, and storefronts that they had been forced to vacate several years before.  
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As Japanese Americans returned to the West Coast, some communities of color were 
anxious about how they would be affected. One survey reported that African Americans were both 
afraid of “losing hard-won improvements gained during the war and evacuation” and of “losing all 
rights eventually if they did not unite with other minorities to defend the evacuated minority.”60 The 
Pacific Citizen corroborated reports of anxiety about Japanese Americans’ return, writing that African 
Americans and Filipino Americans “resisted changes to their neighborhoods” because they worried 
that “the returnees will furnish further competition to them in their already difficult search for 
housing and the better class of jobs.”61 For African Americans living in Japantowns, their settlement 
and increased social mobility was a result of Japanese Americans’ incarceration, and for some 
African Americans, the prospect of Japanese Americans’ reintegration into the community 
threatened their sense of control, stability, and ownership over the space. 
In the November 1945 issue of the JACL Reporter, one of the League’s wartime publications, 
Saburo Kido urged Japanese Americans to be respectful and accommodating of Japantowns’ African 
American residents, though he acknowledged that “there is bound to be some resentment against 
the returning Japanese property owners by those who are displaced.” Kido raised the case of a 
Japanese American purchasing a hotel’s lease in Little Tokyo and attempting to evict all the African 
American tenants, although the buyer was ultimately encouraged to make changes “gradually instead 
of abruptly.” Actions like those of the hotel owner, Kido warned, would be disastrous to the 
community’s wellbeing. In the article, Kido stressed, “Even if there is a right to take action, it is 
important that tact be applied. The Negroes on the whole are sympathetic towards the Japanese. 
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They understand that the district they are occupying belonged to the evacuees.”62 Kido argued that it 
was unwise to sow discord with a group that had been a consistent and generous ally to Japanese 
Americans. Moreover, Kido predicted that Japanese Americans and African Americans likely would 
be sharing the neighborhoods because of African Americans’ wartime property investments and 
purchases. Therefore, it was prudent for the two groups to remain on good terms. 
Despite Kido’s calls for “tact” and consideration of the salient factors at hand, some 
Japanese Americans went ahead and displaced African American residents in their attempts to regain 
their position in the community. In some cases, this was done gradually, through a process known as 
“unobjectionable infiltration,” in which Japanese Americans would replace African Americans when 
the latter’s leases were up.63 However, there were also many cases in which Japanese Americans 
would take more aggressive measures to regain property. For example, in 1945, returning Japanese 
Americans began eviction proceedings for the Buddhist temple on First Street and Central Avenue, 
which had been used as a Baptist congregation serving African American war workers. The church’s 
pastor “believed he had already placed a down payment on the building,” but the eviction 
proceedings nonetheless continued.64 
 A significant factor that facilitated Japanese Americans’ ability to take over property 
inhabited and/or used by African Americans was the fact that neither African Americans nor 
Japanese Americans owned many of the properties in the districts in the first place. Instead, they 
were both subject to the whims and preferences of white landlords. In many cases in the post-war 
period, landlords chose to rent to Japanese Americans over African Americans. This was done in 
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part because, according to Rev. Unoura, the landlords “had experience with both the Japanese 
tenants, and the Negro tenants, and they preferred the Japanese because they kept the buildings up 
better, and boosted the land value.”65 Kango Kunitsugu echoed this sentiment by explaining that 
“property owners had this prejudicial point of view that the Japanese tenants always paid on time.”66 
This preferential treatment led to resentment from displaced African American residents, although 
many of them also recognized that the true cause of their misfortune was the white landlords, not 
the Japanese Americans who benefited.  
 As Japanese American communities became more well-established in their former 
neighborhoods, tensions continued to simmer between the returned internees and African American 
residents as the two groups jockeyed for control over the neighborhoods’ affairs. In 1947, as the 
crime rate in Little Tokyo-Bronzeville rose, the Japanese Businessmen’s Association hired two Nisei 
veterans to patrol the neighborhood at night. This decision provoked anger and consternation 
among the neighborhood’s Black residents, who saw the veterans’ hiring as a measure meant “to 
force the Negroes out of Little Tokyo.”67 In an attempt to de-escalate tensions, the Council for Civic 
Unity organized a meeting for community members to voice their opinions on this issue. At the 
forum, Kenji Ito, a Nisei attorney, tried to assuage African Americans’ fears by saying that the 
patrols were not meant to target African Americans. Ito was asked whether Japanese Americans did 
want to displace African Americans, and he succinctly shut down this idea, connecting it back to the 
injustice of internment: “Japanese don’t believe in evacuation.”68 This incident reflected the fraught 
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endeavor of trying to determine who was in control of the neighborhood, who had the authority to 
make decisions about the community’s wellbeing, and how to implement policies that were 
respectful and cognizant of all the community members’ different needs.  
 In addition to physical displacement and the strain caused by limited housing, the post-war 
economic situation also caused tension between the groups, as Japanese Americans’ ascendance in 
the local economy coincided with African Americans’ downward turn. As the national and state 
economies readjusted for peacetime, African Americans suffered the most severe consequences, 
losing their jobs at higher rates than their white counterparts and earning lower wages than during 
the war years. Black-owned businesses suffered as the financial base of the African American 
community withered. Complicating matters, African Americans patronized Japanese-owned 
businesses, but Japanese Americans rarely shopped at Black-owned businesses. According to Rev. 
Harold Merrybright Kingsley, “[W]hen a Japanese comes into town, they go to a Japanese store or 
restaurant. The Negro will go into either Japanese or Negro owned shops.”69 Although Japanese-
owned stores’ multiracial patronage enabled Japanese American business owners to quickly re-
establish themselves in the community, some African Americans felt like their contributions to 
Japanese Americans’ economic base were not recognized. An anonymous African American resident 
of Little Tokyo-Bronzeville sent a letter to the editor of the Los Angeles Tribune complaining about 
the way that African Americans were received by the Japanese American business owners, writing, 
“[I]n some Japanese business places, we are coldly received as if our trade wasn’t wanted, and in 
others they serve us with a grain of contempt.”70  
Historian Allison Varzally contextualizes these economic slights within a broader dynamic 
occurring in the neighborhood, noting, “Making matters even worse, more and more Japanese store 
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owners moved their residences out of the neighborhood. African Americans interpreted this choice, 
to live in one place and work in another, as disrespectful to, even destructive of, the immediate 
community.”71 Like the conflicts over housing, tensions between Japanese Americans and African 
Americans over business ownership and patronage were rooted in a desire to exert control and 
ownership over the space. The pressure of economic competition created the sense that Japanese 
Americans and African Americans were diametrically opposed in the local economy; under such a 
formulation, Japanese Americans’ economic gains came at the direct expense of African Americans. 
Of course, such a formulation fails to recognize that the competition was a result of white 
intervention to limit both groups’ full participation in the national economy. Japanese- and Black-
owned businesses were relegated to ethnic economies, borne from exclusion. This economic 
marginalization kept Japanese Americans and African Americans poorer than their white 
counterparts and fostered desperation as people were anxious to stay afloat and survive. The state 
interventions in racialized groups’ economic participation was, in part, a tactic to impose divide-and-
conquer rule upon citizens of color. Working together in the business sector would be beneficial for 
both groups, as it had the potential to sidestep the state’s tactics and create a system based not on 
hierarchy and subordination but rather on mutual support. 
  
Post-War Alliances 
As Japanese Americans and African Americans settled into the newly-shared neighborhood 
spaces, many community members drew on the legacies of the wartime connections between the 
two communities to make sure the Western Addition and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville would be 
bicultural, welcoming spaces in which Japanese Americans and African Americans could coexist and 
belong as equals. The war created new priorities and perspectives for members of racialized groups, 
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as they recognized the role of the state in orchestrating both anti-Japanese and anti-Black racial 
oppression. This recognition motivated groups to work together, hoping that unity could help them 
overcome their subordination. Allison Varzally describes these neighborhoods as sites of 
“compromise and cooperation” that were committed to interracial harmony and “facilitated joint 
civil rights activities.”72  
 Although the post-war era was undoubtedly marked by tensions, many community 
organizations – both Japanese American and African American – tried to preemptively release 
statements demonstrating their commitment to building interracial neighborhoods in order to ease 
the transition. For example, the Home Protective Association, headed by Charlotta Bass, the Los 
Angeles-based publisher and editor of the California Eagle, passed a resolution prior to Japanese 
Americans’ return recognizing the Japanese American community’s right to their pre-war 
properties.73 Additionally, an editorial published in the California Eagle on January 4, 1945, chastised 
mainstream media publications for their negative portrayal of Japanese Americans and discouraged 
readers from doing the same.74 In the November 1945 issue of the JACL Reporter, Saburo Kido 
wrote, “‘The Negro-Japanese relationship in Los Angeles and elsewhere must be guarded 
carefully.”75 Similarly, the Los Angeles Tribune published an article that encouraged all people of color 
to “be sympathetic toward one another” during the post-war adjustment period and keep in mind 
their shared “interest in justice and the triumph of conscience.”76 These actions drew upon the 
patterns of collaboration and sense of common cause developed between Japanese Americans and 
African Americans during the war. As outlined in the second chapter, the war served as a catalyst 
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that drew Japanese Americans and African Americans into greater contact with one another and 
sensitized both groups to the plight of the other. Many African Americans were sympathetic to the 
hardships Japanese Americans faced as a result of their displacement and incarceration, and they did 
not want to further harm the community as it tried to reintegrate into civilian life. Likewise, Japanese 
Americans became more aware of and sensitive to African Americans’ struggles for citizenship 
during the war, and they did not want to be responsible for creating more obstacles for the 
community. By publicizing their goodwill towards one another, Japanese Americans and African 
Americans drew on the wartime emergent interracial solidarity to avoid and overcome any 
simmering tensions. 
The strategy of publicly declaring a commitment to interracial cooperation was undertaken 
in part to counter frenzied portrayals in the white press that anticipated an impending race war when 
returning internees and the Black war workers encountered one another. Preceding incarcerated 
Japanese Americans’ release, many white newspapers and magazines published articles that appeared 
to intentionally agitate for or draw attention to the possibility of interracial clashes and outright 
violence in Japantowns that had been repopulated by African Americans during the war. In a 1946 
feature cheekily titled “The Race War That Flopped,” Ebony magazine countered the “glum 
predictions of both social scientists and Hearst headline writers” who “huffed and puffed for a race 
war” by fomenting hysteria about “Japs [re-invading] Little Tokyo.”77 Rather than resulting in a 
“Negro-Nisei battle,” Ebony reported that the transition to the post-war Little Tokyo-Bronzeville 
neighborhood was characterized by “a heartfelt kinship … between the two minorities, both victims 
of race hate.”78 As Allison Varzally notes, “In discovering and publicizing positive interactions, 
Blacks and Japanese dismissed or at least downplayed stories of confrontation that could themselves 
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sew discord. As significant, by blaming Whites for inventing or exaggerating interracial animosity, 
they offered new reasons for collaboration among minorities.”79 Identifying white media agitation 
and racist state policies as the main sources of tensions between the groups gave more justification 
for why Japanese Americans and African Americans should work together rather than in opposition 
to one another. 
The Ebony feature highlighted the successful interracial cooperation at the First Street Clinic, 
the American Veterans Committee, and Pilgrim House, in addition to chronicling the ways in which 
Little Tokyo-Bronzeville residents shared spaces at churches, night clubs, barber shops, grocery 
stores, and on the playground. This rosy picture of an integrated, harmonious bicultural community 
praised the residents for avoiding the pitfalls of racism and infighting and overcoming prejudices. 
The Ebony feature suggested that it was possible – and, in fact, preferable – for Japanese Americans 
and African Americans to work together in post-war multiracial enclaves, where they could 
synthesize their institutions, businesses, and cultures so that everyone could belong and stake a claim 
to the neighborhood. 
Additionally, many Japanese Americans and African Americans sharing the neighborhoods 
recognized that both groups were in this position because of their common struggle to obtain 
quality housing as a result of institutionalized racist barriers to their settlement outside of the inner-
city ethnic enclaves. The Ebony feature acknowledged that “the ghetto restrictions placed around 
Negroes and Japanese alike in economic, housing matters, made cooperation essential for even a 
degree of happiness.”80 Japanese Americans and African Americans recognized that the other 
racialized group was not the cause of their limited social or economic mobility and that infighting 
between the two groups would not advance their cause for fair and equal housing. There was no use 
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in sowing divisions and hostilities within the community. With limited options and few other 
neighborhoods open to their settlement, that would only make the living situation in shared spaces 
intolerable for both groups. In contrast, working together and building community would benefit 
both groups and would allow them to both belong to the neighborhoods.  
These post-war alliances took a different form and tone than the expressions of solidarity 
cultivated during the war years. The rhetoric during the war focused on the injustices of internment 
and emphasized the common goal of democracy, which lost some urgency and rhetorical power 
after the U.S. emerged victorious in 1945 and released detained Japanese Americans. Moreover, 
during the war, many of the most potent expressions of interracial solidarity were abstract and 
theoretical declarations of people’s high-minded values, often published in newspapers or 
magazines. However, in the post-war era, people had to translate those ideals into practice on the 
ground, as they navigated sharing physical spaces with their new neighbors. Nonetheless, the 
language of common cause extolled by Japanese American and African American leaders and writers 
during the war undoubtedly influenced people’s perspectives after the war. By working together, 
Japanese Americans and African Americans rejected the common divide-and-conquer strategies and 
policies of the state, which relied on infighting and competition between racialized groups as a 
mechanism of maintaining a racial hierarchy. 
The recognition of common cause resulted in individual community members making 
gestures to help members of the other racialized group feel welcome and at home in the 
neighborhood. In Little Tokyo-Bronzeville, both Japanese American and African American stores 
displayed signs in their windows that read, “We respect all,” as a token of their “commitment to 
peaceful coexistence.”81 Likewise, some African American residents invited returning detainees into 
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their homes to get to know one another. A man named John Allen hosted an informal brunch at his 
home where four Japanese Americans – Yoneko Gotori, Ruth Horikawa, Agnes Ito, and Tom 
Masamori – were the guests of honor.82 These outreach efforts help foster positive interpersonal 
relationships between Japanese Americans and African Americans.  
In addition to individuals’ expressions of solidarity and commitment to cooperation, several 
major community institutions shifted their programming to help ensure that both Japanese 
Americans and African Americans felt a sense of belonging in their shared neighborhoods. One 
particularly notable institution that promoted interracial solidarity was Pilgrim House, which was 
established in September 1943 as a social services center to assist the thousands of African American 
newcomers that had moved to Bronzeville. It was founded by the Little Tokyo Committee, which 
was a special committee within the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Los Angeles, the Social Service 
Department of Los Angeles County. Pilgrim House was located at 120 North San Pedro Street, 
which served as the Japanese Union Church building before the war. Pilgrim House also stored the 
belongings of Japanese Americans during the war.83 Pilgrim House provided the Black community 
with a wide variety of social services during the war, including “health, sanitation, education, housing 
and employment referrals.” Pilgrim House also coordinated many activities for adults and children, 
such as “a nursery school; Boy Scout and Cub Scout troops; a basketball team; ceramics classes; 
luncheons; counseling; playground space; a toy loan program; meeting space for various 
organizations; free immunization service through the city Health Department; play performances; 
and off-site camping activities.”84 In February 1944, Rev. Harold Merrybright Kingsley – a nationally 
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renowned African American minister from Chicago – was appointed the Executive Director of 
Pilgrim House.85 
As evidenced by its extensive, wide-ranging public programming, Pilgrim House was 
committed to the neighborhood’s holistic wellbeing, and when Japanese Americans began moving 
back to the Little Tokyo-Bronzeville district, Pilgrim House adapted its programming to meet the 
needs of the returning community members. In 1945, Pilgrim House formed the Common Ground 
Committee to foster positive interracial relations between Japanese American and African American 
residents. The Committee hosted several gatherings to facilitate interactions between community 
members of different races. Pilgrim House also employed Sam Ishikawa to undertake outreach 
efforts to the neighborhood’s returned Japanese American community. Ishikawa also served as an 
advisor on the Common Ground Committee. To further demonstrate its commitment to creating 
and maintaining a bicultural community, Pilgrim House also began sharing its space with the 
members of the Japanese Union Church, which held religious services and hosted Japanese language 
classes. Several members of the church – Rev. Sohei Kowta, Rev. Arnold Nakajima, Rev. Seido 
Ogawa, and Chikashi Tanaka – also served on the Pilgrim House board. These steps showed Pilgrim 
House’s genuine flexibility and evolution as an organization to better serve the community. 
One of the Common Ground Committee’s most popular community meetings was an event 
featuring W. E. B. Du Bois that was well-attended by the neighborhood’s African American, 
Japanese American, and Mexican American residents. Du Bois discussed the need for people to 
“[get] acquainted” with one another and the issue posed by different communities of color only 
being familiar with one another “through the hysteria of the majority.” He argued that the 
separation and alienation between different groups of color disempowered people of color and 
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solidified the power of white supremacy. The solution to this problem, as Du Bois conceived of it, 
was for different communities to “[know] each other.”86 This proposed solution mirrored the 
wartime experiences that drew Japanese Americans and African Americans together. As analyzed in 
the second chapter, cross-racial friendships and interpersonal relationships helped facilitate deeper 
interracial alliances and inspire a holistic racial consciousness among people of color. 
In 1947, the owners of 120 North San Pedro Street voted to shift the building’s ownership 
from Pilgrim House back to the Union Church. During a December 17, 1947, board meeting, a 
Pilgrim House special committee affirmed that “the building belongs to the Japanese Church and 
should be returned to them in accordance with the original understanding.” As such, Pilgrim House 
did not contest the building owners’ decision and instead began the process of relocating. Pilgrim 
House also reached out to the Black press to preemptively clarify that the organization was leaving 
willingly and was not being displaced by Japanese Americans. On September 1, 1948, Pilgrim House 
relocated to 150 North Los Angeles Street.87 This concession of power was a massive symbolic 
gesture that illustrated the organization’s empathy for Japanese Americans’ precarious position and a 
commitment to building a new community that reflected the changed demographics of the 
neighborhood. 
Similar to Pilgrim House, both the Booker T. Washington Community Center and the 
Buchanan YMCA in the Western Addition worked to cultivate interracial coalitions and common 
understanding between the neighborhood’s Japanese American and African American residents. 
Before the war, both of these sites were used primarily by Japanese Americans, but after the war, 
they transitioned into shared spaces. In 1945, the community center’s director invited Japanese 
Americans and African Americans to a discussion-based event entitled “Test of Democracy.” As 
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part of the organization’s programming, members of the NAACP, JACL, and African American 
publications came together to reflect on the “strains and gains” of coexisting in the Western 
Addition.88 Likewise, at the YMCA, many people initially were hesitant to share the space, but over 
time the organization developed programming, such as language classes and bridge games, that 
brought people together, and eventually the YMCA became known and accepted as a space for both 
Japanese Americans and African Americans. A major theme running through this type of 
programming was a call for communities of color to bridge the gaps between them and seek unity. 
Compromising and sharing were necessary to maintain a spirit of interracial cooperation in the 
neighborhood.89 
Although there was some economic competition, the commercial sector also proved to be a 
space where Japanese Americans and African Americans could work together. On January 19, 1945, 
African American business owners in Bronzeville hosted a gathering at the Rendezvous Club to 
welcome Japanese Americans back to the neighborhood. On March 30, 1945, Kiichi Uyeda became 
the first returned Japanese American to open a business in Little Tokyo-Bronzeville after the war. 
To celebrate the opening of Uyeda’s business, the Bronzeville 5-10-25 Cents Store, a group of 
African American business owners gifted him with flowers. Hillary Jenks argues that African 
American business owners’ hospitality represented both genuine gestures of goodwill and a sign that 
African Americans felt a sense of ownership over the space. She writes, “[The gestures] were also 
symbolic spatial practices that demonstrated African Americans’ claim to Bronzeville in their 
appropriation of the right to welcome Japanese Americans back to their old neighborhood.”90 
Nonetheless, such proactive and generous examples of cooperation contributed to positive 
relationships among business owners and patrons. Moreover, even if African Americans felt that 
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they were the rightful owners of the neighborhood’s commercial sphere, their gestures made clear 
that they were open to facilitating Japanese American businesses’ inclusion and sharing the space. 
 Another major sign of the neighborhoods’ integration and dedication to collaboration was 
the phenomenon of the multiracial workforces and patronage in both Japanese- and Black-owned 
businesses. In Little Tokyo-Bronzeville, some business owners hired members of the other racialized 
group to work at their businesses, such as Kiichi Uyeda, who hired African American clerks to work 
at his five-and-dime store, and Samuel Evans, who hired Japanese American waitresses to work at 
his restaurant, the Bamboo Room. The racially mixed staff of these businesses also reflected the 
multiracial base of customers that they served. In the pre-war era, most Japanese-owned businesses’ 
customers were European immigrants and other Japanese Americans. By contrast, after the war, 
Japanese American business owners reported that they had “lots of colored trade.”91 Another 
Japanese American business owner commented that “75% of my business now is with the colored 
people who are good spenders and they don’t quibble so much.”92 This changed situation was 
ultimately positive for Japanese American business owners, although it did lead to some struggles for 
African American business owners. 
 
The Unifying Power of Jazz 
 Jazz music was a significant and special mode of connection between Japanese Americans 
and African Americans in the Western Addition and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville after the war. In these 
neighborhoods, culture became a site of solidarity and friendship as people developed affinities by 
playing and listening to music together. Returned Japanese Americans who grew up in Little Tokyo-
Bronzeville after internment “have fond memories of discovering jazz and gospel music in black 
storefronts, recalling especially that they were treated as welcome participants in these locations 
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rather than interlopers.”93 Japanese American musicians were welcomed into the jazz scene in San 
Francisco and Los Angeles. Drummer Paul Togawa played with pianist Hampton Hawes and with 
Lionel Hampton’s band, and Tetsu Bessho interacted with Dexter Gordon, Teddy Edwards, and 
Billy Higgins in the Los Angeles jazz scene. Even when Japanese American jazz musicians were 
eligible to perform with white ensembles, many chose to work with African American musicians 
instead, such as George Yoshida, who joined the segregated Black union, San Francisco Musicians 
Union Local #669, and Harry Kitano, who played with all-Black ensembles.94  
According to Earl Watkins, a jazz drummer in the Fillmore, music was a key part of 
developing community and friendship across races:  
[Jazz] did a lot to help integrate the races, to bring them together socially. There was 
discrimination and separation of the races but with the music, it’s an international 
language. It had a way of bringing the white, black, and Asian communities together. 
I made many friends from all races while I was working in nightclubs. If our music 
hadn’t exploded the way it did, we probably wouldn’t have had the mixing of the 
races, or as much of the camaraderie as we did. The Fillmore jazz had a wonderful 
social impact.95 
 
Watkins fondly recalled the power of jazz in the post-war era, praising it for its unifying power. Jazz 
clubs provided a fun forum where people of different races could come together with a common 
interest and cultivate relationships based on mutual respect for the music. This was perhaps due in 
part to the fact that, as a musical genre, jazz emphasizes improvisation and collaboration as its 
central tenets. This attitude towards music translated into people’s interpersonal relationships as 
musicians and listeners, and jazz proved to be a sufficiently flexible and accepting medium to bring 
people together. Jazz music was recognized as a key part of African American culture in the Western 
Addition and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville, but musicians’ and clubs’ openness and inclusivity towards 
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players and listeners of different races created an environment where both African Americans and 
Japanese Americans felt like they belonged.  
In 1949, a Victorian building at 1690 Post Street in San Francisco – which was once Nippon 
Drugs, a Japanese-owned neighborhood pharmacy in operation since before 1920 – was reopened as 
Vout City, a nightclub run by Slim Gaillard, an eccentric jazz singer, composer, pianist, and 
composer. Gaillard’s club was short-lived, and after the business went under, the building’s owner, 
Charles Sullivan, sought out John “Jimbo” Edwards as a new tenant. Edwards was one of the first 
African American car salesman in the city, and he decided to convert 1690 Post into a cafe called 
Jimbo’s Waffle Shop. Shortly thereafter, musicians discovered an unused back room in Jimbo’s, 
which they began using for jam sessions. Edwards renamed the space Bop City in 1950, and it 
became one of the area’s preeminent jazz clubs.96 Incidentally, the club was located “right next to 
one of the oldest Japanese businesses in the city, Uoki Sakai’s fish market.”97 This juxtaposition 
exemplified the way in which jazz became deeply intertwined with Japanese Americans’ lives in the 
post-war era. 
Many Japanese American residents who grew up in the Western Addition after the war were 
profoundly shaped by the neighborhood’s jazz scene. According to Steve Nakajo, who lived in the 
Western Addition during the 1950s, Bop City was a touchstone in his conception of the 
neighborhood. Nakajo fondly recalled the multiracial landmarks of the neighborhood: 
My world starts from Octavia and Bush at Morning Star Schoolyard. … By the time 
you get down to Bush Street and Laguna, the commercial community starts to 
appear. You’re passing African American churches. You’re passing Victorian 
storefronts that were part of tofu or bean cake factories. … Then as you descended 
down Post Street from Laguna, you started to see barber shops, merchandise shops, 
Japanese artifacts, and all of a sudden, there’s Jimbo’s Bop City. If you were really 
hip in this community, you’d try to sneak out of your house at about 2am to be able 
                                               
96 Kamiya, “Western Addition.” 
97 Kamiya, “Western Addition.” 
138 
to hear all the jazz that was going on in the club. Just an entire community, a whole 
wonderful world.98 
 
Jazz became an integral part of some Japanese Americans’ lives. Like Nakajo, Daisy Uyeda Satoda’s 
sense of the world was shaped by the neighborhood’s jazz scene. Satoda’s mother opened the King 
Café in 1948, which became a hangout spot for jazz figures. In an essay about her post-war 
experience, Satoda recalls one particularly memorable encounter at the café: 
One afternoon, my sister Elsie, who was attending Lowell High School, dropped a 
coin in the jukebox of the King Café and played, for the hundredth time, her favorite 
song: “Gloomy Sunday” by Billie Holliday. Elsie sang and swayed to the music as a 
tall and attractive woman came up, stood behind her, and said, “Um, do you like that 
song?” Elsie, snapping her fingers and swinging her hips, said, “Oh, yes, this song is 
sooo good.” The lady added, “Did you know that’s me singing on that record?”99 
 
This anecdote underscores the depth and frequency of connections between Japanese Americans 
and African Americans in the shared spaces, as well as the power of jazz to build connections 
between people. Like Bop City, King Café became a community institution known for being a 
shared space for people of all races to frequent. Satoda characterized the café as a “a melting pot 
where people of different races and backgrounds could mix,” and where musicians, Japanese 
Americans, and “society’s misfits” all belonged. It was, Satoda writes, “like a second home to 
[Mama],” where Japanese Americans and African Americans “coexisted in this small area of San 
Francisco, not just as neighbors but as friends.”100  
Satoda’s mother welcomed people of diverse backgrounds into her café with open arms. 
According to Satoda, “She let everyone in through the doors of her café,” and “anyone at anytime 
could come to Mama and confide in her.”101 Her most loyal customer was Harry, a handsome 
African American beat cop with a “huge grin,” who would come to the café several times a day to 
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check up on everything.102 Satoda’s mother welcomed both law enforcers and law breakers into her 
café, such as Lois, another regular customer, who was an African American sex worker in the 
neighborhood. Lois would help out around the café by doing dishes and waiting tables. She refused 
any payment Satoda’s mother offered her. Lois lived with George, a Nisei bartender and musician, 
who was also a customer at the café, and she called herself Mrs. Lois Sasaki. Satoda’s mother’s 
inclusivity, open-mindedness, and dedication to hospitality modeled the best elements of interracial 
cooperation in these neighborhoods during the post-war era. She recognized her customers’ 
differences but did not judge them based on their backgrounds. Instead, she built and maintained a 
space where people felt comfortable happily coexisting together.103 
In the years immediately after the war, Japanese Americans and African Americans created 
bicultural communities in the Western Addition and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville. The state’s wartime 
and post-war policies forced the two racialized groups into close physical proximity and drove them 
to figure out how to get along with one another in the newly shared spaces. People struggled to find 
housing and employment and jockeyed for control over the neighborhoods’ sense of identity. These 
spaces were not immune from tensions, but in many cases, members of both communities drew 
upon the wartime legacies of cross-racial identification and empathy to try to work together. 
Japanese Americans and African Americans took steps to ensure that members of both racialized 
groups felt a sense of belonging to the bicultural neighborhoods. However, the interracial alliances 
in these neighborhoods raised the concerns of state officials, who began mobilizing new policies of 
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The End of an Era 
Several years after the war, things began to change in the Western Addition and Little 
Tokyo-Fillmore. In its 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer case, the Supreme Court ruled racially restrictive 
housing covenants unconstitutional. The decision facilitated some Japanese Americans’ migration 
from urban ethnic enclaves and assimilation into predominantly white neighborhoods from which 
they had previously been excluded. Likewise, with rise of suburbia in the post-war era, most of 
Western Addition’s white residents moved away.104 By the 1950s, the Western Addition and Little 
Tokyo-Bronzeville were becoming predominantly African American neighborhoods again. This 
demographic shift coincided with the state’s increased post-war emphasis on modernizing and 
rehabilitating the United States’ cities. After the war, the federal government began prioritizing 
“urban renewal” and allocating funds to redevelop “blighted” property and neighborhoods.105 
President Truman signed the 1949 Housing Act, which allocated money to redevelop cities across 
the country, largely in areas that were populated by poor residents and people of color.  
The new political agenda of promoting urban renewal appeared non-racial on its surface, but 
it was yet another expression of state power deployed to control, dictate, and limit the permanent 
settlement of people of color. City governments described redevelopment policies using rhetoric 
that emphasized structural improvements and modernization, but in reality, these policies had 
racialized negative impacts on the targeted neighborhoods. Urban renewal policies were intended to 
“fix” the problems of social unrest, vice, blight, and moral decay, which were all racially coded ideas 
that portrayed people of color as threats to the cities’ health and wellbeing. Urban renewal mobilized 
the state apparatus to target and displace marginalized residents and constrict the borders of 
belonging to exclude people of color on the local level.  
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In the twentieth century, people of color accounted for 75 percent of those displaced as a 
result of urban renewal projects.106 Local governments in San Francisco and Los Angeles targeted 
both the Fillmore and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville with urban renewal programs, and ultimately the 
racialized policies practically destroyed both communities through eminent domain and urban 
planning. Less than 20 years after Pearl Harbor set Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ 
internal migrations in motion, the government was again telling residents that they had to leave their 
neighborhoods. The dismantling of these neighborhoods through local governments’ interventions 
reveals the cyclical nature of the state’s actions to disrupt the settlement of racialized groups in order 
to limit their citizenship. Redevelopment was a new method for the state to retain the racial order. 
The Western Addition was the San Francisco city government’s top priority under its urban 
renewal plans. The Fillmore was targeted in part because of the size and vibrancy of its Black 
community. In 1948, the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency was formed. To evaluate which 
areas of the city should be targets for redevelopment, each neighborhood of San Francisco was 
scored with “penalty points” for things like dilapidation, number of traffic accidents, cases of 
tuberculosis, and, tellingly, its number of non-white residents.107 In 1956, the Fillmore neighborhood 
targeted for redevelopment with the Western Addition A-1 Redevelopment Project. Phase A-1 
entailed building a six-lane highway, known as the Geary Boulevard or Geary Expressway, that 
would replace Geary Street to take people from downtown San Francisco to the outer Richmond 
District.108 The highway cut right through the Fillmore neighborhood and separated the poorer, 
predominantly African American area from the much wealthier neighborhood of Pacific Heights, 
which was adjacent to it.109 The urban renewal projects in the Western Addition eventually 
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encompassed hundreds of city blocks. By the late 1950s and throughout the early and mid-1960s, 
approximately 20,000 residents – primarily Black, but also some Japanese American and white – 
were forced out of the Western Addition as a result of redevelopment projects.110 
Urban renewal policies also struck a major blow to Little Tokyo-Bronzeville. Both during 
and after the war, Bronzeville was painted by media and the white authorities with the broad brush 
of Black criminality, portraying the neighborhood as a seedy ghetto teeming with unsavory behavior, 
delinquency, and filth.111 Soon after the war, the district, directly adjacent to City Hall, was targeted 
as the site to build the Parker Center, the new Los Angeles Police Department headquarters. As in 
San Francisco, residents were displaced for the project’s realization. The city planned to “acquire by 
purchase or eminent domain all parcels on the block bounded by Main, Los Angeles, First, and 
Temple Streets” in order to complete the Parker Center project.112 Redevelopment led to the 
demolition of nearly 25 percent of the Little Tokyo-Bronzeville neighborhood. It is estimated that 
3,000 residents were evicted to make room for the construction project, and 90 percent of those 
displaced were Black.113 
Pilgrim House, which had relocated to 150 North Los Angeles Street in 1948, received 
notice in 1949, shortly after they had moved, that their new location was slated for demolition as 
part of the Parker Center project.114 The organization was told to vacate the building by December 
31, 1949, but it was granted an extension to stay until September 1, 1950, which was the two-year 
anniversary of the original date it had moved into the building. Shortly after the organization was 
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pushed out of 150 North Los Angeles Street, the Pilgrim House board voted to discontinue the 
organization’s operations on October 16, 1950.115 
Eminent domain was a potent tool that the city governments in San Francisco and Los 
Angeles wielded to control and dictate the terms of settlement for citizens of color, replacing 
previous strategies like racially restrictive housing covenants, Jim Crow, and alien land laws. Eminent 
domain is the right of the state to expropriate private property forcibly, with compensation, for 
public use. According to Chester Hartman, an urban planner in San Francisco, eminent domain was 
a crucial tool to accomplish redevelopment projects: “How do you amass large enough parcels to 
clear a slum if, in fact, there are hundreds, possibly thousands of owners of the property? … A 
major element of urban renewal is the right of a local redevelopment agency to use the government’s 
eminent domain powers to gain control of an entire neighborhood, or part of a city.”116 According 
to Willie L. Brown, Jr., the mayor of San Francisco from 1996 to 2004, the redevelopment projects 
in the Western Addition were motivated by a desire to reshape the city: “I think they saw land, and 
an opportunity to get land, and the only way to clear the land was to use the tools of government to 
achieve that goal.”117 
 The displacement caused by redevelopment projects in the Western Addition and Little 
Tokyo-Bronzeville was profoundly traumatic for the neighborhoods’ residents, especially since many 
of them still remembered undergoing migrations to, from, and back to the neighborhoods during 
World War II, either as a result of internment or from seeking wartime opportunities out West. For 
Japanese American residents, displacement as a result of redevelopment became known as the 
“second evacuation,” inextricably tying it to the pattern of the government uprooting Japanese 
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Americans and denying them full citizenship, as exemplified by internment.118As Hillary Jenks notes, 
many of the facets of the situation in the 1950s and 1960s seemed to follow a similar pattern to that 
of the wartime removal: “[B]arely reestablished in the enclave and still in the shadow of internment, 
trying to demonstrate their reliable loyalty to state authority, Japanese Americans voiced minimal 
protest.”119 The state’s control over people’s property and mobility again demonstrated significant 
elasticity of tactics and continuity of goals. 
 Displacement also had a devastating impact on the neighborhoods’ Black communities, who 
were the primary targets of the state’s post-war redevelopment efforts. While San Francisco and Los 
Angeles’ Japantowns remained intact following redevelopment – albeit significantly smaller and 
more commercial than in their pre-war days – the African American communities in the Fillmore 
and Bronzeville barely survived redevelopment. Reggie Pettus, a barber shop proprietor in the 
Fillmore, lamented the displacement of the neighborhood’s Black residents, saying, “A long time 
ago, it used to be years and years back, we used to call it the Fillmore. Now we call it the ‘No 
More.’”120 Urban renewal devastated the economic and residential base of the African American 
community. Just as displacement reminded Japanese Americans of their forced relocation during the 
war, removal made African Americans reflect on how hard they had worked to establish 
communities on the West Coast as they moved away from their homes in the South to try to find 
better lives. Carol O’Gilvie’s aunt and uncle came to the Fillmore from northeast Texas in 1943, and 
they moved around the neighborhood until they eventually purchased a beautiful Victorian house on 
Ellis Street. The family gave up the house during the neighborhood’s redevelopment, but “[a]fter 
they moved out, there was a long period of time before the property was actually demolished.” 
O’Gilvie recalled, “Every morning until the property was actually leveled, my uncle would drive and 
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park in front of the house and read the newspaper.”121 For African Americans who had worked 
tirelessly since the war to build communities and carve out spaces that supported their racial identity, 
being forced to leave was especially difficult. They had come to the West Coast because it was 
supposed to be the promised land for racial equality. Although it did not live up to this expectation, 
many African Americans – who had taken a major risk by leaving the South, where many of their 
families had lived for generations – had made up their minds that they would create new permanent 
settlements out West. Now, they were being forced to move again. Displacement extinguished the 
dream of a western utopia and bred despair among African Americans that they would never find a 
place in the country where they belonged or could settle comfortably. Redevelopment underscored 
the depth of African Americans’ unbelonging on both the local and national level and signaled that 
Blacks would be largely consigned to a transient or ghettoized existence in the U.S. 
 Redevelopment projects in San Francisco and Los Angeles ushered in the end of an era of 
community building between Japanese Americans and African Americans. Hillary Jenks notes, “In 
the end … Bronzeville ceased to exist less from disputes between African and Japanese Americans 
than as a result of racist spatial practices by a local state that continued to view property associated 
with either community as less valuable, and thus easier to manipulate than Anglo-occupied real 
estate.”122 While the bicultural communities in the Western Addition and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville 
certainly struggled at times to find balance and cooperate, ultimately it was the state’s intervention 
that led to the neighborhoods’ destruction, just as the state’s intervention had led to the creation of 
and influenced the material conditions in these neighborhoods in the first place. 
The parallel trajectories of the communities in the Western Addition and Little Tokyo-
Bronzeville – the spatial segregation, ghettoization, overcrowding, increased interactions between 
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Japanese Americans and African Americans, and the ultimate dismantling of these communities – 
can be attributed in part to the state’s actions and strategic inactions that shaped the racial 
composition of the neighborhoods. This is due to the flexible cycle of the state’s power to control 
and influence people of color’s citizenship and belonging: while the methods and tools used shifted 
widely over time, there were elements of continuity in the state’s goal of demarcating and limiting 
Japanese Americans’ and African Americans’ citizenship and role in their local communities and the 
nation at large.  
The destruction of the multiracial enclaves in the Western Addition and Little Tokyo-
Bronzeville was part of a broader cycle of upheaval, disruption, and relocation of racialized people in 
the United States. As part of the state’s decentered and flexible structure, changing strategy is a 
constant in order to maintain the unstable equilibrium. Before, during, and after the war, Japanese 
Americans’ and African Americans’ citizenship and belonging were in flux, but they also worked 
hard to make gains and put down roots in the communities in which they settled. Because of this 
countervailing force, the state had to negotiate and change tactics in different settings to try to enact 
their goals of limiting these groups’ citizenship. The state’s interventions in the post-war bicultural 
communities in San Francisco and Los Angeles exposes the precariousness of belonging and 
settlement for people of color. The state took steps to reorient Japanese Americans’ and African 
Americans’ relationship to place on the local level. For racialized groups, citizenship does not 
guarantee the right to assume ownership of a space or settle permanently or freely. The evolutions 
of the Western Addition and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville illustrate the cycle of state crackdown and 





World War II was a test of the tenets of American democracy and freedom. The experiences 
of Japanese Americans and African Americans during the war illuminate how deeply embedded 
racism undergirds the U.S. state’s determination of the national identity, belonging, and entitlements 
of its citizens. The nation’s contribution to and support for the fight against fascism and racial 
tyranny abroad threw into sharp relief the racial inequality and conditional citizenship some 
Americans endured on the homefront. In 1963, James Baldwin’s “The Fire Next Time,” a powerful 
and condemning meditation on race in the United States, appeared in the New Yorker. In the piece, 
Baldwin offered his assessment of the war’s lasting significance: “The treatment accorded the Negro 
during the Second World War marks, for me, a turning point in the Negro’s relation to America. To 
put it briefly, and somewhat too simply, a certain hope died, a certain respect for white Americans 
faded.”1 Although Baldwin was writing specifically about African Americans, the sentiment he 
expressed broadly applies to other racialized groups, including Japanese Americans. Many people of 
color interpreted the state’s actions during the war as a sign that it was committed to maintaining a 
racial hierarchy, even as the United States assumed its position as “Leader of the Free World.” The 
war was a test and, as Baldwin concluded, America failed.  
The circumstances of World War II led to, or required, a shift in how the state maintained a 
racial hierarchy that privileged white Americans. Before the war, “change in the racial order was 
epochal in scope,” since racial “minorities had very little access to the political system.” After the 
war, “racially based social movements” became more prevalent and influential; in response, the state 
underwent a major reformation process to re-stabilize the racist social order in the age of liberal 
democracy.2 This period and event in U.S. history marked the transition from a nation in which 
                                               
1 James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (New York: The Dial Press, 1963), 68. 
2 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s, (New York: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 83. 
148 
white power was explicitly codified and underwritten by large structures and institutions to a nation 
in which white supremacy was implemented and embedded in a more piecemeal and adaptable 
manner. The United States’ leadership role as an Allied Power cemented its global reputation as a 
defender of freedom coming out of the war. The world’s new superpower promoted national 
policies that, in theory, were democratic and racially neutral, but in practice maintained racial 
inequality. Having addressed the challenges of race during the war, the state’s ability to address 
challenges to white supremacy after the war was more sophisticated and insidious. 
The state used a wide variety of tactics to dictate and restrict Japanese Americans’ and 
African Americans’ property ownership, physical mobility, and economic participation as a means to 
constrict these communities’ citizenship. The state’s attempts to limit Japanese Americans’ and 
African Americans’ belonging to the nation served as a catalyst for these racialized groups to reflect 
on their relationships with one another and develop an incipient cross-racial solidarity. The 
magnitude of the state’s actions during the war revealed in no uncertain terms its role in and 
commitment to upholding and perpetuating a white supremacist racial hierarchy. This recognition 
spurred Japanese Americans and African Americans to connect with one another in ways that 
transcended racial boundaries. In the post-war era, the cross-racial relationships and identification 
people had cultivated were put into practice in the Western Addition and Little Tokyo-Bronzeville. 
The wartime and post-war transformations of these neighborhoods were a product of the state’s 
various interventions, which pushed people together and pulled them apart at different moments in 
time. After developing a holistic racial consciousness during the war, residents of these bicultural 
neighborhoods were more aware of how important it was to push back against the state’s tactics by 
remaining united. 
During and immediately after the war, Japanese Americans and African Americans found 
myriad ways to resist the state’s shifting policies and tactics of maintaining the racial order. Some 
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members of these communities attempted to define themselves as part of the American national 
community by manipulating and expanding the state’s rhetoric of global democracy to include 
citizens of color on the homefront. During the war, Japanese Americans and African Americans 
shared theories, knowledge, and strategies with one another to gain a better sense of how the state’s 
policies influenced different racialized groups’ lived experiences. This transfer of ideas helped 
cultivate cross-racial identification with and affinity for one another that lasted into the post-war era. 
Immediately after the war, Japanese Americans and African Americans sharing ethnic enclaves in 
San Francisco and Los Angeles created unique cultures and communities informed by the lessons 
learned during the war. Denied government support and social services, residents of bicultural 
neighborhoods created alternative communal institutions to serve their communities’ needs, 
emphasizing inclusivity and joint belonging.  
The experiences of Japanese Americans and African Americans reveal World War II to be a 
laboratory in which the state learned how to maintain the supremacy of whiteness in a putative 
democracy. In turn, the pushback from racialized groups required a refinement in the methods of 
perpetuating racial oppression. The greater significance lies in how the state learned and set 
precedents that had future value for continuing the same cycle of reifying white power, which 
impacted the futures of citizens of color. The shifts that occurred during the war institutionalized 
newer, more subtle policies and ideologies that have proven harder to overturn.  
The actions of Japanese Americans and African Americans during and after the war offer 
lessons going forward. United in their experiences of limited citizenship and varying states of 
national belonging, these two groups pushed back against the state by focusing on collaboration, 
cooperation, respect, and sharing, in contrast to the state’s emphasis on division and hierarchy. The 
responses to the state presented an expansive view of what national and local belonging could mean 
when delinked from exclusivity and racism. These little-known narratives reveal the state’s vast 
150 
power to adapt, redefine, and impose notions of citizenship and belonging upon racialized groups. 
At the same time, the history that Japanese Americans and African Americans share highlights their 
resilience and resourcefulness to combat racism and promote an alternative vision of belonging 
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